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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This dissertation defends the place of representation in music.  Music’s status as a 
representational art has been hotly debated since the War of the Romantics, which pitted the 
Weimar progressives (Liszt, Wagner, &co.) against the Leipzig conservatives (the 
Schumanns, Brahms, &co.) in an intellectual struggle for what each side took to be the very 
future of music as an art.  I side with the progressives, and argue that music can be and often 
is a representational medium.  Correspondence (or resemblance) theories of representation, 
such as the one I offer, have been much maligned in philosophy since the 1960s.  Most 
theories assimilate representation under “meaning,” which has usually been thought to belong 
primarily to language.  As a result, representational content has been taken to be purely 
conventional in the way that sentential meaning is.  People want to know what music 
“means,” and these theories interpret this as “what does it refer to?” or “what propositions 
does it express?”  I argue that propositional communication is only one (small) part of the 
issue.  Once we overcome the bias of conceiving of musical works as essentially linguistic 
items, speech acts (performed) or sentence tokens (written), we can begin to take music on its 
own terms to discover how it represents—one way in which it “means.” 
The first step is to “naturalize” music’s representational content.  Influenced by recent 
discussions in the philosophies of mind and science, I argue in Chapter 1 that composers 
represent extra-musical objects, events, and states of affairs through their works by exploiting 
antecedent relations (such as similarities in pitch, timbre, and structure) in order to secure 
reference to them.  In Chapter 2, I survey and respond to the main challenges that those 
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skeptical of music’s representational possibilities would raise against my theory of musical 
representation.  In Chapter 3, I explore a number of ways through which music has been 
claimed to represent in order to show how my theory accounts for these diverse phenomena 
better than its conventionalist rivals, both in terms of the metaphysics and the epistemology.  
Chapter 4 extends this discussion by offering an account of how we perceive, understand, 
appreciate, and interpret sophisticated musical representations.  I conclude by teasing out 
some of my theory’s implications and suggesting areas for further research. 
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CHAPTER 1 
  
EXPLICATING MUSICAL REPRESENTATION: 
 
DEFINITIONS, CLARIFICATIONS, AND PROBLEMS 
 
 
 
In the following chapters I present a theory of musical representation.  
Correspondence (or resemblance) theories of representation, such as the one I offer, have 
(with few exceptions) been much maligned in almost every area of philosophy—including 
aesthetics and epistemology, as well as the philosophies of language, mind, and science—
since at least the 1960s.  Most other theories assimilate representation under “meaning,” 
which has been thought to belong primarily to linguistic communication.  Since Donald 
Davidson’s “Truth and Meaning,” linguistic meaning, and as a consequence meaning in 
general, has been assumed to be truth (reference and satisfaction) conditions.  Linguistic 
meaning is obviously conventional, and as a result representational content has been taken to 
be purely conventional in the way that sentential meaning is.   
People want to know what music “means,” and conventionalist theories have 
interpreted this as “what does it refer to?” or “what propositions does it express?”  No doubt 
there is some of that.  Music can be a medium of propositional communication.  But I contend 
that this is only one very small part of the issue.  Once we overcome the implicit linguistic 
imperialism in semantics that has led many to think of musical works (and works of art in 
general) as essentially linguistic items, as either speech acts (performed) or sentence tokens 
(written), we can begin to take music on its own terms in order to construct a more 
satisfactory account of musical meaning.   
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The main mode of musical meaning is expression.  How patterns of organized sound 
express human emotions is one of the central and most vexing questions of musical aesthetics.  
It is also one that I do not plan to address.  There is no question (at least, anymore1) as to 
whether music can express emotion.  But the very possibility of musical representation, 
another important mode of artistic meaning, has of late caused a great deal of controversy 
within musical aesthetics.  (The historical landscape of the debate surrounding musical 
representation leading up to the most recent rounds of argumentation is surveyed in the next 
chapter.)  Thus, I feel clarifying and attempting to resolve many of the more pressing issues 
that pertain to musical representation constitutes a more worthwhile contribution to the field 
than offering another account of musical expression.  My theory of musical representation 
takes the first step toward clarification and resolution by treating the question of 
communicative meaning independently from that of representational content.  
On my theory, composers represent objects, events, and states of affairs through their 
musical works by exploiting antecedent resemblances or relations, such as similarities in 
pitch, timbre, loudness, and structure, in order to secure reference to them.  Reference is 
secured when the music communicates those objects, events, or states of affairs to its 
audience, which, in turn, informs and shapes how the audience perceives, appreciates, and 
understands the music.  To illustrate this, take an almost too obvious example: Ralph 
Vaughan Williams’ The Lark Ascending.  In hearing a particular passage as ascending, we 
recognize that the lark that is its intended subject is likewise ascending.   
Exploiting antecedent relations to achieve reference in this way almost never happens 
in linguistic communication.  Pure reference, which almost all linguistic communication is, is 
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purely conventional (non-natural), since the relationship between words and their objects is 
almost entirely arbitrary.  But structures, such as that of ascent (a change in position from 
lower to higher), and the other sorts of resemblances that I take to be central to musical 
representation, possess their potential for exploitation intrinsically—i.e., independently of 
anyone’s intention to exploit them.  For instance, the similarity between a lark’s ascent and 
any melodic ascent, understood more broadly as a change in position, exists regardless of 
whether the composer (or anyone else) intends the melody to represent a lark’s journey.  As a 
result, a musical work’s representational content cannot be purely conventional in the way 
that most linguistic content is.  Music simply does not “mean” in the same way that sentences 
“mean.”   
My goal is not to ignore the fact that conventions sometimes play an important role in 
certain musical representations.  I recognize the fact that music in the Western classical 
tradition (broadly conceived), which is my sole focus, may be as highly convention-bound as 
languages are.  The difference, though, is that there are no musical correlates to words, whose 
meanings remain somewhat fixed regardless of context.  Moreover, many of the 
representational techniques I explore in the following chapters have become conventional 
within the tradition, at least by David Lewis’ widely accepted definition of “convention,” as 
“a regularity in behavior produced by a system of expectations.”2  My goal, rather, is simply 
to decentralize the role of language-like conventions in how we generally conceive of musical 
representation.  
That we perceive and understand the musical line of The Lark Ascending as ascending, 
rather than as exhibiting some other structure, is certainly connected with our thinking of 
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some notes as high and others as low, which is relative to the conventions of music in the 
Western tradition.  Because of this, certain melodic lines ascend similarly to how larks 
ascend.  Any other binary relation could have been selected to describe relative pitch-
difference, but, as a matter of historical fact, was not.  Labeling pitched sounds as “high” and 
“low,” terms originally referring to the vertical position of physical objects, occurred as the 
result of a mixture of metaphor and linguistic convention—the metaphorical transference of 
predicates from one domain into another, which was governed by the conventions of the 
linguistic tradition in which it originated.   
That we label pitches in this way is what allows us to recognize the similarity of 
structure between the music and the world that Vaughan Williams has exploited to depict the 
journey of a lark.  In this case, and in every similar case, while the linguistic convention 
facilitates our recognition of the representation, it neither creates nor grounds the 
representation.  The features of the work relevant to its resemblance to its subject exist 
antecedently as a result of sharing features with other musical works.  Our current auditory 
perception of music is, to a large extent, pre-structured based on learned mental schemas 
derived from our prior musical experiences of a wide variety of works within the Western 
repertory, 3 which were once guided (perhaps consciously at first) by a conventional 
vocabulary of both literal and metaphorical predicates, but which (over time) have become 
internalized as tacit listening dispositions that cause us, among other things, to form 
expectations as to how a given musical line will progress from one moment to the next.  This 
is examined at length in Chapter 4.  
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So, while historically rooted in linguistic conventions, the fact is that perceiving and 
understanding a musical line as ascending, or as drooping, lethargic, spritely, bright, and so 
on, have over time become an essential part of the tacit listening dispositions of those 
entrenched within music in the classical tradition.  Were a listener not to experience Vaughan 
Williams’ piece as ascending, we would strongly question how attuned they were to the 
musical surface and thus whether they understood the music.  It is this fact that Vaughan 
Williams and other composers exploit in their composition practices when arranging works of 
both program and absolute music. 
This case exemplifies the main upshot of my theory, which is to show that we do not 
have to fall back on linguistic reference when attempting to makes sense of musical 
representation.  My theory shows that there are musical properties and structures with 
antecedent relations to extra-musical objects, events, and states of affairs that composers can 
exploit and, as a matter of historical fact, have exploited in order to represent things 
musically.  But those relations (such as “change in position”) exist whether or not they are 
intentionally exploited for the sake of representation, and I argue that they often have their 
influence on both composers and audience members whether they are aware of it or not—i.e., 
that we perceive and understand a good deal of a work’s representational content 
unreflectively. 
Offering an explication of musical representation largely in terms of the exploitation 
of resemblances is the most productive way to deal with the philosophical controversies 
surrounding the topic for the following reasons.  First, it captures the most important features 
of how we generally use the term “representation” across contexts.  Second, within the 
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musical context, it captures the diverse and complex phenomena captured by the term 
“musical representation” better than any of its competitors.  Third, it provides us with the 
clearest standards by which to demonstrate that certain musical works are representations, 
contrary to the arguments of several skeptics.4  Fourth, it conforms to and captures the 
complexities of the actual ways in which we perceive, understand, and appreciate musical 
representations.  Finally, it offers the most fruitful means by which to evaluate musical 
representations in terms of accuracy and success, which conform to our actual interpretive 
practices. 
1. Definitions and clarifications 
Following tradition, I call the class of purportedly representational works “program 
music,” since such works are normally accompanied by programmatic aids—“text, title, 
program, or other literal hint that they are not to be taken as pure musical structure”5—that 
give us information about what is represented.  The complementary class is “absolute music,” 
whose members are those works that both lack such textual aids and, more importantly, are 
not representations.  While absolute music comprises the majority of instrumental works 
within the Western classical tradition, program music constitutes a sizable minority, utilizing 
a wide range of musical techniques that, while not class-specific, are exhibited less often by 
absolute works.  So in addition to investigating program works in order to discern their 
representational capabilities, I also offer an explication of these techniques that will aid our 
understanding of their use by any musical work, program or absolute.   
On my theory, a program work, w, represents some subject, s, only if w resembles s.  
Some distinctions need to be made at the outset to avoid any confusion.  When investigating 
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questions surrounding musical representation, we need to recognize that the following three 
issues, though related, are separate: (1) whether w represents s (and how accurately), (2) 
whether w is used to represent s, and (3) whether w communicates s (and how successfully).   
The first is an ontological issue that pertains solely to whether w resembles s and, if 
so, to what degree.  Resemblance simpliciter, however, is much too broad to be theoretically 
or practically helpful as part of a definition of representation.  Nelson Goodman’s main 
argument against resemblance theories of representation is that anything can resemble 
anything else in almost an infinite number of ways.6  If everything innumerably resembles 
everything else, then the concept of representation becomes vacuous and can do little 
philosophical work.  Resemblances can function representationally, Goodman believes, but 
only if they are couched within a symbol system that is wholly bound by conventions.   
My theory turns Goodman’s on its head.  In Chapters 3 and 4, I argue that such 
conventions function representationally only if they are couched within an overarching system 
of resemblances.  Nevertheless, I take Goodman’s skepticism regarding the vacuity of 
resemblance seriously.  Composers cannot just exploit any sort of resemblance in order to 
represent their intended subjects.  The concept of resemblance, therefore, needs to be 
restricted in order for my theory to be acceptable.   
My theory does so by letting purely musical properties, structures, and relations 
delimit the set of resemblances that are of interest to a discussion of musical representation.  
These include similarities in pitch, timbre, loudness, expression, and tempo.  But the most 
important and prevalent sort of resemblance exploited in works of program music is similarity 
of structure; and of particular interest are melodic, harmonic, and rhythmic structures.  This 
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stems from the fact that musical works are themselves structures—arranged patterns of sound.  
As I demonstrate, it is the exploitation of structural similarities that allows music to break free 
from representing purely auditory phenomena (natural and manmade sounds), to which the 
first list of similarities just offered would largely restrict it, and confers to music the ability to 
represent non-auditory objects, events, and states of affairs.  For this reason, shared structure 
is the most philosophically interesting sort of resemblance, in addition to being (empirically) 
the most prevalent sort exploited by composers.  Consequently, the majority of the subsequent 
discussion focuses on structural similarity. 
The most restrictive type of structural similarity (apart from strict identity) is 
isomorphism.  Composers often exploit isomorphisms between musical and extra-musical 
structures to represent their intended subjects.  At its base, an isomorphism is an information 
preserving transformation.  In abstract algebra, an isomorphism is defined as a mapping from 
one structure, the home domain, to another, the target domain, which is both one-to-one 
(bijective) and onto (surjective).  This means that each element of the home domain 
corresponds to a unique element in the target domain (one-to-one) such that the target 
domain’s elements are fully exhausted in the mapping (onto).  As a result, no relevant 
information from the targeted structure(s) is lost in the mapping.  What the home domain 
preserves in the mapping are (a) the relationships between the target domain’s individual 
elements, (b) those between multiple elements or sets of elements, and (c) the properties of 
those finer- and coarser-grained relationships.   
The centrality of isomorphism to different types of representation has been explored 
and advocated by philosophers in several fields since the previous century.  It has been used 
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to explain such diverse phenomena as human perception, memory, and intelligence;7 how our 
language and our theories capture reality;8 how we directly translate the meanings of 
statements from other languages into our own;9 and how representational paintings are 
created, perceived, and understood.10  A theory constructed by synthesizing the preceding 
views might claim that the core of human experience consists largely of a patchwork of finer- 
and coarser-grained isomorphisms, which map multiple dimensions of reality.  It has even 
been suggested that isomorphism comprises the central organizing principles of Western 
music in the classical tradition.11  One could thus extend the synthesized theory to assert that 
we find such music pleasing because it abstractly mimics our mode of experience, dusting off 
Schopenhauer’s old idea12 and repackaging it in a new idiom.  This, however, is not my 
goal.13 
While isomorphism is needed to explain the sorts of representations explored by 
philosophers of mind and science (at least, according to the advocates of the theories 
mentioned above), it is much too restrictive to ground musical representation.  That is, not 
every aspect relevant to a program work’s status as a representation can be fully reduced to 
how it functions within an isomorphism.  In the philosophy of music, and aesthetics in 
general, the precision and exactitude provided by isomorphism is not needed for our 
theoretical or practical purposes.  Little, if anything, hangs on whether an artistic 
representation and its intended subject resemble each other isomorphically rather than in some 
other, less strict, way.  That they structurally resemble each other in certain relevant respects 
is all that is needed to understand how the work represents its subject.   
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This may not be the case in, e.g., the philosophy of mind, however.  Say you have a 
theory of mental representation that makes the following claim about visual perception: we 
are able to represent the visible world to ourselves only because an array of neurons in the 
visual cortex resembles the world as it actually is.  If that resemblance (that structure of the 
world mirrored in the brain) were not isomorphic, according to certain theorists,14 how we 
spatially navigate through the world would be incomprehensible.  Only isomorphism offers a 
strict enough mapping for an item in the world to have the exact same location within the 
structure of the mental representation, allowing us to plan our action with regard to it 
accordingly.  If there is a mismatch between a point in the world and its correlate in the brain, 
then actually reaching that point will become a practical nightmare.  We would have to rely 
more on luck than on a natural ability.  These theorists would contend that, as a consequence, 
evolution would have weeded out such ill-adapted creatures hundreds of millennia ago.  Our 
brains, therefore, must exploit isomorphisms for the sake of our survival as a species. 
Expecting this sort of (evolutionarily fine-tuned) precision from artistic 
representations, let alone musical ones, would be wholly unreasonable.  Moreover, it does not 
conform to our actual listening and interpretative practices.  Few listeners have or make use of 
the concept of an isomorphism as they attend to works of program music; the “structural 
similarity” relation or even simply the “sounds like” relation (for less sophisticated listeners) 
gets the job done.  Plus, how many interpretations of works of program music have you read 
that (either directly or indirectly) appeal to strict isomorphisms?  Instead, in dealing with 
musical representations, “similarity of structure,” as a loosening of isomorphism, is usually all 
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that is needed when we are referring to structural resemblances between the music and its 
subject.  
The second issue mentioned above that needed to be clearly distinguished pertains to 
whether w is used to represent s.  This is a question of intentions.  Since on my theory w could 
be used to represent anything it resembles in certain respects, issue (2) above needs to be 
qualified to inquire, “whether w is used by the composer to represent s.”  What is of specific 
aesthetic interest is whether w’s composer, rather than any random person having no direct 
causal relationship to w’s production, intended to represent s, and as a result arranged w such 
that it resembles s.  This qualification is warranted because, by definition, w is a work of 
program music if its composer associates it with a text, title, or other aids that direct our 
attention to what it is meant to represent.  These programmatic aids help to fill in s for the 
listener.   
Simply by associating the music with programmatic aids, the composer licenses us to 
analyze his or her work as a representation rather than as a piece of absolute music.  Without 
such a deliberate public action, acquiring this interpretive license involves significantly more 
work.  This will often require uncovering a hidden program through a formal examination of 
the music, bolstered by anecdotal or other evidence from either the composer or his or her 
close associates.  Such was the case with the discovery of the extra-musical references in 
Alban Berg’s Lyric Suite, which was musically encoded with his initials (A. B.) and those of 
his mistress (H. F.), as well as a withheld vocal setting of a German translation of 
Baudelaire’s “De Profundis Clamavi.”15  I return to examine the relevance and scope of 
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composers’ intentions on our interpretations and evaluations of their musical representations 
later in this chapter. 
The third issue, regarding whether w communicates s, is largely epistemological, as it 
deals with how we perceive, appreciate, and evaluate w.  It mainly pertains to how we 
recognize the resemblances between w and s, and how easily we do so, i.e., how well w 
conveys s to us.  The distinctions between (1) representational status, (2) composer intent, and 
(3) communication, to my knowledge, have not been drawn explicitly within the philosophy 
of music.  This, I contend, has led to a good deal of confusion regarding the nature of musical 
representation.  So by drawing these distinctions, I aim to clarify the investigation into 
musical representation, which I hope marks an advance in the philosophical discourse.  
Further clarifications are needed, however. 
The representational subject, s, consists of the object(s), event(s), or state(s) of affairs 
referred to or implied by the program that accompanies w.  In short, s is what the composer 
uses w to represent; and through w, he or she intends to convey s to us.  The specific aspects 
of s that the music targets and that are potentially recognizable in the music are w’s 
representational content.  In short, the content consists of just those structures, relations, and 
properties of s that are targeted by and thus mirrored in w.   
Representational content can be thought of in terms of what I referred to above as the 
“home domain,” which is defined by the aspects of w that have correlates in s.  Similarly, 
those aspects of s, which I refer to as “targets,” become the target domain.  The home and 
target domains are constructed from the musical properties and patterns we perceive in w and 
the perceptible properties and structures (i.e., targets) that are abstracted from s, respectively.  
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As a consequence, w will not represent every aspect of s.  How we determine which aspects of 
s are included as w unfolds before our ears in real time is thus of utmost philosophical 
concern.  This issue is taken up in Chapter 4.  
Since all representations are abstractions, w only targets certain properties, structures, 
and relations of s.  Accuracy pertains to both the number of targets and how much w distorts 
them—i.e., w’s degree of similarity to its targets.  Success, though connected to accuracy, is 
more strongly related to salience—i.e., how strongly we associate the aspects targeted by w 
with s.  As is made clear in Chapter 4, a few salient but highly distorted targets often convey a 
program work’s subject to us more effectively than many highly accurate targets.  Our 
evaluations of w’s status as a representation of s, its accuracy, and its success, while 
conceptually separate, often coincide in practice.   
The accompanying program provides the initial evidence for w’s representational 
status, as it indicates the composer’s intention to use w as a representation of s.  Whether or 
not w is in fact a representation of s is determined by an inspection of both its musical 
properties and its fine- and coarse-grained musical structures and relations, which can be done 
by either examining w’s score or attending to (authentic) performances of w—preferably both, 
with more attention paid to the latter.  If there is compelling evidence that w resembles s in the 
right sort of ways (resembling its targets principally along the structural dimensions of 
melody, harmony, or rhythm) and to a sufficient degree (such that the resemblance is 
perceptibly recognizable), keeping in mind that the barest skeleton is all that is needed, then 
its status as a representation is conferred.  These qualifications are examined and amplified in 
Chapter 3.   
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2. Problems for resemblance 
I have just sketched the central ontological and epistemological features of my theory, 
which I develop in Chapters 3 and 4, respectively.  With these definitions and clarifications in 
hand, it is worth pausing for a moment to explore some of my theory’s implications and to 
respond to some initial obstacles that the exploitation of resemblances must overcome to be 
considered as the ground for musical representation.  An objector could rightly claim that 
while the restricted notion of resemblance that I am making use of is a reflexive, symmetric, 
and transitive relation, artistic representation, as we normally conceive of it, is none of these. 
   
REFLEXIVITY 
Everything resembles itself.  It would follow from this that since every musical work (and 
passage therein) resembles itself, it represents itself.  Consequently, every musical work 
would trivially be a representation.  Reflexivity is not a worthwhile result for anyone who 
wishes to maintain that most musical works are not representations, i.e., that most are 
absolute, which nearly every reasonable thinker on the subject (myself included) does.  
Thus, resemblance does not seem to fit with our ordinary use of “musical representation.”    
 
SYMMETRY 
If w resembles s in respects a1…, an, then s will likewise resemble w in those respects.  This 
means that not only would w represent s, but that s would also represent w.  Not only would, 
e.g., Debussy’s La Mer represent the sea, but the sea would also represent La Mer.  This is 
another intuitively unappealing consequence for conceiving of musical representation in 
terms of resemblance, as it once again fails to fit with our ordinary use of the term.   
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TRANSITIVITY 
If A resembles B in respects a1…, an, and B resembles C in the same (or sufficiently similar) 
respects, then A will resemble C in those respects.  Extending the previous example, if s [B] 
is a stormy sea, w [A] will also represent anything that s resembles, e.g., the upset stomach 
of a particular food-poisoning victim, u [C], so long as s’s aspects (a1…, an) remain 
unchanged.  Consequently, w would target the same (or sufficiently similar) sorts of 
relations and properties in u as it does in s.  A section of Debussy’s La Mer would therefore 
represent gastrointestinal turmoil in addition to a tumultuous seascape.  But this is strongly 
counterintuitive.  It suggests that any work of program music could represent an 
innumerable array of wildly diverse things, almost none of which the composer could have 
intended or actually did intend.16   
 
I avoid these objections to resemblance’s role in musical representation in the following ways.  
I take them in reverse order. 
The transitivity objection is unsuccessful because it fails to recognize the distinction 
between status and use.  While La Mer could resemble several important properties, 
structures, and relations that arise within my upset stomach, and thereby acquire the status of 
an upset stomach representation, no one (to my knowledge) has ever used La Mer in this way.  
But more importantly, Debussy does not use La Mer in this way.  He uses it to represent the 
sea.  Contrary to Goodman and others,17 the artist’s intentions do matter, at least in a minimal 
sense.  That is, what Debussy uses La Mer to represent, and thus at least part of what he 
wishes it to communicate to us, is indicated by its title and the titles of its three parts, which 
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spur us to analyze the work as a representation.  Therefore, if a composer associates his or her 
work with a title or any other programmatic aids that either explicitly or implicitly refer it to 
things beyond itself, that work will be a candidate for representational analysis, which will 
determine (first and foremost) whether the work is a genuine representation.  This conclusion, 
which is not particularly bold, is warranted because fits with our actual interpretative 
practices.    
Rather than being a hindrance to my theory, resemblance’s transitivity is actually one 
of its strongest assets, for it allows me to account for two significant musical phenomena, both 
of which involve the transference of representational content from one organizational schema 
into another.  The four Sea Interludes from Benjamin Britten’s opera Peter Grimes instance 
the first phenomenon.  Each interlude directly represents the sea, but they also represent the 
titular character’s psychological states.  This is achieved through a metaphor (implied by the 
narrative) between Grimes, who is a fisherman, and the sea.  Metaphors are a type of 
linguistic analogy that preserve some of the properties, structures, and relations that a 
predicate refers to, even though it has been transferred into a schema to which it does not 
originally belong.18  As a result, the predicate uses its associations within its original schema 
to sort and reorganize the new one.19  The interludes, w, represent the sea, s, and the sea 
represents Grimes’ psyche, p; and thus, by transitivity, w represents p, as long as the aspects 
that comprise the s-schema (a1…, an) remain unchanged in the mappings from both w to s and 
s to p.  Without resemblance’s transitivity, it is difficult to see how the s-p metaphor could do 
the representational work for which Britten uses it.  This is another example in which 
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linguistic convention secures our recognition of an antecedent (structural) resemblance 
between a program work and its subject(s).   
The second important musical phenomenon that resemblance’s transitivity accounts 
for is the transference of representational content from one musical work to another by either 
direct quotation or paraphrase, both of which are types of purely musical reference that make 
use of structural resemblance.  “Storm,” one of Britten’s Sea Interludes, directly quotes from 
the second movement of Mahler’s Fifth Symphony, “Stürmisch bewegt, mit größter 
Vehemenz.”  It is arguable whether this passage is a representation in its original setting 
(rather than merely expressive of certain negative emotions) and, if so, of what.20  Mahler’s 
title for the movement, however, suggests an association between the music and the general 
class of things in the world that move stormily (clouds, people, relationships, etc.).  Britten 
exploits this connection by transferring the quoted passage into the new musical setting of 
“Storm” in which it acquires an explicit (and perhaps new) representational subject.  Mahler’s 
passage is used directly by Britten to qualify the sea, “it is turbulent,” which in turn qualifies 
Grimes’ psyche, “it is turbulent like a stormy sea.”  Each step, from quotation to metaphorical 
transference, is made possible by resemblance’s transitivity.  Being able to account for both 
this phenomenon and the previous one is a desirable feature of my theory.  It is also one that 
my competitors, including Peter Kivy, Nelson Goodman, and Kendall Walton, have difficulty 
accommodating.21 
Turning to the symmetry objection, whether or not s, the sea, represents w, Debussy’s 
La Mer, has little bearing on my project.  Let us assume that the English Channel, where La 
Mer was completed in 1905 (and thus may be its specific subject), on certain occasions bears 
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a strong structural resemblance to the work’s second movement, “Jeux de vagues.”  For the 
sake of argument, let us even say that the play of waves on the Channel is sometimes strongly 
isomorphic to the music’s lively rhythmic motion—the main dimension along which the work 
represents the sea.  The music represents the sea because its rhythms are isomorphic to the 
movement of the waves.  But why do the waves not represent the music?   
The reason why resemblance (by itself) is not sufficient for representation in this (or 
any) case is that the waves have not been used to represent the music—i.e., no one has 
exploited the antecedent resemblance between the waves and the music to create an aquatic 
representation of Debussy’s work.  By exhibiting certain rhythmic (and other) structures and 
possessing a certain set of properties that could be shared by works of music and other things, 
the waves possess their potential content intrinsically, but as a matter of historical fact no one 
has exploited it.  Were someone to point out the resemblance between these waves and the 
music, I would be perfectly comfortable acknowledging that she had thereby created an 
aquatic representation of “Jeux de vagues,” and that she is an artist whose medium is the sea.  
But the aquatic representation of music is not the musical representation of the sea, and 
Debussy’s intentions only fit the latter direction, i.e., music-to-sea representation.  While 
resemblance is necessarily symmetric, representation is not.  As a result, the symmetry 
objection misses the mark.  But it helps to clarify the definition of representation I have been 
working with throughout this chapter.   
The reflexivity objection further clarifies and restricts my definition of representation.  
While it is undeniable that musical works (and their parts) resemble themselves, their 
composers do not exploit or draw our attention to these resemblances in a way that would 
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license us to interpret the works (or their parts) as self-representations.  The subjects of works 
of program music are (real or fictional) extra-musical objects, events, and states of affairs, and 
not the works themselves.  This is what distinguishes them from works of absolute music, 
which are their own subjects—though not by resembling or representing themselves, but 
simply in virtue of their composers not associating them with extra-musical objects, events, 
and states of affairs.  Representation, as I am defining it, is an extrinsic relationship between a 
work of music and something in the world (its subject),22 which functions as such through the 
composer’s exploitation of the music’s intrinsically possessed potential content, i.e., certain 
musical properties, structures, and relations that are sufficiently similar to those of its subject.   
It is important to note that parts of individual works resemble, are isomorphic to, or 
are even identical to other parts of themselves and sometimes (in the cases of quotation, 
paraphrase, and allusion) to parts of other works.  Indeed, self-resemblance of the (former) 
sort just described is one of the central organizing principles of Western music in the classical 
tradition.  It is what prompts Kivy to refer to music as “the fine art of repetition.”23  
Repetition, moreover, as I elucidate in Chapters 3 and 4, is one of the means through which 
program works represent their subjects.  Further problems for my theory are dealt with in the 
next chapter, which examines and dispenses with several objections raised against it, and (for 
that matter) any theory of musical representation, by individuals who are skeptical of music’s 
representational abilities.   
 
3. Competing theories of musical representation 
Above I mentioned three theories of musical representation with which mine is in 
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chapters, as he is currently the central figure in the philosophy of music.  So I only deal 
briefly with certain problematic aspects of his account below.  Unlike Kivy, Goodman and 
Walton are not taken seriously within the debate concerning musical representation, and their 
theories are roundly dismissed as general theories of artistic representation.  Since I largely 
agree with the grounds for their dismissal, which I shall not rehearse here,24 I do not deal with 
them at any length in the following chapters.  Their theories are worth at least a few pages 
here, however, and not just for the sake of good philosophical housekeeping.  Rather, in 
addition to being highly suggestive, Goodman and Walton provide helpful contrasts to my 
theory, which helps to distinguish some of its central features by way of negative relief.  
  
3.1. Kivy’s Gricean account 
In the next chapter I use Kivy’s work as a source of both support for my theory and 
resistance to its skeptical challengers.  Kivy’s negative arguments against the skeptics are, 
unfortunately, much more convincing than his positive account of musical representation.  
This is not to say that his positive account is not illuminating—far from it!  The reason that it 
is inadequate, however, is that Kivy falls victim to the linguistic bias in semantics discussed 
above by modeling representation on linguistic communication.  This gives rise to two related 
and deeply problematic beliefs that Kivy maintains concerning musical representation: (first) 
he conflates a program work’s status as a representation with its communicative success, from 
which (second) he concludes that in most cases how we describe a work lies at the heart of its 
ability to represent its subject.  
Following J. O. Urmson, Kivy believes that artistic representation is an “intentional” 
concept.25  “I cannot represent unintentionally,” he says, “although I can unintentionally make 
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something that might (mistakenly) be taken for a representation, just as the winds and the 
tides can make a piece of driftwood appear to be a representation of a human figure, say, by 
virtue of its having a striking ‘human’ shape.”26  In order for w to represent s, according to 
Kivy, the composer must intentionally use w to communicate s to his audience.27  Taken by 
itself, this is unproblematic.  What separates artistic representations from those of other sorts, 
e.g., edge detection in the visual cortex,28 is that they have an explicit representational 
function.  In the case of musical representation, this is made readily apparent by the 
programmatic aids accompanying the works that associate them with their subjects.  But for 
Kivy representation is also a “success” concept.  “[A] certain modicum of success,” he claims, 
“is required beyond the intention to represent, to make the intended representation a 
representation in fact.”29  His account is strongly Gricean: in order for w to represent s, the 
composer’s intention to communicate s using w must be met by his or her audience, 
demonstrated by their ability to grasp what he or she meant by w.30  If the audience does not 
grasp the composer’s intention, w fails to represent s. 
 One way the audience demonstrates their grasp of the composer’s intention to 
represent s is through the vocabulary they use to describe w.  Kivy argues that most works of 
program music successfully communicate and thus represent their subjects because we 
describe some of their respective features using the same predicates.  In these cases, Kivy 
suggests that the operative linguistic conventions (e.g., calling both musical forms and 
psychological states “happy” or “sad”) create the correspondence between w and s, which, 
when recognized by the audience, secures w’s status as a representation of s because the 
composer’s intention has been successfully grasped.  Kivy takes this to be his account’s most 
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important discovery, since he contends that arranging pieces of music such that they can be 
described in the same way as their intended subjects is the main method that composers use to 
represent them musically.31  
 Since w’s composer almost certainly desires it to succeed as a representation (why 
else would he create it or bother associating it with a program?), which will only happen if he 
or she can make listeners aware of w’s particular connections to s, I agree with Kivy’s point 
that the composer often arranges w such that it shares a descriptive vocabulary with s, since 
this will likely facilitate the listeners’ awareness of w and s’s connections.  But success should 
not be confused with status.  The presence of a shared descriptive vocabulary (a fact about our 
linguistic practices) cannot underpin w’s status as a representation of s (a fact about the 
music).  It is not necessary by Kivy’s own lights because he contends that there are other 
unrelated ways through which program works represent their subjects, which I introduce in 
the next chapter and evaluate in Chapter 3.  And it cannot be sufficient because we describe 
works of absolute music using the same sorts of predicates that Kivy mentions—“ascending,” 
“descending,” “dark,” “bright,” “melancholy,” “tender,” etc.—and they do not thereby 
become representations; nor are we treating them as such by describing them with these 
predicates. 
Contrary to Kivy, I do not consider shared descriptions (when they apply) to be 
representationally constitutive.  Instead, their role is epistemic.  Shared descriptions serve as 
reliable indicators of the corollary properties, structures, or relations that comprise w’s 
representational content.  Kivy fails to acknowledge that the reason w and s share a 
vocabulary is because they perceptibly resemble each other—i.e., because we have perceived 
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(often unreflectively) the cross-modal similarities that the composer exploits to represent s 
with w.  Consequently, the fact that we use the same or sufficiently similar predicates to 
describe aspects of both w and s should serve to direct our attention toward the ways in which 
w and s are similar.  In such cases, representation, which (on my view) is established by w’s 
exploitation of its underlying resemblances to s, secures w’s reference to s, not (as it is on 
Kivy’s view) the converse.   
My theory divorces musical representation from the linguistic baggage Kivy saddles it 
with by arguing that w’s status as a representation is separate from its communicating relevant 
information about s to us.  But Kivy’s account clarifies an important aspect of my theory.  
While actual success does not affect a work’s representational status, since the audience could 
fail (en masse) to recognize in w many salient and accurately rendered aspects of s, a piece of 
music is a representation only if it can potentially succeed.  This qualification helps delimit 
the sorts of resemblances that program works can exploit to represent their subjects.  Namely, 
those resemblances must be at least potentially recognizable as such by the audience.  If the 
composer is exploiting resemblances that do not fit with our learned mental schemas based on 
previous musical experiences (i.e., the norms and conventions of Western art music we have 
internalized as tacit listening dispositions), or is targeting s along nonmusical dimensions of 
w, then w is not a musical representation of s.32  
Kivy seems to have something similar in mind in his (previously mentioned) reference 
to the piece of driftwood, his example of a seemingly successful representation that is not a 
representation in fact because it lacks an intentional act.  The reason the viewer mistakenly 
believes the driftwood to be a representation of a human is presumably because of how 
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quickly and effortlessly she recognizes their “striking” structural resemblance.  If someone 
were to exploit this resemblance, perhaps by doing little more than titling the driftwood 
“human,” the driftwood’s potential representational content, which it possesses intrinsically, 
would be activated, and it would thereby represent a human.  Perhaps simply by mentally 
tokening, “human,” upon recognizing the structural similarity, the driftwood represents a 
human to the viewer—a possibility Kivy overlooks.   
An artwork’s title, similar to the presence of a shared descriptive vocabulary, does not 
create the resemblances and thereby secure its status as a representation, but rather calls 
attention to resemblances that the artwork already bears to its subject.33  This is the main role 
that titles and other programmatic aids play in our experience of works of program music, 
though there are interesting complications explored in Chapter 4.  The use and function of 
programmatic aids is by no means uncontroversial, as it leads to a certain set of skeptical 
objections to the possibility of musical representation that the next chapter examines.  
If suitably educated and receptive listeners (despite our best efforts) cannot perceive 
the resemblances between w’s properties, structures, and relations, and their targets in s 
referred to or implied by the program, then w does not succeed as a musical representation of 
s.  Since w’s representational content will not be available to perception, we cannot 
understand and evaluate w as a musical representation.  If the resemblances between w and s 
are sufficiently tenuous, the selected correspondences sufficiently unfamiliar, or the 
dimensions along which w targets its corollaries in s sufficiently oblique, i.e., if the perceived 
mismatch between w and s is sufficiently strong, then w may not just be a poor representation 
of s, but a misrepresentation of s, which (despite even a large-scale skeletal correspondence 
 25 
between w and s) may be treated in practice as a non-representation.  Similar to accuracy, 
success varies in degrees, and the distinction between a poor representation and a 
misrepresentation is not at all sharp, since it is largely contingent upon our interpretative and 
evaluative practices.   
Another possibility for why we take w to fail as a representation of s in these cases is 
that we are witnessing a poor version of the composer’s work: a poor performance, and thus 
the blame gets shifted onto the conductor and performers; or a poor arrangement of the work, 
one that modifies (by addition, omission, or alteration) its representational content, and thus 
the blame gets shifted onto the composer(s) who arranged it.   
The final possibility in cases where we fail to perceiving w and s’s similarities, which 
I hinted at earlier and discuss at length in Chatper 4, is not that the composer’s attempt to 
represent s is simply poor or an unmitigated failure, but that we (his audience) are failing to 
attend to certain relevant aspects of w or are attending to them incorrectly, or have 
misunderstood the program such that our initial beliefs about s are misguided and are thus 
improperly guiding our experience of w as it unfolds in real time.  As participants in and co-
creators of an aesthetic experience enabled by the composer, some of the burden for w’s 
success falls to the sophistication of our interpretive and evaluative abilities.  Kivy recognizes 
this,34 but ends up placing too much weight on us (the audience) by making success 
constitutive of status.  He also misunderstands our actual interpretive practices.   
As I mentioned above, it is central for Kivy’s account that the audience grasps the 
composer’s intention to represent s with w.  Our grasp of his or her intention can be 
immediate, as Kivy believes happens when we hear the striking melodic and timbral 
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similarities between the cuckoo call in Beethoven’s Pastoral Symphony and an actual cuckoo 
call,35 or it can be mediated by a deliberate interpretative effort involving an appeal to 
extrinsic evidence, which the majority of cases require (to varying degrees).  It would seem 
that the most obvious evidence we have for the composer’s intention to represent is the 
presence of programmatic aids he or she has associated with the music.  But Kivy disagrees. 36  
“In almost all cases,” he contends, “the only evidence we have for the composer’s intention to 
represent is that a representational interpretation of the music works.  So we cannot be saved 
from the hard work of interpretation by the evidence of lack of intention.”37  By Kivy’s lights, 
to ask whether the composer intended to represent s with w, from the standpoint of our 
interpretative practices, is (despite its constitutive import) one thought too many.  Evidence 
for a composer’s intention to represent, therefore, is not sufficient to spur us to provide a 
representational interpretation of his or her music.   
What actually spurs us to interpret a musical work as a representation, Kivy claims, is 
when, already involved in the hard work of formally interpreting a piece of music, we become 
perplexed by an eccentric passage that a purely musical interpretation cannot accommodate.  
[W]e are driven to seek a representational or pictorial answer to a problem [of 
formal understanding] in those instances where […] a purely musical one will 
not suffice, or is not available at all, and where we have some at least prima 
facie reason for believing representational or pictorial features might be 
present.38  
 
Programmatic aids are (consequently) relevant to the hard work of interpretation only after we 
are confronted with a purely musical puzzle.39  Where no such puzzles arise, not only can 
programmatic aids do no interpretative work, but we also are not licensed to perceive, 
understand, or evaluate the music as representational.  For Kivy, perceiving and 
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understanding a work of program music as a representation is secondary to perceiving and 
understanding it as a purely formal object.  This instances the strong formalist position he has 
advanced throughout his career,40 since representational content and musical form are wholly 
divorced on his account—or, at least, representational content only results (or perhaps 
emerges) from musical deformations, passages we have difficulties perceiving and 
understanding as music without appeal to their extra-musical aspirations.41  
But Kivy’s formalism pushes him even further, as he subsequently proceeds to deny 
that our understanding of a program work’s representational content can positively influence 
our understanding of its purely formal aspects.  “If I have a genuine difficulty with a work of 
music,” he states, “an interpretation will resolve it for me by calling my attention to features 
of the work I may have missed, or by redescribing features with which I may already be 
familiar in such a way as to bring to them a significance and (therefore) an intelligibility they 
did not have for me before.”  This is correct.  It is precisely how I believe deliberate 
interpretive effort can sometimes resolve perceived mismatches between w and s.  But Kivy 
follows this by stating, “If I do not have a question, there can be no answer, and in such a case 
an interpretation becomes a gratuitous appendage that can really describe nothing about the 
work.”42  Accordingly, a representational interpretation is merited only when a formal 
interpretation fails to account for a perplexing musical phenomenon.  Representational 
interpretations, therefore, only make up for deficiencies in our formal understanding of the 
music; Kivy bars them from extending or deepening that understanding—a claim I challenge 
in Chapter 4.   
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The upshot of Kivy’s account is that if a work of program music succeeds purely 
musically, i.e., if we can perceive and understand its formal properties, structures, and 
relations without appealing to the accompanying programmatic aids or other extrinsic 
evidence, then it necessarily fails as a representation.  But this is extremely counterintuitive.  
Very few works of program music pose many (if any) puzzles to our purely musical 
understanding.  Kivy’s theory consequently fails to tell us much about musical representation 
because on it few program works need to or should be explained in representational terms on 
pain of superfluity, and thus their representational content, i.e., their relationships to their 
subjects, adds nothing to our perception and understanding of them as works of music.  
 Kivy is forced into this position by his desire to make composers’ intentions necessary 
for musical representation while at the same time trying to avoid the intentional fallacy.43  To 
be a representation w’s composer must intend it to be so, Kivy claims, but those intentions can 
neither motivate nor figure into our formal interpretive efforts; rather, they are wholly 
discovered in the music as a result of those efforts.  This is wholly untenable.  Since most 
program works do not require representational interpretations in Kivy’s sense, their status as 
representations is denied because we are unable to discover from the musical alone whether 
their composers intended them to be representations, and thus they do not meet Kivy’s 
standard of success.  By modeling musical representation on a Gricean theory of linguistic 
communication, Kivy is unable to account for many of the most important phenomena and 
works of music that any adequate theory of musical representation must be able to 
accommodate. 
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Despite these problems with his (version of the) Gricean model, Kivy is correct that a 
theory of musical representation must account for the composer’s intention to represent s with 
w in some way.  As discussed earlier, my theory does so by maintaining that if a composer 
accompanies his or her work with programmatic aids, it is automatically a candidate for 
representational analysis.  That is, the presence of programmatic aids provided by the 
composer, rather than the emergence of formal interpretive puzzles, is sufficient to prompt us 
to interpret and evaluate his or her work as a representation of the subject referred to or 
implied by those aids.  W’s status a representation of s is subsequently secured by the 
perceptible resemblances between w and s that the audience, suitably primed by the program, 
discovers in their experience of the music.  This is contrary to the skeptics, who claim that the 
audience uncritically selects those resemblances through a process of free-association.  On my 
view, perceiving and understanding musical representations centrally involves active (and 
largely unreflective) associations, but they are by no means “free.”  Instead, as I discuss in 
Chapter 4, the complex interactions between the programmatic aids and the music restrict the 
(associative) interpretive space.    
Program works target some features of their subjects44 but not others and, of the 
features they do target, many are altered.  Our interest in program music resides as much in 
the similarities between w and s as in how w diverges from s, and clarifying this is part of our 
interpretative and evaluative tasks.  The similarities and differences between w and s factor 
into (a) how accurately w represents s, i.e., how faithful w is to s, and (b) how successfully w 
communicates s to us.  These questions can only be satisfactorily answered by formal 
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comparisons of the music and its subject, and give rise to related questions that can only be 
answered by appealing to the composer’s intentions.   
Why were aspects t1…, tn of s, but not other properties, structures, or relations, 
targeted by w?  Why does w target them along such-and-such dimensions rather than along 
others?  Why does w alter t1…, tn thusly, thereby weakening their resemblance, rather than 
leaving them unaltered or altering them in other less deleterious ways?  These questions can 
be partly answered by appealing to anecdotal evidence from the composer or his or her close 
associates.  But oftentimes no such evidence is readily available to account for the composer’s 
specific decisions within the work.  As a result, while the explicit intentions and specific 
choices behind a work’s composition matter to and often guide our understanding, 
appreciation, and evaluations of works of program music as aesthetic objects, they rarely 
settle issues of interpretation, as Kivy rightly observes, though overstates.  
 
3.2. Goodman’s nominalist theory  
Similarly to those skeptical of music’s representational possibilities, whose arguments 
I survey and respond to in the next chapter, Goodman originally reserved the term 
“representation” for pictures.  Later, convinced by Vernon A. Howard,45 he conceded that 
musical works could be representational, but only in virtue of their scores’ non-notational 
features.46  For Goodman, a musical score is a set of performance directions that determines 
which note or notes are to be played from moment to moment.47  A score cannot determine 
how the notes are to be played, but merely their order and relative durations.  All 
performances that adhere to this strict serial requirement will match the score note-for-note, 
and thereby count as “authentic” versions of the same work.  By Goodman’s definition, a 
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musical work is the set of all performances that fully comply with a given score in this way.48  
Non-notational written instructions, such as those indicating tempo, timbre, dynamics, and 
expression, can be ignored in realizing an authentic performance of a work, as their 
conceptual borders are so vague—e.g., the forte in the performance of one work may be 
played identically (in respect of loudness) to the fortissimo in the performance of another 
work (or possibly of the same work), and both can be correct within their respective 
performances.  However, if there is even the slightest mismatch between a performance and 
the score’s notational aspects, be it through the omission, addition, or substitution of notes, 
whether intentional or unintentional, the performance will count as one of a different work.  
Similarly to Kivy, Goodman models artistic representation on a theory of linguistic 
communication—his own.  Goodman casts representation as a type of denotation, which is the 
mode of reference in which predicates stand for other things.49  On his view, A represents B 
when A functions as a symbol for B within a symbol system bound by arbitrary (i.e., non-
natural) conventions that is both syntactically and semantically dense and relatively replete.  
Western standard musical notation is not syntactically dense, since between any two notes 
there is not always a third.50  Nor is it replete, since the only relevant features for 
interpretation are the shapes of the notes and their vertical and horizontal arrangements on the 
staff.51  Western standard notation, therefore, does not provide a symbol system suitable for 
representation by Goodman’s lights, and thus musical scores are nonrepresentational.   
It follows from this that on Goodman’s theory musical representation can only occur 
at the level of performance.  But none of a score’s notational aspects that are realized in its 
performances can count as part of their representational content.  So melody, harmony, and 
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rhythm, which scores prescribe, cannot figure into any work’s representational content.  The 
only aspects that are potentially representational are those that Goodman believes are not 
prescribed by the score: tempo, timbre, dynamics, expression, and perhaps others.  This 
theory is deeply problematic for several related reasons.   
First, as a theory of musical representation, it is markedly anemic.  Unlike pictorial 
representations, not every feature of a performance of a program work has potential 
representational significance; and thus in practice composers (unlike painters) cannot draw 
upon all of their medium’s resources in their attempts to represent.  In fact, only the properties 
indicated by a score’s directional markings (fortissimo, vivace, dolce, etc.) count toward a 
performance’s representational status.  But since these markings are unrelated to a work’s 
identity, performers can ignore them.  As a result, musical form and representational content 
are wholly unconnected on Goodman’s theory, and the latter rests not with composers, but 
with conductors and performers.  This implausible consequence is one that my theory avoids 
by arguing that a work’s melodic, harmonic, and rhythmic structures, as well as its 
composer’s intentions, are central to its ability to function as a representation.   
Second, Goodman’s theory ignores actual composition and listening practices.  It is 
mainly through melody, harmony, and rhythm that most composers of program music, and 
their listeners, take program works to be representations of their alleged subjects.  In Chapter 
3, I show how the representational techniques employed by composers are underpinned by 
resemblances along precisely these dimensions of structure.  A divorce from practical 
concerns does not pose a problem from Goodman’s perspective, however.  The intentions, 
beliefs, and desires of composers do not enter into his conception of the relationship between 
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scores and performances (and thus authenticity and identity), so they also would not feature in 
his account of musical representation.  Goodman’s theory can make sense of a composer 
using his or her work to represent something only if he or she is also conducting or 
performing it.   
To discount composers’ intentions as Goodman does, however, is to disregard the 
distinction between program music and absolute music, since it allows for any work of music 
to be used by anyone to represent almost anything as long as an appropriate symbol system 
can be constructed in which the music denotes that thing.  This is all but guaranteed by 
Goodman’s insistence on the arbitrariness of symbol systems.52  But as I argued above, such 
cases hold only a cursory aesthetic interest.  In practice, the main evidence that warrants a 
representational analysis of a work of music is that its composer has accompanied it with a 
program that associates it to things outside itself through either direct reference or 
implication.  On my view, representation and reference, while separate, are intimately linked.  
Their relationship will be investigated in detail in the following chapters.                
Finally, Goodman’s theory cannot accommodate the fact that many musically 
educated individuals are able to pick out at least some of a program work’s representational 
content through the inspection of its score.  These individuals are able to do this because 
melody, harmony, and rhythm are not only central to musical identity, but also, contrary to 
Goodman, to musical representation.  Goodman would respond by claiming that these 
individuals are treating the score as a diagram instead of as a notational scheme.  While 
denotations, diagrams are not representations in his sense because they are neither 
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syntactically nor semantically dense.53  In no way, he would conclude, can Western standard 
notation be relevant to a work’s representational status.   
To this I reply that educated individuals are able to recover some of a work’s 
representational content just from inspecting its score due to a fact that Goodman ignores that 
the score structurally resembles its authentic performances along the dimensions of melody, 
harmony, and rhythm.  A score is a canonical set of performance instructions, which due bear 
certain structural resemblances to their performances—e.g., a rising musical line notated in 
the score (qua series of marks on a page) is reflected in a rising auditory line (qua series of 
pitched sounds).  Goodman ignores the fact that scores and performances share structures 
because he conceives of their relationship as purely conventional and thus wholly arbitrary.  
There certainly could be systems of musical notation that bear no resemblance to the auditory 
structures whose production they direct.  But Western standard notation, the system Goodman 
and I are dealing with, is not one of them.  Ironically, since Goodman’s criterion for 
authenticity within this system is note-for-note matching, scores and authentic performances 
end up being strongly isomorphic on his view.  In fact, the isomorphisms that Goodman 
requires are so strong as to be impractical, as there are probably very few actual performances 
that meet Goodman’s identity requirement, and as a result most of our talk of “musical 
works” is illusory.  Consequently, I contend that the view I advance in the following chapters 
offers a more satisfying account of what a musical work is while remaining faithful to our 
ordinary practices in a way that Goodman’s admittedly54 does not. 
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3.3. Walton’s make-believe theory 
Walton contends that music is capable of representation because it can be used as a 
“prop” in a “game of make-believe.”  By this he means that musical works can prompt 
“imaginative listening,” which induces us to perceive fictional worlds.55  We are listening to 
music imaginatively in Walton’s sense any time we recognize, e.g., a melody as rising or 
falling, joyful or yearning; a gesture as timid or aggressive; a rhythm as languid or urgent; 
and, most importantly, the core binaries of tension and release, and motion and rest.56  
According to Walton, we pretend (or imagine) to perceive in these musical forms actual 
instances of rising (et al.) and as a result the music comes to represent them to us.  If this is 
correct, musical form and representational content (contrary to Kivy) are intimately joined in 
our musical experience by our ability to listen with imagination.  And for Walton this ability 
is both necessary and sufficient to perceive music as music rather than as mere sound.   
In an important respect, I agree with Walton’s conjoining of form and content in 
perception, which I discuss in Chapter 4.  I also agree with Walton’s further claim that we are 
licensed to listen to program works in this way by their composers.57  On my view, the “rules” 
of the “game” are found in the accompanying program, which indicates some of what we 
should be listening for in the music, since it refers to or implies many of the work’s targets.  
But despite these agreements, three related problems arise for Walton’s theory that mine 
either avoids or overcomes: (1) it conflates imaginative perception and representation; (2) it 
stipulates (without adequate support) that all musical perception is imaginative in the relevant 
sense; and as a result (3) it is unable to capture adequately the complex epistemology that it 
actually suggests.   
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On Walton’s theory, the fact that we perceive musical forms imaginatively within the 
proper context entails their representational status.  Any melody that rises, e.g., represents 
rising in virtue of our hearing it as such.  The same problem that arose for Goodman above 
arises for Walton, namely, that even works of absolute music can be representational on his 
theory.58  Whenever we listen to a musical work imaginatively in Walton’s sense, which is 
always, since we must do so in order to hear the sounds as music, it functions as a prop in a 
game of make-believe.  All music is representational because, according to Walton’s theory, 
we must perceive it with imagination.   
But the belief that we perceive musical forms as such imaginatively does not 
automatically commit one to their status as representations.  Skeptic Roger Scruton, on whom 
I spend a good deal of time in the next chapter, agrees that imaginative perception is 
epistemically primitive within our musical experience, but denies that it entails 
representationality.59  By equating imaginative perception with representation, Walton 
appears to beg the question against a position like Scruton’s from the outset.  This is not the 
case, however, since their notions of imagination differ.   
For Walton, imagining x means pretending that x is real within a certain set of rules.  
Imagining that a small boulder is a bear, e.g., involves treating it as if it really were a bear by 
adopting appropriate bear-attitudes, -beliefs, and -desires toward the boulder, which generates 
numerous “fictional truths.”60  In this way the boulder is used as a prop in a game of make-
believe in which, according to the rules, large objects of a certain sort are bears.  By appealing 
to fictional truths, Walton (similarly to both Kivy and Goodman) remains within the purview 
of the linguistic bias in semantics mentioned above, which conceives of meaning (and 
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representational content) in terms of truth conditions.  Scruton likewise maintains this bias.  
His notion of imagination is Fregean: imagining x means entertaining the proposition ‘x’ 
without asserting its truth or falsity.61  Unlike Walton, however, Scruton does not take his 
definition of imagination to be (ontologically) coextensive with that of representation.  
Instead, he claims that the ability to imagine in this way is (psychologically) necessary to 
perceive and understand any kind of artistic representation.  
Scruton casts his notion of imaginative perception as one of several necessary 
conditions for representation, all of which (as we shall see in the next chapter) he argues 
music fails to satisfy,62 whereas Walton makes his notion both necessary and sufficient for 
representation.  One could object to Walton’s sufficiency claim and argue that Scruton’s 
attitude toward his own notion of imagination should be applied mutatis mutandis to Walton’s 
with regard to musical representation.  That is, while perceiving musical forms as rising, 
falling, and the like, may be necessary for recognizing a work’s representational content, 
imaginative listening on its own does not guarantee a work’s status as a representation.  
Instead, our ability to hear music in this way should be taken as part of the epistemological 
and psychological foundation from which musical representations are composed and 
experienced as such.   
While I believe this to be correct, I feel that an even stronger argument is warranted.  
Skeptic Stephen Davies, who largely agrees with Scruton’s position and, as such, likewise 
receives an extended treatment in the next chapter, offers just such an argument.  In doing so, 
he simultaneously questions Scruton’s notion of imaginative perception.   
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Davies casts doubt on Walton’s claim that the type of imagination required to perceive 
basic musical forms as music must rest on an appeal to make-believe.63  He contends that the 
notion of imaginative perception employed by Walton is altogether implausible, and thus can 
be neither necessary nor sufficient for musical representation.  The type of imagination that 
Davies believes is involved in musical perception is found in veridical perception, functioning 
(in a fairly Kantian way) as an organizer of the perceptual manifold.  Focusing on musical 
themes, which for both Walton and Scruton are imaginary objects in their respective senses, 
Davies states, “I do not hear the notes as if they are a theme, I do not entertain the thought 
that they constitute a theme—for I would make no mistake in taking them for a theme.  […]  
It is not fictional that those notes make up the theme, and it is not fictional of me that I hear 
the theme.”64   
Similarly, when we hear a musical line as rising or falling, or as exhibiting any other 
proto-representational features—i.e., musical properties, structures, and relations that could 
be exploited by composers of program music to represent extra-musical objects, events, or 
states of affairs, since they comprise part of our pre-structured mental schema based on our 
prior musical experiences—we neither treat the notes as if they are rising or falling nor 
entertain the thought that they are.65  Instead, we perceive a genuine instance of a change in 
position, a structure (an antecedent relation) that belongs to more than one sense modality.  In 
short, we correctly assert the proposition, “this musical line is rising.”  When it occurs in a 
work of absolute music, since the composer does not use the rising line to correspond to 
anything extrinsic to the music, we experience it as a purely musical phenomenon.  But, as I 
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discuss in Chapter 3, when a musical line rises in a work of program music, it very well could 
comprise a part of the work’s representational content.   
Davies’ argument is bolstered by recent evidence from the field of cognitive 
psychology, which suggests that the most fundamental aspects of our musical experience, 
including those mentioned by both Walton and Scruton (which I dubbed “proto-
representational”), can be fully accounted for by veridical perception, which fits with our 
listening practices.66  Both Walton’s appeal to “make-believe” to account for musical 
representation and Scruton’s appeal to “metaphorical experience” to deny this status to all 
works of music67 are thus wholly inadequate because they fail to capture the epistemology 
and underlying psychology of our actual listening practices.68  For this reason, I agree with 
Davies’ conclusion that imagination in neither philosopher’s sense is involved in perceiving 
and understanding musical forms as we actually do, and thus that the accounts of musical 
representation that they draw from their accounts of imaginative perception are misguided.   
The final problem for Walton’s theory relates to the first.  Since imaginative 
perception is epistemically basic, so too is representation; and thus, as I stated above, all 
music is representational.  One might object that if this were the case, the concept of musical 
representation could do no philosophical work because the distinction between program and 
absolute music would be blurred beyond recognition.  On Walton’s theory, as on Goodman’s, 
the objector would continue, it would be a distinction without a difference.   
To this Walton could rightly respond that different games of make-believe have 
different rules, and thus the distinction between absolute and program music marks a genuine 
difference—though it is one of degree rather than one of kind.  Simply to hear music in 
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organized patterns of sound requires a set of very low-order “rules” developed over time 
within the Western tradition, which strongly and tacitly influences our listening practices.  But 
the set of rules that govern works of program music are of a much higher order, and have a 
less nebulous source.  These rules, which the composer outlines (both explicitly and 
implicitly) in the program, shape and guide how we should perceive and understand the music 
just as strongly as the (almost entirely tacit) low-order rules do; they simply operate at a 
higher level of conscious awareness and listeners can exert more control over how they are 
applied as the music unfolds in real time.  As a result, on Walton’s theory there could be 
multiple levels of representation within a given work.  In fact, it is representation all the way 
down to the most basic level.   
This consequence is highly suggestive.  But the question that must be asked is whether 
there are any relationships between the levels.  If each level of a complex representational 
system is ontologically or epistemically sealed off from the others, then every program work 
could conceivably represent numerous incommensurable subjects simultaneously.  This 
would pose a problem for a coherent theory of musical representation and for anyone trying to 
offer a coherent representational interpretation of a given program work.  If the levels are not 
sealed off, which it seems must be the case for the sake of coherence, then each higher-level 
representation must depend upon a lower-level one, which in turn must depend upon an even 
lower-level one, all the way down to the ground-level representations, which are those by 
which we perceive the auditory patterns as music.   
This picture of multi-leveled nestings of musical representations suggested by the 
make-believe theory is deeply interesting, but it is one that Walton never articulates or 
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explores.  My theory captures the ontological and epistemological complexities suggested by 
this picture, which are explored in Chapter 3, because it follows from having structural 
resemblances ground most musical representations that a mapping of a target by a higher-
level musical structure will be brought about by mappings of targets by each of the lower-
levels.  I argue that to understand a work of program music’s subject, we identify the 
representational content at just the highest levels rather than at every level either 
simultaneously or in a quick ascension, which is what Walton’s theory seems to entail.  In 
other words, in reflectively perceiving and understanding the higher-level correspondences, 
we unreflectively recover the lower-level ones in our perception and understanding.69  
Moreover, if it is make-believe all the way down, as Walton’s theory seems to entail, then it 
seems as though there must be reflection all the way down.  While this may be the correct 
picture of how we describe a program work’s representational content when offering a (post 
hoc) discursive interpretation of the work, our actual moment-to-moment experiences with 
works of program music as they unfold in real time do not bear it out.  Unlike Walton’s 
theory, mine is able to accommodate both the reflective and unreflective aspects of our 
musical experience.  (How it specifically does so is explored in Chapter 4.)  And in doing so, 
my theory possesses an epistemological economy that Walton’s lacks.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
ON THE VERY POSSIBILITY OF MUSICAL REPRESENTATION 
RESPONDING TO THE SKEPTICAL CHALLENGE 
 
 
 
In the previous chapter, I explained that musical representation is achieved through the 
exploitation of resemblances between a musical work’s properties, structures, and relations and 
those of the objects, events, or states of affairs referred to or implied by its accompanying 
program.  The next two chapters explore the ontological and epistemological aspects of this 
account.  The current chapter clears the way for this exploration.  In what follows I argue for the 
plausibility of the claim that music is sometimes a representational art.  The idea that musical 
representation is a genuine possibility has become one of the most controversial topics in the 
philosophy of music.  As such, I survey and evaluate the current philosophical debate, which 
converges on whether works of program music can and do qualify as genuine artistic 
representations.  Instrumental music is of central concern because nearly everyone who writes on 
the subject agrees that when accompanied by sung text, stage action, or both (as in opera and 
musical drama), music can contribute to the representational whole of such hybrid artworks.  
Philosophers differ only with regard to the degree and kind of music’s contribution in these 
cases.  The question, then, is whether music (as an artistic medium) has enough resources to 
represent things external to itself, similar to how, say, painting does.   
Music’s status as a representational art has been hotly contested since the mid-nineteenth 
century, and the roots of the current philosophical debate trace back to what has come to be 
known as the “War of the Romantics.”  During this period, progressive and conservative 
composers, musicians, critics, and theorists were pitted against each other in a struggle for what 
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each side took to be the very future of music as an art.  I begin with a brief discussion of the 
history of program music and the original debate surrounding musical representation, as it forms 
the basis of the current debate, which is this chapter’s central concern.  My main goal is to cast 
suspicion on the shared assumptions and arguments—many of which derive from the Romantic 
conservative movement—advanced by Roger Scruton and Stephen Davies, both of whom are 
skeptical of music’s representational possibilities.  Peter Kivy has been the most vocal opponent 
of the position advanced by these skeptics over the last three decades, and his arguments against 
their position, which I take to be largely successful, are surveyed and evaluated throughout the 
discussion.  It is important to note at the outset that despite their fundamental differences 
regarding music’s representational possibilities, both Kivy and the skeptics conceive of musical 
representation largely in terms of conventional meaning modeled on linguistic communication; a 
model my theory strongly resists.   
 
1. A brief history of program music 
Program music, as I have been using that label, has been a going concern in the Western 
“classical” tradition since the Renaissance.  From the Renaissance to the Romantic period, where 
the art form reached its zenith, and up through the present day, a number of techniques have been 
developed, employed, and refined by composers to represent extra-musical objects, events, and 
states of affairs.  During the Renaissance, works such as Martin Peerson’s The Fall of the Leafe 
and William Byrd’s The Battell, the second of which may be the earliest work of properly so-
called program music (written c.1591), helped establish the practice of associating intentionally 
representational works of music with external aids—texts, titles, programs, etc., used to guide 
and shape the audience’s perception and understanding as the works unfold in real time by 
referring the audience to their intended subjects.  This period also saw the genesis of several 
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musical techniques for representation, which were further developed during the baroque and 
classical periods in both purely instrumental music and music set to texts in operas, musical 
dramas, choral music, and songs.  One technique is auditory imitation.  A section of Byrd’s The 
Battell titled “The Marche to the Fighte,” e.g., contains the imitation of a horn fanfare (by 
virginals) after which the music builds to an energetic passage meant to indicate that the soldiers 
have joined the battle.  Both have relevant inscriptions, “tantara tantara” and “the battells be 
joyned,” in the score under their respective measures.1  The earlier passage is an instance of 
musical sounds imitating other musical sounds, while the later passage musically imitates the 
sounds of battle.  
“Tone-painting,” another technique developed during Renaissance, is concerned with the 
musical expression of a text’s broader emotional character.  Few examples illustrate tone-
painting better than baroque master J. S. Bach’s aria “Erbarme dich” from the Matthäus-Passion.  
The solo violin can be recognized as weeping along with the alto, whose voice expresses the 
melancholy and grief of the event upon which the lyrics comment: the moment Peter, after 
having denied Jesus, weeps bitterly upon recalling that the man he has forsaken had predicted he 
would do so.  As a result of the melodic lines, the tone qualities of the violin and voice, and their 
harmonic interplay, the music not only reinforces the lyrical content, but further intensifies it, 
which renders more fully the scene referred to by the lyrics and depicted by the music, and thus 
communicates it to us more successfully.  In tone-painting, reference and representation, by way 
of the exploitation of an expressive resemblance between the music and its target, work in unison 
to offer a more emotionally impactful musical experience.   
“Word-painting,” the third main technique developed during the Renaissance, involves 
“the use of musical gesture(s) in a work with an actual or implied text to reflect, often pictorially, 
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the literal or figurative meaning of a word or phrase.”2  This technique is perhaps most famously 
exemplified by the Credo section of Bach’s Mass in B-minor, in which the phrase descendit de 
caelis (“He came down from heaven”) is set to a falling musical and vocal line.  Another 
instance is minor classical composer Carl Friedrich Zelter’s setting of Goethe’s poem “Um 
Mitternacht,” in which the word Gestirn (“star”) is mirrored musically by an ascending leap of a 
ninth.3  These two cases, as well as the energetic passage from Byrd’s Battell, succeed 
representationally because we recognize them as sharing perceptual properties with their targets.  
Moreover, in each case we use the same words to describe the passages and their targets4—both 
Jesus and the music can be correctly said to “descend;” both the star (relative to our standpoint) 
and the note corresponding to it (relative to those surrounding it) are “high;” and both the battle’s 
onset and the music are “energetic”—and the composers are fully exploiting these linguistic 
conventions.  The relationship between music’s ability to represent and how we describe it is 
examined at length at the beginning of the next chapter, as it figures in our experience of most 
works of program music. 
I am now in a position to begin constructing a typology of musical techniques composers 
in the Western classical tradition have made use of to represent things musically.  In the works 
discussed above, taken in reverse order, the music either (i) shares properties with (auditory or 
non-auditory) objects, events, or states of affairs; (ii) expresses emotions corresponding to 
general scenes or specific characters; (iii) imitates auditory (musical or non-musical) objects; or 
some combination thereof.  To this list three more techniques should be added: (iv) bald 
stipulation, (v) conventional association, and (vi) nonstandard instrumentation.  In the next 
chapter, I show how each of these six techniques involves the exploitation of resemblances and 
explore their relationships, where they exist, to linguistic conventions.  The use of these 
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techniques was most prevalent during the Romantic period, culminating in the development of 
the concert overture (Felix Mendelssohn), the idée fixe (Hector Berlioz), the symphonic poem 
(Franz Liszt), the leitmotif (Richard Wagner), and the tone poem (Camille Saint-Saëns), which 
are instanced (respectively) in such purely instrumental program works as Die Hebriden, 
Symphonie Fantastique, Eine Faust-Symphonie (after Goethe), Siegfried Idyll, and Le rouet 
d'Omphale (after Hugo).   
Technique (iv), bald stipulation, is best exemplified by Wagner’s leitmotifs, in which a 
recurring musical theme is associated with a particular character, location, event, or idea.  The 
theme need not share any relevant properties with, express the mood of, or imitate its target(s) in 
the work’s subject.  Instead, the association between theme and target is achieved solely by the 
composer’s (explicit or implicit) stipulation, secured by conventional reference established by 
the composer in this piece of music, usually in the form of an explicit linguistic act.  I show in 
the next chapter, however, that this stipulative act of reference by itself is not sufficient for the 
theme to represent its intended subject; rather, it must function within (or as a part of) the 
unfolding global correspondence scheme (i.e., the maximally large-scale resemblance) between 
the work and its subject.   
Technique (v), conventional association, is instanced by both Beethoven’s Wellingtons 
Sieg and Tchaikovsky’s 1812 Overture.  Beethoven develops part of “God Save the King” as a 
fugato to target the jubilant English crowds after Wellington’s victory over Napoleon’s armies at 
the Battle of Victoria.  In doing so, he is exploiting the conventional association between the 
song, to which the fugato bears a recognizable auditory resemblance, and Britain’s military 
leader.  In a similar way, Tchaikovsky uses “La Marseillaise” and “Bozhe, Tsarya khrani!,” the 
respective anthems of France and Russia at the time, to stand for their country’s armies within 
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the context of the piece.  As with bald stipulation, composers make use of (explicit or implicit) 
reference to extra-musical objects, events, or states of affairs in order to secure them as targets 
within the global correspondence scheme between the work and its subject.  Unlike bald 
stipulation, however, conventional association is underpinned by a recognizable auditory 
resemblance, i.e., auditory imitation, rather than a purely stipulative act.  But once again, this 
technique, which makes use of conventional linguistic reference, functions representationally 
only in conjunction with the exploitation of antecedent resemblances.   
Technique (vi), nonstandard instrumentation, is also instanced in the previous two works.  
Beethoven includes muskets as part of Wellingtons Sieg’s orchestration and Tchaikovsky scores 
cannon fire in the 1812 Overture.  When sounded, these nonstandard instruments are meant to 
represent barrages of artillery by the represented armies.  Thus, the sound of muskets and cannon 
is represented in these works by actual musket- and cannon-fire.  (It is worth noting that the 
cannon called for in Tchaikovsky’s score is often replaced by a bass drum, which is the standard 
instrument in the Western classical tradition that most closely resembles the sound of cannon-
fire.)  As with the previous two techniques, the nonstandard instruments employed by technique 
(vi) target certain aspects of a work’s subject through the combination of resemblance and 
reference.  When a composer employs this technique, the instruments refer to themselves by 
sounding exactly like themselves.5  The instruments draw attention to themselves in ways that 
standard musical instruments typically do not precisely because they are unexpected within their 
musical surroundings—i.e., because they are non-traditional or unconventional.  The 
representation here occurs at the level of auditory resemblance, in this case, the exploitation of 
auditory identity.  
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These six techniques, which I thoroughly examine in the next chapter, are deeply 
entrenched within the Western tradition.  As such, suitably educated listeners can draw upon 
their background knowledge of them in understanding the relationship between a program 
work’s musical form and its representational content.  These epistemological claims regarding 
how we perceive and understand works of program music as representations are discussed at 
length in Chapter 4, where the account of musical representation I develop in the next chapter 
will be applied to an extended analysis of a sophisticated work of program music.  Before I can 
begin my response to those currently skeptical of music’s representational possibilities, their 
position must be clarified.  To do so requires elucidating its historical roots, which trace back to 
the mid-nineteenth century.  
 
2. Romantic skepticism 
Romanticism in music is marked by such features, instanced in both absolute and 
program works, as departures from established formal conventions (especially from sonata 
form); bolder melodies, richer harmonies, and denser textures; explorations of chromaticism, 
pentatonicism, dissonance, and key modulation; the use of a wider range of pitches, dynamics, 
and tone-colors; the expansion of the orchestra; and greater structure and unity to lengthier 
works.  These features can be accounted for in part by their foundations in the attempts of many 
of the above-named (and other) composers to represent extra-musical objects, events, and states 
of affairs.   
Liszt famously proclaimed, “New wine demands new bottles.”  By this, he meant that the 
stale musical formulas of the past could not contain the ideas he and others wished to convey 
with their compositions.6  We can take Liszt’s proclamation as the motto for the Weimar 
progressives, a group aligned both ideologically and compositionally with Berlioz, and 
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championed by critic Richard Pohl, of which Liszt and Wagner were the most prominent 
members.  One key progressive belief was in music’s representational abilities, and Liszt’s 
symphonic poems are often held up as embodiments of this belief.  However, according to Liszt 
scholar Alan Walker, not only did Liszt not believe that his works were representational, but also 
that music was not generally a representational art form.7  Walker claims that Liszt believed 
music could express the mood that a poem, picture, object, or event evoked in one who 
experienced it; he did not believe that music could directly present those things to be experienced 
by the audience.8   
But even if Liszt was correct that his works were only capable of expressing feelings, by 
explicitly associating them with extra-musical subjects, as he in fact did, Liszt’s works 
nevertheless count as representations by my lights, as they are instances of tone-painting—
technique (ii) above.  So despite Liszt’s alleged assertion to the contrary, his works are genuinely 
representational, and, moreover, they represent by making use of more than just expressive 
similarity.  For instance, Liszt does not attempt to represent the narrative of Goethe’s drama in 
his Eine Faust-Symphonie—i.e., he does not attempt to reflect the large-scale narrative structure 
of the drama in his work’s large-scale symphonic structure.  Instead, he offers, as the work’s full 
title (in drei Charakterbildern) indicates, character sketches of the drama’s three main 
characters: Faust, Gretchen, and Mephistopheles.  In doing so, Liszt is making use of bald 
stipulation to connect themes to the aspects of characters to which he intends them to correspond.   
The dimensions along which Liszt targets these aspects of the characters are mainly 
expressive, and thus each part represents its subject largely by expressing emotions appropriate 
to (or about) them. Additionally, thematic material developed in one sketch often reappears, and 
is further developed, in another.  From the purely musical perspective, this lends a sense of unity 
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and coherence to the entire symphony, which is quite lengthy—its performances normally clock 
in at over seventy-five minutes.  But it also deepens our understanding of the characters sketched 
by the work by rendering them and their relationships to one another more fully.  And in order to 
better convey the characters to his audience, as well as give his symphony greater unity, Liszt 
had to depart from musical formulas established during the classical period.  This was common 
practice for Liszt and his progressive allies, who often felt stifled by the rigid “rules” of the past 
and had no problem bending them to suit their purposes.   
This was not true of the progressives’ ideological rivals, the Leipzig conservatives.  This 
group, aligned with Mendelssohn and championed by critic Eduard Hanslick, included such 
composers and musicians as Robert and Clara Schumann, Joseph Joachim, and Johannes 
Brahms.  Interestingly, early in their careers, each of these composers wrote works of program 
music, not unlike their progressive rivals.  In fact, Mendelssohn’s Die Hebriden, also known as 
Fingal’s Cave, is considered a masterpiece within the genre: a musical seascape based on his 
experience with the famed Scottish cave, as well as on the Ossianic poems that made it famous 
and paintings that were based on them.9  Furthermore, the thirty-eight pieces of Robert 
Schumann’s Carnaval and Davidsbündlertänze suites for solo piano are each supposed to 
provide a musical portrait of a person (real, e.g., individual conservatives, or Chopin and 
Paginini, or fictional, e.g., characters from the French commedia dell’ arte) or a sentiment.  
Carnaval’s last piece, “Marche des ‘Davidsbündler’ contre les Philistins,” is actually 
Schumann’s attempt to depict the Leipzig conservatives’ (who he referred to as “The League of 
David”) defeat of the Weimar progressives (the Philistines) in the battle for the future of music—
a wish that, as a matter of historical fact, went unfulfilled.  Finally, even though Brahms is 
considered the premier writer of absolute music of the Romantic period, the first of his Ballades, 
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Op. 10 (for piano), titled “Edward,” was intended as a representation the Scottish saga of that 
name.   
The above examples illustrate that the focus of the disagreement between the Romantics 
regarding musical representation was normative rather than ontological, which is what 
distinguishes it from the current debate.  The Romantics were not concerned with whether or not 
music is capable of representing things beyond itself.  All assumed (to varying degrees) that it 
can and sometimes does.  Instead, they were concerned with whether they should continue the 
practice of composing works of program music.  Influenced in part by Schopenhauerian ideals, 
the debate centered on musical “purity.”  The question was whether music should be beholden to 
references to literary and other works of art in order to convey ideas—mainly the expression of 
emotion, which the extra-musical references would help to specify by giving the listener 
particular targets for the emotions expressed by the music—or whether composers should 
attempt to develop purely musical means through which to convey ideas.  Those who opted for 
the latter option, as the conservatives did, believed that attempts at musical representation would 
only get in the way of music’s progress toward this goal—mainly, the creation of a purely 
musical vocabulary of the human emotions.  In order to ensure music’s future as the “highest” art 
form, i.e., the one toward which all others would aspire, they concluded that the production of 
program music needed to be halted, and a good deal of intellectual effort was spent attempting to 
do just that.10 
The schism between the progressives and conservatives, which we now know as the War 
of the Romantics, grew for several years before finally hemorrhaging during the mid-1850s.  
Both camps, choosing vitriolic attacks through the press more often than the presentation of 
reasoned arguments, took themselves to be fighting for the very future of music and its viability 
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as an art form.  The debate centered on a set of competing ideas, which are nicely summarized by 
Walker: “programme music versus absolute music, form versus content, the oneness versus the 
separateness of the arts, newness versus oldness, revolution versus reaction.”11  From the first 
three binaries, it is apparent that the philosophical conversation with which this dissertation is 
concerned traces its roots to exactly this period of music history.  As will become clear in the 
discussion to follow, Kivy and I have sided with the progressives, while Scruton and Davies 
have taken up the mantle of conservatism.   
Music critic and theorist Eduard Hanslick has had the most lasting impact among those 
advancing conservative ideals, as he originally expressed the line of attack most vigorously 
pursued by current skeptics against the possibility of musical representation.  Hanslick contends 
that music’s content resides solely in itself, i.e., in its purely formal structure; consequently, he 
collapses the traditional distinction between form and content—a consequence with which, as 
will be made clear in the next two chapters, I am largely comfortable.  On his account, “to 
represent something, is to clearly exhibit it, to distinctly set it before us.”12  Music, he argues, is 
incapable of meeting this (Cartesian) standard of clearly and distinctly presenting a subject to us.  
“The composer of instrumental music never thinks of representing a definite subject,” he claims; 
“otherwise he would be placed in a false position, rather outside than within the domain of 
music.  His composition in such a case would be programme music, unintelligible without the 
programme.”13  He singles out Liszt’s symphonic poems as instances of such unintelligible 
instrumental music.  In this passage, Hanslick establishes the standard, adhered to by 
contemporary skeptics, that the subjects of works of program music should be understandable 
through our experience of the musical alone, without appeal to the program.  If a program is 
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required to understand any aspect of a work’s musical structure, then, according to Hanslick—
and, as we shall see, his skeptical successors—it fails as music. 
In spite of the efforts of Hanslick and his conservative allies, the progressives emerged 
victorious, at least in terms of the direction Western art music was to take.  The Romantics’ 
successors, the Impressionists, chiefly Claude Debussy, Maurice Ravel, and Ralph Vaughan 
Williams, increasingly moved away from the musical formulas of the past and offered additional 
examples of program music, including, La Mer, Miroirs, and The Lark Ascending, respectively. 
The twentieth century saw several movements that took advantage of the greater experimentation 
and formal freedoms offered by their Romantic and Impressionistic predecessors.  During this 
period many paradigmatic works of program music were produced.  To focus just on America, as 
examples of movements and works on both sides of the Atlantic are too numerous to list here, 
modernist Charles Ives gave us such compositions as Central Park in the Dark and The 
Unanswered Question; John Alden Carpenter gave us Adventures in a Perambulator, a 
symphony detailing a baby’s outing with his nurse; and George Gershwin fused jazz, imitations 
of urban sounds, and a classical sensibility in Rhapsody in Blue, the most famous program work 
by an American composer of that (or any) period.  My goal in what follows is to succeed 
philosophically where Liszt and the progressives succeeded musically: by presenting a theory 
that leaves little doubt as to music’s status as a representational art form.   
 
3. Contemporary skepticism 
There are two forms of contemporary skepticism regarding the possibility of musical 
representation.  Scruton is a hard-core skeptic because he withholds the status of representation 
from every work of program music, since he believes that music (as an art form) cannot meet the 
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standards set by his theory of artistic representation.14  As such, his position is strongly aligned 
with Hanslick’s—though, unlike Hanslick, Scruton does not deny music’s ability to express 
emotions.  Davies’ skepticism is significantly more moderate.  While Davies largely defends 
Scruton’s position, he contends that there is a class of properly so-called musical representations; 
he simply believes that it is too small to merit extended philosophical analysis.15  Despite this 
difference, Scruton and Davies advance a “seeing-in” theory of representation from which they 
derive the two strongest arguments that any theory of musical representation must overcome to 
get of f the ground.   
I call Scruton and Davies’ first argument against the possibility of musical representation 
the confirmation bias argument, which directly stems from Hanslick’s assertion that music can 
never clearly exhibit a definite subject.  This argument states that for any musical work, w, 
regardless of whether it is programmatic or absolute, we can supply it with any program 
whatsoever and discover musical correlates to aspects of w’s alleged subject, s, which we will 
take to comprise its representational content and use to confirm w’s status as a representation of 
s.  In short, the evidence we collect from w to confirm that it is a representation of s will be 
biased from the outset by the simple fact that we are given a program that suggests a relationship 
between w and s.  The program leads us to believe that there ought to be perceptible s-correlates 
in w, and, according to the skeptics, we will find them because any work will bear numerous 
resemblances of various sorts to s from which we could selectively produce a number of 
reasonable correspondence schemes to s.   
The skeptics conclude from this that, because there are no program-independent, purely 
musical ways through which musical works can indicate that we should treat them as 
representations of their alleged subjects, music’s status as a representational art is called into 
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question because, once again following Hanslick, it seems that the (extra-musical) programmatic 
aids do most of the “representational work”—i.e., it is the program, rather than the music itself, 
which secures w’s status as a representation (of s).  They further conclude that if any musical 
work can (come to) represent anything as a result of the mere suggestion of a relationship to that 
thing, then the notion of musical representation becomes conceptually vacuous and, as such, can 
do little helpful theoretical or practical work.  Moreover, if every musical work is potentially 
representational, then, according to the skeptics, the distinction between absolute and program 
music is illusory, a consequence that few philosophers of music of any stripe would be willing to 
accept. 
The second skeptical challenge to the possibility of musical representation, which I call 
the assimilation bias argument, is closely related to the first.  While the confirmation bias 
argument focuses on the relationship between a musical work and any program, the assimilation 
bias argument problematizes the relationship between a work of program music and the program 
specifically associated with it by its composer.  By doing so, it calls into question the very nature 
and practice of program music.  As a result, it presents the largest hurdle that any theory of 
musical representation must overcome. 
  The assimilation bias argument begins with the correct assumption that the primary 
function of the programmatic aids accompanying a work of program music, w, is to prime our 
musical expectations by referring to or suggesting a set of objects, events, or states of affairs that 
comprise its intended subject, s.  From our background beliefs about s, we create a “schema” (or 
interpretation framework) that encompasses the sorts of properties, structures, and relations, i.e., 
“s-correlates,” that we expect to hear in w.  On my theory, this schema, the creation of which 
need not be a fully (or even mostly) reflective endeavor, would consist of a weighted list of 
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possible targets in s to which w could correspond—i.e., aspects of s that would likely be mirrored 
in w, perhaps arranged by degree of likelihood.   
The skeptics claim that, were the above account accurate, listeners would have to modify 
each new bit of auditory information as w unfolds in real time to fit our (program-induced) 
schema, regardless of its musicological import—i.e., regardless of whether the properties, 
structures, or relations that we interpret and evaluate as representationally significant are 
musically significant.  The skeptics conclude that those aspects that we take to comprise w’s 
representational content may not be genuinely “musical” aspects of w, and, as a result, our 
understanding and appreciation of w, qua representation, could be independent of our 
understanding and appreciation of w, qua music.  In other words, the bits of the musical 
progression that we mark off as individual units of musical significance (motifs, recapitulations, 
transitions, changes in key or mode, etc.) may have no bearing whatsoever on those we mark off 
as having representational significance (as targeting characters, their returns, changes in location 
or personality, etc.)—i.e., genuine musical boundaries may not be reflected in our interpretation 
schemas.  That musical form and representational content could come apart in works of program 
music in such a way that our representational understanding and our purely musical 
understanding of a given program work can be wholly unrelated, the skeptics conclude, casts 
serious doubt on whether the sort of representation concerned is actually “musical,” rather than 
merely “auditory.”  If this is the case, as they claim it is, then music can only be said to function 
as a vehicle for representation of another sort.  Consequently, works of program music are not 
properly so-called representations, qua works of music. 
In my estimation, no theory of musical representation presently on offer has yet 
overcome these two challenges adequately.  The main reason for this, I contend, is that most 
 57 
theories are guilty of the two major problems diagnosed in the previous chapter: (first) 
maintaining the linguistic bias in semantics, and (second) failing to clearly delineate between (1) 
a work of program music’s status as a representation, (2) its composer’s intentions, and (3) how 
accurately it renders and how successfully it communicates its subject to us.  The confirmation 
and assimilation bias arguments exploit these major weaknesses of the other theories by also 
buying into the linguistic bias and conflating these three issues.16  I cannot hope to overcome 
these skeptical challenges until my theory has been laid out in Chapter 3 and is fully up and 
running in Chapter 4.  As a result, in the following discussion I am only able to begin to cast 
doubt on them.  The majority of the present chapter is spent dispensing with many of their other 
arguments against the possibility of musical representation as a way to clear the ground for my 
main arguments against the skeptical position, which I complete in Chapter 4.     
 
4. Scruton’s representational skepticism 
Scruton begins his hard-core skeptical argument with the perfectly reasonable thought 
that in order to test music’s representational possibilities there first need to be clear conditions 
that any musical work must satisfy to count as a representation.  Since painting provides the 
clearest and most uncontroversial examples of artistic representation, Scruton derives five 
necessary conditions for artistic representation from it.  An artwork is representational, according 
to Scruton, only if (1) we can become aware of what it represents without help from external 
aids, such as its title or an explicitly associated text; (2) we can distinguish between the work’s 
medium and its intended subject; (3) it makes us interested in its subject; (4) it expresses definite 
thoughts about its subject to us; and (5) our interest in it as a representation of its subject is not in 
its “truth,” but may be an interest in its “lifelikeness,” i.e., we can evaluate its representational 
content using standards of accuracy, but not truth conditions.17  The first three conditions 
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comprise Scruton’s “seeing-in” account of representation, which he appropriates from Richard 
Wollheim.18  The last two conditions comprise the semantic aspects of his account, expressing 
his belief that “representation is […] essentially propositional.”19  Given the above conditions, it 
is clear that Scruton believes artistic representation to be in the communication business in the 
same way that language is.  As such, I begin with the semantics before turning my attention to 
the “seeing-in” aspect of his account.   
 
4.1. Semantics 
Scruton strongly conflates an artwork’s representational status with both its artist’s 
intention to represent and its communicative success.  This is because the model for the semantic 
aspects of his account, although he never explicitly acknowledges it, just like Kivy, is almost 
certainly Gricean.  In fact, one of the most important of these aspects is directly analogous to 
Grice’s theory of non-natural meaning.  According to Grice, an agent means something (non-
naturally) by an utterance or gesture if and only if she intended her utterance or gesture to 
produce some effect in an audience by means of their recognizing her intention.20  Simply 
qualify “agent” as “artist,” and swap “artwork” for “utterance or gesture,” and we get what 
Scruton takes to be the core of artistic representation.  This fact becomes all the more apparent 
when we make the relevant replacements in Grice’s account of what he calls “the occasion-
meaning of indicative-type utterances,” a later refinement to his account of non-natural meaning, 
which refers to what given utterances meant when they were originally produced.21  According 
to Scruton (following Grice), by creating a representational artwork, r, its artist means to convey 
proposition p about r’s intended subject, s, if and only if for some audience, the artist created r 
intending (i) that the audience should believe that she believes p about s, (ii) that the audience 
should believe that she intended (i), and (iii) that (i) should be achieved by means of achieving 
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(ii).  This, for Scruton, is how artistic representations “mean,” which is precisely how Grice 
believes that sentences “mean.”   
Scruton believes that representational works of art are essentially linguistic items.  This is 
clear from the statement of his condition (4) for artistic representation. 
A representational work of art must express thoughts about its subject, and an 
interest in the work should involve an understanding of those thoughts. […] 
Even in the most minimal depiction—say, of an apple on a cloth—appreciation 
depends on determinate thoughts that could be expressed in language without 
reference to the picture: “Here is an apple; the apple rests on a cloth; the cloth 
is chequered and folded at the edge.”22    
  
As Davies notes, Scruton conceives of representation as assertion.  In the above condition, 
Scruton indicates that, similar to an assertoric sentence, the meaning of which is non-natural (as 
it is, in Grice’s terms, an indicative-type utterance), an artistic representation, r, must contain (a) 
a subject, s, (b) a predicate, which expresses some proposition, p, that qualifies s, and (c) a “full 
stop,” which completes p, thereby allowing r to convey a “definite thought” about s.23  That 
Scruton models the semantics of representation on assertion is further bolstered by the 
implication in condition (5) that artistic “assertions” can (although, they need not) be assessed 
for truth.24  
Scruton qualifies these semantic aspects of his account in his first (seeing-in) condition 
for representation by severely limiting the epistemic resources that the audience can draw upon 
to learn p about s from r.  Specifically, he restricts the means through which we can discover that 
the artist intends to represent s, and that the artist believes p about s, to just our perceptual 
experience of r.  Scruton is not so radical as to limit our experience to just the raw sense data.  
He is willing to accommodate the fact that our perceptual experience of r will be strongly 
affected by our (art historical) background knowledge of the relevant conventions of the artistic 
tradition in which r was produced, the artist’s style, and so on.  The relevant sort of background 
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knowledge can be propositional, but will most often be knowledge by acquaintance, which has 
been acquired and refined by experience with many artworks by many artists working in diverse 
traditions, media, and genres.  Scruton is simply claiming that the artwork, qua vehicle for 
perceptual experience, must be able to speak for itself—which, given how strongly Scruton 
maintains the linguistic bias, we can basically take literally.  
In order to count as representation, therefore, a work of program music must be able to 
convey its (non-natural) meaning—its subject, and the composer’s thoughts about it—to us 
through just the music alone, without relying on the assistance of the accompanying program or 
other epistemic aids.  Scruton is concerned with discovering a “purely musical route” to 
representation, “a feature of music [as an artistic medium] that will enable it to present thoughts 
about something other than itself.”25  If works of program music cannot make us aware of, and 
thereby communicate propositions to us about, their intended subjects without the help of 
programmatic aids, then there is nothing particularly “musical” about how they represent.  
Instead, the representation—conceived of as the communication of propositional meaning—will 
be achieved through the combination of music and text.  And Scruton believes that the music is 
the submissive partner in this relationship, since the text is what makes us aware of the work’s 
subject in the first place.  While the music may be able to participate in the act of predication by 
helping to qualify our understanding of the subject, because it does not assert the subject, it 
cannot achieve the full status of artistic representation. 
Scruton goes so far as to deny that music can even participate in the predication.  
Consequently, works of program music fall short of condition (4).  “If music is to be 
representational,” he begins, “then its subject must be not only picked out, but also 
characterized.” 
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But that requires a context, and in music the context seems to add no further 
precision to the “representational” parts.  A certain passage in [Richard 
Strauss’] Der Rosenkavalier “imitates” the glitter of a silver rose.  But what 
more does this passage say about the glitter except that it is a glitter (and even 
that may go unnoticed)?26 
 
Scruton further claims that one cannot derive a definite description of the sea from Debussy’s La 
Mer; and thus, it also fails to satisfy condition (4).  But this is patently false.  The music swells, 
churns, undulates, becomes dark and violent, and so on.  How we find out that it is the sea that 
these predicates are meant to qualify, however, is wholly irrelevant to whether music satisfies 
condition (4).  And, for Scruton, this is a non-semantic concern, since it pertains to his first 
condition.  Moreover, what does the redness of the apple in the hypothetical still life painting that 
Scruton uses to explain condition (4) tell us more than “the apple is red”?  Should we expect 
anything more from the musical glitter in Der Rosenkavalier?  By Scruton’s lights, we should 
have no problem recovering from this passage that Strauss intends to convey to us his belief that 
the silver rose provided by the program glitters.  
This argument against Scruton’s fourth condition comes from Kivy.27  It is important to 
note that Davies cites it approvingly, and takes it even further.  Scruton conceives of artistic 
representations as assertions, which convey definite or determinate thoughts about their subjects.  
As such, Davies restates Scruton’s argument against La Mer satisfying condition (4) as: “There 
is […] no definite end to the description one might offer, no full stop provided by the music with 
which to end the characterization of the subject;” consequently, the propositions that the music 
communicates to us are indeterminate.28  What Davies asks in response is, “Where is the thought 
expressed in a painting completed?”29  “Pictures are said to be worth a thousand words,” he 
proceeds, “just because there need be no end to the description of the way a subject is 
represented.  More correctly, there is no exact number of words equivalent to a picture, because 
pictures do not describe as language does.”30  Scruton’s fourth condition should not be taken 
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seriously, Davies continues, because it is so restrictive that not even uncontroversially 
representational paintings can satisfy it.  It should be no surprise, then, that works of program 
music fail, as well.  From this, Davies concludes, “that music fails Scruton’s fourth condition can 
hardly count against music’s being depictive, since representational paintings fail the same 
condition in a similar manner.”31   
To take this line of argumentation a bit farther, in Scruton’s underdescribed example of 
the apple painting, the context in which the apple’s redness is situated does not offer any further 
precision as to the thoughts it conveys to us.  But give the example more flesh, and the apple’s 
redness could certainly convey such additional thoughts as, “the apple is glowingly red and thus 
seems to be part of what we conceive as living, but will soon be rotten, memento mori.”  The 
musical glitter in Der Rosenkavalier, analogous to the silver rose’s glitter, when the context 
Scruton fails to provide is fleshed out, could convey similar higher-order thoughts.  During the 
time period in which the opera was set, a silver rose was a symbol of love and fidelity.  And in 
the scene in which it appears, a young man acting as a proxy courter, known as a Knight of the 
Rose, asks for the hand of a wealthy young woman on the behalf of his principal.  But the young 
man and woman fall in love, and the rest of the opera deals with their attempts to keep her from 
marrying the young man’s principal.  The rose’s glitter, then, could convey the sparkling 
possibilities of young love, with perhaps an implied recognition that everything that glitters 
eventually dulls—beauty fades, youth gives way to old age, and love can slacken.    
Recall that Scruton claims to derive his five necessary conditions for artistic 
representation from uncontroversial instances in painting.  But this claim is merely asserted 
without argument.  This, along with the arguments made by Kivy and Davies, strongly indicates 
that Scruton’s semantic conditions, at least condition (4)—condition (5) is not particularly 
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problematic, as few philosophers of art believe that truth and falsity apply to works of art in any 
nontrivial way—, were created solely to deny the possibility of musical representation.  Scruton 
is merely begging the question at the outset in favor of the brand of musical purism he has 
advanced throughout his career.  
 
4.2. Seeing-in  
Davies’ skepticism is moderate precisely because he wholly disregards the semantic 
aspects of Scruton’s account.  He believes that representation is essentially non-propositional 
and, as a result, should not be modeled on assertion.  But Davies does maintain the seeing-in 
aspects of Scruton’s theory, with some qualifications.  In what follows, I examine Scruton’s first 
three conditions for representation and Davies’ defense of them.  I also show how the possibility 
of musical representation is perfectly consistent with Scruton’s prior ontological and 
epistemological commitments.  This is important because I agree with versions of many of them.  
As such, these prior commitments need to be understood before I can present and evaluate the 
skeptical arguments Scruton makes against musical representation that result from his version of 
the seeing-in theory of artistic representation. 
 
4.2.1. Scruton’s pre-skeptical commitments 
Scruton argues that when listening to a performance of a musical work we are induced 
into the purely auditory or “acousmatic” world described at length by P. F. Strawson, a world 
that is wholly non-spatial.32  The ontological status of any sound in the acousmatic world is as a 
non-spatial “secondary object,”33 which precludes its reidentification across time; thus, instead of 
hearing the exact same sound again, we merely hear multiple instances of the same sound-
universal.34  Scruton acknowledges, however, that this appears to be invalidated by our actual 
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experiences with music, which seem infused with spatiality.  For instance, we perceive certain 
notes as higher or lower than others.  But more fundamentally, our experience of music would be 
fundamentally different were we unable to hear the repetition of a given phrase, motif, melody, 
or theme as a genuine reappearance, rather than another instance of the same sound-universal.  
Moreover, the practice of musical composition is based on the fact that we hear given aspects of 
the music as “(one and) the same again;” without this fact, e.g., counterpoint would be 
impossible.   
To make sense of the phenomenology of our actual musical experiences, which seem to 
contradict his underlying ontology, Scruton contends that we do not attend to the sounds 
themselves when listening to music.  Instead, we attend to their secondary properties, tones, 
whose essential features are pitch, loudness, and timbre.  Tones, Scruton claims, can only be 
experienced by rational beings with imagination of the Fregean sort described in the previous 
chapter—i.e., imagining x means entertaining the proposition ‘x’ without asserting its truth or 
falsity.  As a result, Scruton gives us the following three-layered picture of the auditory reality of 
musical experience: (3) tones supervene on (2) sounds, which supervene on (1) physical air 
vibrations.  Many creatures perceive sounds, but Scruton stipulates (without solid evidence or 
argument) that only humans can perceive tones in those sounds.  This is because to experience 
music as we do requires that we imaginatively superimpose a (disjoint and finitely differentiated) 
tonal structure, e.g., the twelve-tone chromatic scale, onto the (syntactically dense) pitch 
continuum provided by the world of physical sound.35  This structure is quasi-spatial, admitting 
of only a vertical dimension (“up” and “down”), which is why musical sounds can appear to us 
as either “higher than” or “lower than” one another.   
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When saying that sounds are incapable of reidentification in the acousmatic world, the 
notion of identity to which Scruton is appealing is that of numerical identity.  But tones, unlike 
sounds, are not a part of the physical world; rather, according to Scruton, they are “imagined 
objects.”  This is not to say that tones exist apart from the sounds on which they supervene.  
Instead, Scruton states that sounds and tones (acoustical and musical objects, respectively) are 
merely two incommensurable ways of conceptualizing the exact same phenomenon: our 
perception of the underlying physical air vibrations.36  As a result, we can correctly talk about a 
musical performance using either exclusively auditory concepts, such as (changes in) frequencies 
and amplitudes, or exclusively musical concepts—most relevantly, in terms of harmonic, 
melodic, and rhythmic organization.  But only the latter way is to talk about the performance as 
music. 
Because tones are imagined, rather than real, objects, Scruton suggests that the proper 
notion of identity for music should be “intentional identity,” as conceived by P. T. Geach.  Take 
the sentence, “Hob thinks a witch has blighted Bob’s mare, and Nob wonders whether she (the 
same witch) killed Cob’s sow.”37  Hob and Nob’s intentional attitudes have a common focus 
even though nothing exists at that focus, since there are (in fact) no witches.38  Similarly, say we 
are listening to a musical performance and perceive a recapitulated theme transposed into a 
different key.  In recognizing it as such, we intend to identify the recapitulation as the 
reappearance of the one and the same theme that we previously heard, despite the fact that they 
are qualitatively different.  Furthermore, we are even able to identify one and the same theme in 
different works of music through the use of musical quotation—e.g., Britten’s incorporation of 
parts of Mahler’s Fifth Symphony’s second movement in his fourth Sea Interlude, which was 
discussed in the previous chapter.   
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Even though the two themes in both these cases are not numerically identical, we treat 
them as if they were; and were we not able to do so, our experience of music would be 
completely different from how it actually is.  Scruton concludes that this must be because, in the 
imagined world of tones, the parts of a musical work can be intentionally reidentified over time.  
Since tones seem to be individuals in Strawson’s sense, Scruton calls them “quasi-individuals,” 
which we treat as if they admit of numerical identity.39  On Scruton’s account, then, tones are 
somehow able to bootstrap epistemically from our capacity to identify (and reidentify) them 
intentionally to our capacity to do so numerically, and this is what accounts for our actual 
musical experience.  Unfortunately, Scruton never fills in the “somehow;” and thus this move is 
epistemologically dubious.    
Individual tones, or notes, form chords and phrases, which form melodies, which form 
themes, which evolve through variations to form movements, the concatenation of which 
constitutes the musical work.  It follows from this on Scruton’s view that, similar to individual 
tones, musical works inhabit the imagined tonal world we superimpose onto the auditory reality 
we perceive.  As a result, Scruton defines a musical work as the “intentional object” of an 
auditory pattern that we hear in that pattern.40  Unless they possess some peculiar feature(s), 
notes are generally too simple to count as quasi-individuals, since we usually cannot reidentify 
them across time.  But phrases, melodies, and the rest are complex enough to allow for 
reidentification.  And because a musical work is the concatenation of its parts, it admits of 
reidentification in the same way.   
The identity conditions of a musical work, according to Scruton, are relative pitch, 
duration, measure, and tempo, because they contribute to the work’s tonal organization—i.e., its 
rhythmic, melodic, and harmonic arrangement.41  Authentic versions or performances of a work 
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can vary in all sorts of perceptibly recognizable ways, so long as they completely preserve its 
tonal organization.  But if a version or performance disrupts or reorders any aspect of the work’s 
tonal organization, whether intentionally or not, it will not count as a performance of that work; 
instead, it will count as a performance of a different, though historically related, work.  From 
this, Scruton can be understood as holding a type of property dualism with regard to the identity 
of musical works, since he believes that a work is irreducible to the specific auditory pattern in 
which it is perceived, since we can hear one and the same musical work in auditory patterns with 
widely divergent qualities—played on different instruments, at different tempos, with different 
dynamics, etc.42  
In the acousmatic world into which Scruton alleges music induces us, sounds exist 
independently from the objects that (typically) emit them.  So musical works cannot be reduced 
to or explained by the instruments that are the means of their physical production.  Scruton 
supports this claim by appealing to the fact that an individual melody can be passed from 
instrument to instrument (or between instrumental groups) without our recognizing an 
interruption.  That is, despite the qualitative changes, we perceive and understand it as one and 
the same melody.43  Not only is this gap between the concrete (auditory) world and the tonal 
(musical) world ontological, it is also epistemological.   
Scruton contends that to hear the instruments in the music, so to speak, is to make use of 
a notion of causation that is debarred from our experience of a musical work, qua quasi-
individual in the acousmatic world.44  Consequently, we are not allowed to infer from a sound or 
series of sounds the specific (or even type of) instrument that produces it because our musical 
experience, qua purely auditory experience, does not possess the epistemic resources to justify 
such an extra-musical causal inference.45  But this is not to say that Scruton believes causation 
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plays no role in our musical experience.  Indeed, he takes it to be central to how we perceive and 
talk about music.  However, instead of the ordinary, prohibited notion of causation, Scruton 
claims that music exhibits a “virtual causation” in which “one tone does not merely give rise to 
its successor; it creates the conditions which make the successor a right or appropriate response 
to it.”46  Scruton believes the causal order we hear in tones, qua quasi-individuals existing in the 
imagined acousmatic world, to be that of reason-governed action, which requires the Fregean 
sort of imaginative listening he maintains.   
Scruton further believes that imaginatively listening to music produces a “metaphorical 
experience” of the music.  In particular, he claims that our experience of music is permeated with 
metaphors of life: of space, movement, and animation.47  These metaphors, Scruton contends, are 
indispensable to our experience of music—take them away, he believes, and our experience 
would no longer be of music, but of chaotic noise.48  Metaphors can be eliminated from 
descriptions of the material world (viewed scientifically), but not from descriptions of our 
musical experiences (viewed aesthetically), which Scruton takes to indicate that the experiences 
themselves must be metaphorical.49  While this move is highly dubious, Scruton claims that it 
provides further evidence for his claim that music exists in the intentional acousmatic world,50 
far removed from ordinary experience, which motivates many of his skeptical arguments against 
musical representation that result from the seeing-in aspect of his account.  
 
4.2.2. Music’s standing within the seeing-in theory of representation  
Since it is from unequivocally representational paintings that Scruton claims to derive his 
seeing-in account, a painting will help illustrate its three conditions.  Without prompting from 
external aids, the Mona Lisa provides the visual impression of a woman to any viewer with even 
the most basic familiarity with the conventions within which it was produced.  As a result, 
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condition (1), which states that we must become minimally aware of the work’s subject without 
external aids, is met.  The painting’s title merely serves to tell us who this particular woman is, 
rather than to indicate that the work is (in fact) meant to be a representation.  Additionally, in 
perceiving the woman, we simultaneously perceive the flat surface of the canvas, the thickness of 
the painting smeared on it, and all of the other sensible features of the medium.  The painting 
satisfies condition (2), therefore, because in viewing it we are clearly aware of both the 
painting’s surface features and the woman we see in them—i.e., the medium and the subject are 
appreciably distinct.51  Finally, we would not say that someone who failed to see a woman in the 
Mona Lisa has fully understood the painting.  We would say, instead, that their aesthetic 
experience of the work is greatly impoverished.  To be interested in the Mona Lisa, therefore, is 
centrally to be interested in the woman da Vinci has put in his painting for us to see.  For this 
reason, the work meets condition (3). 
This points to a general feature of Scruton’s account that Davies highlights,52 and which 
he also shares.53  For Scruton, an artwork is a representation (of a particular subject) only if its 
creator intends it to be.54  Specifically, a representational artwork is created with the intention 
that Scruton’s first three conditions be satisfied.55  For an artwork to be representational, then, 
there must be sufficient background conventions within its medium to allow for representation; 
otherwise, the artist’s intention is merely a wish that cannot be fulfilled.56  While the visual 
medium of painting allows an artist’s representational intentions to be met, Scruton and Davies 
believe that music’s auditory medium (generally) does not. 
Scruton begins his skeptical argument with the thought that if music is capable of 
representing anything, it should be able to represent sound.  Consequently, he examines musical 
imitation as a possible route to representation.57  Within the Western tradition, we find that music 
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imitates both musical and (natural or manmade) non-musical sounds.  The popular music in 
Mozart’s Don Giovanni and the Lutheran hymn in Richard Wagner’s Die Meistersinger von 
Nürnberg provide examples of the former sort of imitation, while the birdsongs in Beethoven’s 
Sixth Symphony and locomotive sounds in Arthur Honegger’s Pacific 231 provide examples of 
the latter sort.  Scruton contends that both types of musical imitation fail to meet his second 
condition because, when perceiving them, the distinction between subject and medium dissolves 
due to the simple fact that both are sound.58   
On its face, this seems to be especially true for the musical imitation of musical sounds.  
Scruton says of the first example, “The light orchestra placed on the stage by Mozart in Don 
Giovanni imitates the sound of popular music only by reproducing it.  Representation is achieved 
through the purely theatrical, non-musical convention that what is on the stage is part of the 
action.”59  In Don Giovanni, the route to representation is theatrical rather than purely musical.  
Moreover, contemporary light orchestra tones are both the subject and the medium of Mozart’s 
work.  Condition (2) is thus not satisfied, and so the music fails to be representational.  Davies 
concurs, noting that Mozart’s reference to popular music is achieved by the direct quotation of 
three other contemporary works, one of which was “Non Più Andrai” from his own Le nozze di 
Figaro.  The reason this does not count as representation, according to Davies, is that in making 
use of these works Mozart does not change their idiom or alter them to fit the style of his work; 
instead, he simply presents them unaltered.60   
While Don Giovanni fails to satisfy Scruton’s second condition, the other example of the 
musical imitation of music offered above does not.  Wagner does not merely reproduce quaint 
church music in Die Meistersinger, an opera set in sixteenth-century Bavaria.  Rather, as Kivy 
observes, a full orchestra accompanies a sixteenth-century hymn, which utilizes the resources of 
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nineteenth-century harmony.61  No adequately educated listener would confuse Wagner’s music 
with quaint church music; instead, we hear a sixteenth-century hymn in the work.  The 
distinction between subject and medium is upheld, since sixteenth-century church music 
(subject) is represented in a nineteenth-century style (medium).  Generalizing from this, as both 
Kivy62 and Davies63 do, any musical work that imitates other music in a different style or idiom 
should be said to represent that music because not only does it satisfy condition (2), but the other 
two seeing-in conditions, as well.  It satisfies them because (1) any sufficiently educated listener 
should recognize the music it represents and (3) such a listener will certainly be interested in its 
presentation in its new musical surroundings.  Contrary to Scruton, then, the musical imitation of 
music sometimes counts as representation, by his own lights. 
In addition to opposing the representational status of the musical imitation of music in 
general, Scruton also argues that musical imitations of non-musical sounds do not count as 
representations because they fail to distinguish between subject and medium, thereby failing to 
satisfy his second condition.  But given Scruton’s ontology, this is patently false.  As we saw 
earlier, Scruton claims that music is not comprised of sounds, but rather of the tones that 
supervene on them.  Ordinary notions of spatial location and causation apply to real world 
sounds, but not to tones.  The musical imitation in these cases are not sound-to-sound, as Scruton 
contends, but tone-to-sound, since the musical tones correspond to real world sounds.  Because 
the subject-medium distinction is upheld, the musical imitation of non-musical sounds always 
satisfies condition (2).   
A problem arises, however.  By imitating non-musical sounds, composers are often 
attempting to represent the objects that typically emit them, and not merely the sounds 
themselves.  For instance, by imitating a cuckoo’s call in his Sixth Symphony’s second 
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movement, “Szene am Bach,” Beethoven may also be intending to represent the (almost certainly 
fictional) cuckoo that makes it within the scene targeted by the movement.  But Scruton argues 
that this is impossible.  In attending to music we are attending to the acousmatic world whose 
sole occupants are tones and from which concrete particulars, such as the cuckoo and the clarinet 
that imitates its call, have been ontologically and epistemologically exiled.  Moreover, the 
concrete particulars themselves are not imitated by the music; rather, the sounds they emit, which 
exist as independent secondary objects, are.  While musical imitation may “gesture” toward 
concrete objects, according to Scruton, it cannot represent them.64  It seems the musical 
representation of non-auditory objects is doomed from the outset.   
Scruton’s sole reason for disallowing gesturing as a musical route to representation is that 
our thoughts about what is being gestured toward by the music are indeterminate—e.g., all we 
know is that there is a cuckoo somewhere; we do not know what it is doing, where it is 
specifically located, and so on.  This violates condition (4) because the music tells us nothing 
about the cuckoo.  But since this condition has been rejected, this line of argumentation is 
blocked.  As such, departing from Scruton, Davies contends that when hearing the clarinet in the 
Sixth Symphony’s second movement, we are licensed to move in thought from “the sound of a 
cuckoo’s call” to “the presence of a cuckoo,” which we entertain rather than affirm.65  This 
particularly Fregean locution66 is perfectly consistent with Scruton’s account of the 
imagination’s role in aesthetic experience.67  This means that, once condition (4) is rejected, 
Scruton’s overall theory of our musical experience has within it the resources to accommodate 
gesturing as a purely musical route to representation (on his seeing-in theory).   
Davies believes that we can move in thought from “the sound of x” to “x’s presence” 
because we regularly identify (and name) sounds by the objects that typically produce them, and 
 73 
accurate imitation allows us to do this with music.68  By making use of the strong association 
between sounds and the objects that typically emit them, the composer invites us to 
imaginatively posit the objects into our musical experience—i.e., we entertain (without 
affirming) the idea that in listening to the music we are also attending to the objects themselves.  
Gesturing via imitation, then, constitutes a genuine musical route to representation.  It is 
certainly one that composers have often employed in their attempts to represent extra-musical 
objects, events, and states of affairs.   
To be clear, gesturing occurs when a composer, in order to remind us of and thereby refer 
to a particular target—an extra-musical object, event, or state of affairs, comprising part of the 
work’s subject—uses a musical phenomenon that imitates, or “sounds like,” a sound typically 
emitted by that target.  For instance, using the previous example, Beethoven imitates a cuckoo’s 
call to refer us to the cuckoo that comprises part of the subject of “Szene am Bach.”  Because 
highly accurate musical imitations of non-musical sounds make us aware of their subjects 
unprompted, they also satisfy Scruton’s first condition.  Such imitations consequently meet 
condition (3) by interesting us in their intended subjects—e.g., by leading us to wonder about the 
cuckoo’s activities and whereabouts within the scene depicted.  Therefore, it is consistent with 
Scruton’s pre-skeptical commitments—and since condition (4) is no longer of any concern—that 
easily recognizable musical imitations of non-musical sounds should count as genuine 
representations. 
While Scruton could possibly allow this for a few special cases, he would counter that 
even if musical imitations can interest us in their intended subjects, most are not accurate enough 
to gesture clearly to their subjects on their own, and thus must rely on programmatic aids to 
secure reference to them.  Since this violates his first condition, Scruton would conclude that 
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most musical imitations fail to be representational.  Thus, while it seems we can easily recognize 
the clarinet’s cuckoo call in Beethoven’s Pastoral without prior knowledge of the program, it is 
almost certain that no listener would recognize the flute’s nightingale call without additional 
assistance, since it is not very accurate.  Scruton is correct that cases of recognizing the auditory 
object of a musical imitation unprompted are few.   
But imitation is only one way that composers have attempted to secure reference (on my 
view, by exploiting antecedent resemblances) to non-auditory objects, events, and states of 
affairs.  There is an important set of works of program music that make little or no use of the 
imitation of musical sound, among which are Hector Berlioz’ Symphonie Fantastique and 
Richard Strauss’ Till Eulenspiegels lustige Streiche.  By their very nature, such works require 
programmatic aids in order for us to recognize not only their subjects, but, more fundamentally, 
that they are meant to be representations in the first place.  Without Strauss having provided us 
with a title and program, we surely would not recognize the initial horn call in Till Eulenspiegel 
as the statement of the titular protagonist’s theme, which, through repetition and variation, 
infects the rest of the orchestra in the work’s introductory measures, leading to the D clarinet’s 
statement of his second theme, which is also unknowable as corresponding to Till without the 
program.69  According to Scruton, in such attempts at representation, “the composer is apt to 
depend on a specific literary reference in order to secure the hearer’s complicity in what is better 
described as an imaginative endeavor than as an inevitable perception.”70  That is, since such 
pieces of music, which comprise nearly all program works, cannot guarantee that the listener will 
recognize the intended subject through purely musical means, they fail to be genuinely 
representational.   
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So far only unprompted musical imitations, which Kivy dubs “musical pictures,”71 fully 
satisfy Scruton’s seeing-in theory of representation.  The question before us now is whether any 
sort of prompted musical representation, including ambiguous imitations of non-musical sounds 
and non-imitational attempts to represent non-auditory objects, events, and states of affair, meet 
Scruton’s third condition.  This is just the assimilation bias argument, which cannot be answered 
satisfactorily until we have a full account of how this sort of representation is achieved.  This is 
the subject of Chapters 3 and 4, in which I argue that representation is guaranteed for these 
works because they resemble (in the right sort of ways) the things referred to or implied by their 
accompanying programmatic aids.  Since this cannot be developed here, the following discussion 
will function to clear the ground for my theory’s plausibility.   
Scruton’s third condition, which claims that an interest in representation requires an 
interest in a work’s subject, presents the greatest challenge to the account of representation I 
wish to develop, for it implies that one cannot fully understand a successful artistic 
representation without recognizing that it is, in fact, a representation.72  It would be absurd for us 
to say that a viewer who treats the Mona Lisa as a pure abstraction, and thus fails to see the 
woman in the painting, has fully understood the painting.  But Scruton contends that this is not 
the case for the alleged musical representations under consideration, which he believes we can 
fully understand while being deaf to their representational content.73  Moreover, Scruton argues 
that even if we are aware of a program work’s representational claims, this will very rarely 
influence our understanding of the music, as an aesthetic object understood in purely 
musicological terms.74  From this, Scruton draws the conclusion that musical form and 
representational content are wholly independent from one another, and thus that there is nothing 
particularly “musical” about how works of program music represent (if they do at all). 
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Davies believes that evidence for Scruton’s conclusion resides in that fact that, as he 
correctly notes, “almost without exception, composers of program music have maintained that 
their music should possess a musical integrity that does not depend on its being 
‘representational’.”75  In other words, representational works aspire to the condition of absolute 
music because their composers wish them to be evaluable in those terms.  No musically educated 
listener would accept a composer’s attempt at representation as a legitimate excuse for bad 
music.76  This objection to the possibility of musical representation only succeeds, however, if 
we accept the skeptics’ move of setting musical form over and above representational content, 
which seems to be bolstered by the wish of composers of program music for their works to be 
evaluated in just this way.   
While my response to this objection cannot be discussed until after the next chapter, for 
the moment it is worth noting that the form-content distinction is one that few practicing 
musicians take seriously.  (It is also one that Goodman gives us good reason to be suspicious 
of.77)  Of course composers want their program works to possess musical integrity.  Their 
attempts at representation would be of no aesthetic interest if the relevant passages of the works 
did not fit in and further the musical progressions within those works.78  Such non-cohesive 
musical representations would be curiosities meriting only a passing mention within the 
philosophy of music, similar to how the optical illusions of trompe l’oeil paintings are treated by 
theories of pictorial representation.   
Davies further defends Scruton’s conclusion, which upholds the distinction between 
musical form and representational content, by arguing,  
Even if the phenomenal experience differs between listeners one of whom 
attends to the programmatic title of a musical work and one of whom does not, 
it is not apparent that the difference need reflect a difference in musical 
understanding such as to debar the second listener from appreciating the piece 
as the work it is.79 
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The difference between the listener who experiences a program work as a representation and the 
one who does not resides almost exclusively for Davies in the terms each uses to describe the 
same aspects of the musical structure.  Using Debussy’s La Mer as his example, Davies says that 
a listener of the first sort may describe the work “in suitably ‘watery’ terms—ebb and flow, 
currents, waves, spume,” whereas a listener of the second sort will instead talk of “the power of 
the bass-line, harmonic clashes, and so forth.”80  One way to explain this difference, toward 
which Scruton and certainly Davies are inclined, would be to claim that the first sort of listener 
simply lacks the requisite musicological training and technical vocabulary to describe the work 
in purely musical terms.  As such, their use of representational language to describe La Mer 
merely serves as epistemic training-wheels, which, with practice, should eventually be removed 
as they acquire a formal musical education.  (As will be made apparent in Chapter 4, on my 
theory, a combination of both ways of describing the piece of music is what education should 
achieve.) 
 One may be tempted to think that by positing two modes of understanding works of 
program music, one representational and the other purely musical, Davies has sown the seeds of 
the skeptical position’s undoing.  To counter Davies, one might argue that any utterance made by 
one listener can be translated into the other’s vocabulary.  When a listener of the second sort 
hears one of the first sort describe a certain part of La Mer in terms of “violently crashing 
waves,” she takes this to mean, “a harmonic clash ending in a crescendo,” and so on for any such 
description.  What we have, then, are two commensurable ways of understanding the same 
musical phenomena.  Both listeners may have a genuine musical understanding of the work, 
therefore, but simply express it in different terms.  This response misses the mark, however, 
because, as Davies notes, the same sort of translation into the purely musical lexicon could be 
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done for one who, falling prey to the confirmation bias argument, mistakenly hears La Mer as a 
representation of the composer’s mother and describes the same part of the work as “an 
emotionally turbulent time leading to an outburst of anger.”81  By the same line of reasoning 
presented above, this listener points to the same salient features and thus genuinely understands 
the music, but merely expresses it differently.   
This consequence should be unacceptable to any defender of a robust theory of musical 
representation who takes the composer’s intentions seriously.82  In order to respond to the 
skeptics adequately, one must instead show that form and content are inseparable, that a 
representational understanding of program works enhances our purely musical understanding of 
them—i.e., to listen to such works as absolute music is not to understand certain relevant aspects 
of the music fully—, and vice versa.  In short, one must show that we have a better musical 
understanding of program works as music when we perceive and understand them as 
representations, which I do in Chapter 4.   
I lay the groundwork for this demonstration in the next chapter, in which I analyze each 
of the representational techniques outlined in the beginning of this chapter.  Before doing so, it is 
worth noting that the very existence of such a typology, produced by looking at examples of 
works of program music, undercuts what Davies believes to be a knockdown objection to the 
very possibility of musical representation.  He asks, 
Are there general methods for musical depiction such that, when they are 
followed, many different sounds, objects, or states of affairs might be 
depicted?  Are there conventions (as there are for perspective in various 
styles of pictorial depictions) for mapping musical features onto the world in 
a systematic fashion?  I think not.83 
 
The analysis provided in the next chapter should prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that Davies 
thinks wrongly.  I turn to this task presently. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE REPRESENTATIONAL TECHNIQUES 
RESEMBLANCE, REFERENCE, AND THE GLOBAL CORRESPONDENCE SCHEME 
 
In the previous chapter I responded to several skeptical objections to the possibility of 
musical representation in order to clear the ground for my theory.  As this and the following 
chapter unfold, more evidence will be offered to bolster my responses to the skeptics.  In the 
present chapter, I argue in favor of my theory’s central ontological claim: that the exploitation of 
resemblances between the music and the world lies at the heart of musical representation.  To do 
so, I analyze the techniques introduced in Chapter 2 to demonstrate that each acquires its 
representational abilities—or contributes to the representational whole of a program work—only 
in virtue of its function within the global, maximally coarse-grained correspondence scheme 
between the work and its subject (i.e., the structural resemblance that the work bears to its 
subject at the largest scale) and by exploiting or creating local, finer-grained resemblances 
between the work and its subject.  The result is a holistic conception of musical representation, 
which asserts that a complex representing structure can be so only if all sorts of smaller things 
are right—where what counts as rightness in those items depends on the larger context.  If there 
are too many mismatches at the local, smaller-scale levels, then the work would count not just as 
a highly inaccurate representation of its subject, but worse, as a misrepresentation, and thus a 
failure.  
The techniques adduced in the previous chapter divide into two general classes based on 
how (from the smaller scale) they enable a program work (as a whole) to represent its subject.  
Members of the first class, which I call correspondence-enabling resemblances (CeRs), (when 
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employed at a lower level of w) secure nonlinguistic reference to s—or create local, finer-grained 
correspondences to s through purely musical means—by resembling their targets in s, t1…, tn, in 
virtue of either (i) sharing some of their auditory or non-auditory properties, (ii) expressing 
emotions similar to those specifically expressed by or generally appropriate to t1…, tn, or (iii) 
imitating certain aspects of t1…, tn’s auditory organization.  These techniques function 
representationally by resembling smaller-scale targets in s, and thus acquire some 
representational content of their own, which they then impart to the increasingly higher-level 
correspondences between w and s into which they figure integrally as w unfolds in real time.   
Members of the second class, resemblance-enabling references (ReRs), have little or no 
representational content of their own—or, at least, whatever content they do acquire factors into 
their representational function within w less than that acquired by the CeRs.  Instead, (when 
employed at a lower level of w) they activate some of w’s potential content at higher levels 
through direct conventional (linguistic or language-like) reference to their targets in s by either 
(iv) baldly stipulating them, (v) exploiting their preexisting associations with other musical 
works, or (vi) using nonstandard instruments (or using standard instruments in a nonstandard 
way) that draw attention to themselves within their surroundings.  These techniques function 
representationally by fixing some of w’s smaller-scale targets in s, forming the basis of 
increasingly large-scale resemblances between w and s as w unfolds in real time.  That is, ReRs 
fill in some of the lower-level placeholders left open by the global correspondence scheme 
between w and s, consequently becoming representational content for the next levels up the 
compositional hierarchy. 
Both classes of techniques—any member of which can be used in concert with any other, 
as most program works make use of multiple techniques to render their subjects both more 
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accurately and successfully—function at the smaller scale within their works, and whatever 
content they may acquire (if any) is made available for exploitation by the higher levels of 
organization within the global correspondence scheme.  One main difference, though, is that 
CeRs correspond to their targets because of properties, structures, or relations that they possess 
internally.  ReRs rely less on their internal features to correspond to their ultimate targets in s and 
more on their external relationships to other parts of w—or, at most, they rely on each equally, as 
is the case with technique (vi).  As a result, their representational function in w is less 
straightforward than the CeR’s.   
So far I have sketched my account at a very high level of abstraction.  I turn shortly to 
filling in the finer-grained details by way of several examples, analyzing each technique in turn 
and highlighting their relationships to each other.  Before doing so, though, it is worth pausing to 
discuss my appeal to a certain set of binary concepts in the preceding discussion to articulate my 
account—i.e., more or less local or global, smaller- or larger-scale, lower- or higher-level, finer- 
or coarser-grained—as they pertain to the global correspondence scheme between a work and its 
subject.   
The relationship between higher-level phenomena (objects, properties, structures, and 
relations) and the lower-level ones upon which they supervene is a deeply important one in many 
areas of philosophy.  My theory argues that not only do lower-level musical phenomena exert an 
organizational (causal) force on higher-level ones, i.e., influence their arrangement and resulting 
audible effects, but also that higher-level musical phenomena likewise exert an organizational 
force on the lower-level ones that (fully or partially) account for them.  This latter concept, 
known as “downward causation,” is deeply controversial within the philosophies of mind and 
science.1  I recognize that a host of problems arise when philosophers in these fields appeal to 
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downward causation to explain naturally occurring phenomena, such as the claim that conscious 
states affect change at the neural level or that biological processes reach down and alter the 
quantum events upon which they supervene.  But downward causation poses fewer difficulties 
when used to explain intentionally organized systems, such as works of music (whether program 
or absolute), and the practices associated with their composition, consumption, and 
comprehension.2   
In order to achieve a certain desired higher-level audible effect, say, unity or closure, the 
composer must arrange the participating small-scale phenomena in a certain way, or within a 
certain limited range of ways, to produce it.  Here, the desired effect exerts a causal influence as 
to how the lower-level phenomena must be arranged in order for it to be achieved.  Similarly, 
while the work is unfolding in real time, our experience of larger-scale musical phenomena may 
cause us to revise our prior (reflective or unreflective) judgments regarding the smaller-scale 
phenomena that give rise to them.  For instance, the experience of a deceptive cadence may 
temporarily cause us to reconsider our judgment regarding the key of the tonic, as we desire, but 
ultimately fail, to make the cadence fit with the progression that precedes it, which produces the 
sense of unease intended by the composer.  More locally, whether a chord or figure sounds stable 
or unstable, consonant or dissonant, introductory, transitional, or resolutive, and the like, depends 
upon its immediate and, I claim, (less obvious) distant surroundings.   
For instance, Roger Scruton says of musical dissonance that its “harmonic essence […] 
lies not so much in the pattern of overtones that causes us to register it, as in the relations of 
tension, transition and resolution that [one chord] bears to surrounding chords.”3  (As I discuss in 
the next chapter, Scruton wrongly denies that the properties exhibited by a given auditory 
phenomenon are affected by temporally and hierarchically distant musical phenomena.)  
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Consequently, the exact same sounds (when heard by themselves) may exhibit different 
properties, sometimes radically different ones, depending upon their musical surroundings.  A 
perfectly standard jazz augmentation of a major chord, e.g., would sound intolerably dissonant in 
most classical works.  Such differences can become so stark that the sounds may even be 
perceived and recognized as distinct musical phenomena.  As Scruton notes, offering numerous 
helpful examples, “musical analysis often distinguishes identical sounds.  Depending on context, 
a chord may be given several conflicting descriptions.”4  The identities of musical phenomena 
are as much dependent upon extrinsic relationships as on their intrinsic properties. 
I suggest broadening Scruton’s previous statement (in a way that he would likely be 
amenable to) to assert that, more fundamental than technical musical analysis, ordinary (largely 
unreflective) musical experience often distinguishes identical sounds, as divergent analyses often 
depend upon ordinary experience.  Our abilities to discriminate both difference in sameness, as 
the above suggests, and sameness in difference (which psychologists call “perceptual 
constancy,” of which there are multiple types), such as (musically) when we experience a 
melody played on different instruments or in different keys as “the same melody” or (visually) 
when we experience the objects in our rooms as retaining their shapes and colors from dawn to 
dusk,5 reside near the core of our aesthetic experiences. 
The properties exhibited by musical phenomenon ϕ, and even ϕ’s identity, depend not 
only on ϕ’s internal features but also on its extrinsic relationships to temporally near and distant 
musical phenomena at the same, lower, and higher levels of w’s compositional hierarchy.  The 
properties and identities of these phenomena, in turn, depend upon their relationships to both ϕ 
and other musical phenomena, from the most elementary musical objects and processes to the 
maximally coarse-grained aesthetic object we experience and understand as w.  That is, the set of 
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properties exhibited by individual musical phenomena, which is the source of their very 
individuation, is conferred via the complex, dynamic, trans-hierarchical interplay between and 
amongst the parts the systematic totality of which comprises w as a unified musical whole.  And 
there seem to be no principled grounds by which to deny the perceptual or evaluative impact that 
one musical phenomenon, no matter how temporally or hierarchically distant, can have on 
another.  This account, especially the last claim, is by no means uncontroversial.  It is given an 
extended treatment and defense in the next chapter.  
Similarities to other types of art are illuminating here.  Regarding visual media, Ernst 
Gombrich notes that, similar to musical properties, the identities of visible properties, which we 
might normally conceive of as “simple,” are in fact necessarily relational.  For instance, we 
perceive a white tablecloth in the shade as brighter than a piece of coal in the sunlight even if, 
isolated in a side-by-side comparison, the latter is in fact lighter than the former.  The same is 
true in paintings.  A swath that we perceive as bright white in one painting may appear dull or 
even not white in another due to their respective surroundings.6  The identities of local visual 
phenomena, or at least the experiences they engender, are (thus) deeply affected by their 
extrinsic relations to other visual phenomena. 
Turning to higher-order pictorial phenomena, consider Dutch baroque interior paintings, 
many of which include depictions of other paintings.7  The representing painting’s subject is a 
particular room and, to render it accurately, one of its particular targets, a hung painting of, say, a 
landscape, must be included.  For simplicity, call the representing painting Interior, and the 
represented painting Landscape.  Landscape, as one object among many, bears certain spatial 
and other visible relationships to the other objects in the room, and those relations, taken 
abstractly, comprise the global correspondence scheme between Interior and its subject (the 
 85 
room).  Taken in isolation from its surroundings, the stretch of Interior’s canvas in which 
Landscape is located may contain trees, streams, woodland creatures, and the like, but Interior, 
taken as a whole, does not—trees (et al.) were not typical seventeenth-century Dutch furniture.  
While Landscape represents a natural setting, Interior represents a domestic setting that happens 
to include a landscape-representation (Landscape), as well as other objects and the relations they 
bear to Landscape and to each other.  So the representational whole of Interior affects the 
identity of its parts—painterly trees (et al.), rather than real ones, are among its targets, and their 
internally possessed properties, structures, and relations to each other comprise some of 
Interior’s representational content.  
Similar to these examples from painting, higher-order linguistic phenomena play an 
important role in the identities (or meanings) of lower-order phenomena in both ordinary 
language and the literary arts.  While the meanings of words are relatively fixed, they can be 
stretched and given shades of nuance, and their specific senses depend upon their surroundings.  
What a given word means in one context may be radically different in another.  And the more 
words we put together (in phrases, sentences, paragraphs, etc.), the more opportunity there is for 
variation—as in metaphor, pun, double entendre, irony, and other such linguistic devices.  
Moreover, their specific connotations may be anticipated by earlier words (phrases, etc.) or may 
require revision due to later words (phrases, etc.).  For instance, how we interpret the sentence, 
“He went to the bank where his father’s belongings had been deposited,” will depend upon 
whether we are being told about a fiduciary transaction or a steamboat wreck.  This is as true of 
ordinary language as it is of poetry.  Indeed, part of the poet’s craft is to elevate this banal fact 
about ordinary language to the level of high art.   
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Moving from words to the things they are about, in works of narrative literature, as well 
as in plays and films, later moments in the plot can force us to revise our prior judgments 
regarding specific characters or events (e.g., the revelation that Norman Bates is his mother in 
Hitchcock’s Psycho), which, for suitably sensitive and attentive readers or viewers, can also be 
anticipated (foreshadowed) by previously occurring events (e.g., that Norman’s mother is never 
actually shown in any previous scene).  This deeply interconnected, complex network of 
temporally unfolding lower- and higher-order, finer- and coarser-grained inferential relationships 
between (fictional or fictionalized) objects, events, and states of affairs comprises the narrative, 
which is a dynamic hierarchical structure, bears a strong analogy to works of music.  It is for this 
reason that music is better suited to representing (dynamic) narrative subjects rather than 
(relatively static) pictorial ones.  To return briefly to the discussion from the previous chapter, 
the standards set by pictures, contrary to Scruton, are simply not the right ones by which to judge 
music’s representational possibilities.  
The above suggests that musical phenomena (objects, events, and states of affairs, and the 
properties they exhibit), just like swaths of paint and stretches of painted canvas, words (phrases, 
etc.), and literary characters and events, do not acquire their properties and identities in a 
vacuum.  Any attempt to understand them must involve an appeal to the other phenomena with 
which they are related within their respective artworks.  As this is the case, the complex network 
of upward and downward relationships subsisting (through mutual feedback) between (a) a 
musical whole and its parts and (b) its subject, s, and the system of smaller-scale targets that (i) 
give rise to s and (ii) are brought about by s as a result of its association with the musical whole, 
are of the utmost importance to my theory.  Their ontological and epistemological relevance will 
be made clear as the discussion proceeds in this and the next chapter, respectively. 
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1. Technique (i): simple property sharing 
 The title of this section can be interpreted in two ways: that technique (i) functions 
representationally through either “simply sharing single properties” or “the sharing of simple 
properties.”  The ambiguity here is intentional, as untangling these two senses figures 
prominently in my analysis of the technique.  I argue that the former interpretation (with some 
important qualifications), and not the latter, is the correct way to describe how technique (i) 
functions representationally within a work of program music.  Peter Kivy thinks otherwise, 
arguing that some program works represent their subjects not only in virtue of sharing single 
properties with them, but more importantly by sharing simple properties with them.  But the 
preceding discussion seriously calls this view into question, and none of the examples Kivy 
adduces actually support it. 
Kivy’s main example is a moment from the first movement of Part I of Haydn’s oratorio 
Die Schöpfung, “Im Anfange schuf Gott Himmel und Erde.”  This movement renders the words 
of Genesis 1:1-4 into music, building to the climactic moment when God introduces light into the 
universe.  Haydn uses a C-major chord played fortissimo by the entire orchestra, c, to represent 
God’s First Light, l.  The reason Haydn’s intention succeeds, Kivy concludes, is solely because c 
and l are both irreducibly bright, and not because of any structural similarities the passage in 
which c is embedded might bear to its larger-scale biblical target (of which l is a part).8  But a 
closer examination of this passage reveals a complexity to c (and its correspondence to l) that 
Kivy suggests it lacks, which indicates that the mere possession of “simple” brightness by both c 
and l, taken in isolation from their respective organizational systems, does not and cannot bear 
the representational burden by itself. 
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C-major chords are not bright simpliciter.  In one context, that arrangement of notes (C, 
E, G) may be perceived as remarkably bright, as is the case with c in any worthy performance of 
Die Schöpfung, while in another its brightness may be unremarkable, while in still another it may 
be perceived as not bright at all, perhaps even as dull.  This makes musical brightness strongly 
analogous to visual brightness, since, as discussed above, the latter is necessarily relational.  
Kivy himself provides contextual clues for why we perceive c as bright, and thus a compelling 
reason to believe, despite his claims to the contrary, that its brightness is not simple (i.e., 
irreducible and non-contextual): 
At the opening of the Creation, after the representation of chaos (Die 
Vorstellung des Chaos), Haydn muddles about in the key of C minor, in 
subdued tones and low registers, with the chorus and bass soloist accompanied 
only by muted strings.  The sound is dark throughout, and reaches its nadir on 
the words: “And God said: Let there be light, and there was…,” sung by the 
chorus a capella, in unison.  But when the word “light” occurs again, in “and 
there was light,” the full orchestra, woodwind, brass, strings unmuted, comes 
on like Gangbusters, on the “brightest” imaginable C-major chord.9   
 
From Kivy’s own description, we discover that at least three larger-scale structural 
relations are relevant to c’s brightness: (1) the dynamic shift from soft to loud, (2) the move 
toward higher registers, and (3) the modulation from C minor to the parallel C major.  Haydn 
establishes our musical expectations of lowness, quiet, and instability at the outset of the 
movement, and then violates all of them simultaneously the moment c is played, which is why it 
targets l so effectively.  C’s brightness relative to what precedes it, rather than just its internal 
qualities is the resemblance Haydn actually exploits to represent his intended subject.  Similar to 
the universe prior to God’s intervention, what once was dark and unstable becomes extremely 
bright and stable.  The dynamic shift serves to increase the volume of c’s brightness, with the 
fortissimo (“as loud as possible”) contributing to make c sound as bright as possible.  
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Brightness is not only not a simple, irreducible property of c, it turns out that it is not 
even a single property of music in general.  We use “bright” to describe numerous diverse 
musical phenomena.  Among them are (a) timbre: sounds possessing fewer overtones are 
typically brighter than those with more overtones; (b) harmony: the more consonant and resonant 
a chord is, the brighter it typically is; (c) pitch height: higher registers are typically brighter than 
lower ones; (d) relative pitch: an ascending melodic line in any mode is typically brighter than 
the corresponding descending one; (e) pitch contour: keys that begin on higher notes are 
typically brighter than those beginning on lower notes; and (f) relative intonation: scale modes 
with less flattened intervals are typically brighter than those with more flattened intervals.10   
The brightness of the C-major chord in “Im Anfange schuf Gott Himmel und Erde” is 
accounted for by its fewer inharmonic overtones, higher register, increased consonance and 
resonance, and fewer flattened intervals relative to the preceding passages.  Similarly, l’s 
brightness is accounted for by its transparency, luminosity, and voluminosity relative to the 
preceding chaos.  Within their respective contexts, c and l are relatively clear (timbrally and 
visibly), relatively high on a continuum (of pitch and of luminosity), and fill whatever space they 
occupy (the concert hall and the universe).  So, contrary to Kivy’s assertion, c’s brightness is not 
simple and irreducible, but complex and relational.  By my lights, this only serves to enhance c’s 
resemblance to l, enabling it to acquire representational content of a much finer grain, which it 
then imparts (both prospectively and retrospectively) to the increasingly higher-level 
resemblances within the global correspondence scheme between Die Schöpfung and Genesis. 
Kivy’s conclusion that c represents l simply because they share “simple” brightness rests 
on his assumption that c could not target l if it were not also bright.  This suggests that Kivy 
advances a “bottom-up” conception of musical representation in which the representation of the 
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whole is derived from, and is fully reducible to, the representational abilities of its parts.  That is, 
w represents s because w’s parts—smaller-scale musical objects, relations, and states of affairs 
(relations holding over n-tuple objects), the systematic concatenation of which ultimately gives 
rise to w—already represent their small-scale targets, the systematic concatenation of which 
ultimately gives rise to s, on their own.11   
For Kivy, the first movement of Die Schöpfung, m, represents the narrative content of 
Genesis’ first four lines, g, because (at the small scale) c represents l, which is due to the fact that 
they share a single, salient property (brightness).  If c did not represent l independently of its 
function within m, then, according to Kivy, m could not represent the climactic moment of g.  M 
would instead represent God’s failed or aborted attempt to introduce light into the chaos, and 
thus Die Schöpfung would misrepresent the events referred to in Genesis.  As a result, for Kivy, 
the representational burden depends almost entirely on the successful execution of that C-major 
chord.  If we cannot perceive it as bright, then we have witnessed a representation of God’s 
failure or abortion rather than the creation Haydn intended.   
In arguing against this conception, I do not mean to discount the importance of c’s 
brightness.  That c is bright contributes to m’s successful representation of g; however, c does not 
represent l simply because, similar to l, it is also bright.  Brightness is a complex property that c 
comes to possess as a result of its relationships to other (higher-order) parts of m.  C’s ability to 
represent l, therefore, is more a function of its relations to its surroundings than of whatever 
features it happens to possess independently.  In short, c derives its ability to represent l from 
m.12   
Contrary to Kivy’s account, c possesses very little representational content of its own 
when taken in isolation.  Moreover, if context were not deeply important, as Kivy seems to 
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believe, it would seem to follow that every C-major chord exhibiting brightness, regardless of the 
work, would represent light (or, for that matter, anything else that is also bright)—an utterly 
indefensible consequence, as the resemblance of local properties is not sufficient for 
representation.  Instead, I contend that c’s potential representational content is activated by its 
surroundings in m, causing it to exhibit properties it lacked on its own (e.g., as Kivy describes it, 
that c is “the ‘brightest’ imaginable C-major chord”), which feed back into our musical 
experience and cause us to modify our prior judgments regarding those surroundings—that they 
were darker, more muddled, and less stable than previously recognized.  C and its surroundings 
mutually qualify each other in our experience of m, enabling c to better approximate l, which (at 
the higher level) causes m to represent g more accurately.  
My theory offers a holistic conception of representation in which Kivy’s “bottom-up” 
approach is integrated with a “top-down” approach.  Viewed from the top down, we get an 
overall sense of the global correspondence scheme between w and s.  We get this view on Die 
Schöpfung from both its evocative section titles and the libretto to which Haydn set the music, 
which describes the general narrative structure the work is meant to mirror, beginning with 
God’s creation of the universe out of chaos and concluding with Adam and Eve’s first joyous 
hours in the Garden, which is supplemented by our background knowledge of Genesis (upon 
which Haydn relies).  This gives us a very general interpretation scheme as to how the music will 
unfold that we subsequently employ, from the bottom up, in our experience of the musical 
progression as it is performed.  Each section of the piece fills in the finer-grained details—the 
lower-order placeholders—left open by the global correspondence scheme between the work and 
its subject by approximating their targets by resembling some of their properties, structures, or 
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relations.  How this operates within our experiences of sophisticated works of program music is 
the subject of the next chapter.  
Technique (i) functions representationally by sharing perceptual properties with lower-
level, smaller-scale targets in s.  The perceivable effect in Die Schöpfung of the low, muted 
strings in C minor is one of persistent darkness, while that of c, i.e., the higher, louder, abrupt 
shift to C major, is one of intense brightness.  By sharing these properties with their targets at the 
lower level, the musical shift from darkness to brightness (a higher-order relationship between 
two lower-lower phenomena) corresponds to the visual shift described in the libretto, following 
the narrative presented by Genesis.  How the properties are related to one another at a higher 
level within the music, rather than the properties themselves, is doing most of the 
representational work.  But that those properties are similar to those of their correlates in the 
subject furnishes them with some representational content of their own within the overarching 
correspondence scheme, which they immediately give up to the increasingly higher levels within 
the scheme as Die Schöpfung unfolds in real time, resulting in a more accurate and successful 
representation of the biblical story of God’s creation of the universe.   
But what is it to say that the work and its subject share the properties of darkness and 
brightness?  It certainly seems to be a category mistake to say that c’s brightness is of the same 
sort as that possessed by l.  If c is bright and the passage that precedes it is dark, it is only in 
virtue of prior linguistic conventions—a metaphorical transference of property predicates from 
vision to audition.  Technique (i) is unproblematic when the perceptual properties shared by w 
and s are auditory, such as when they have corresponding moments of loudness or quiet, but it 
seems less clear of properties exhibited in more than one sense modality, such as brightness, 
darkness, softness, hardness, thinness, thickness, sweetness, and sourness.  When w and s “share” 
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such properties, do they share anything more than synaesthetic predicates—mere labels, 
“bright,” “dark,” etc., that just happen to apply to more than one sense modality as a matter of 
linguistic convention?  Or are those shared predicates stronger than mere homonyms, directing 
our attention to genuine similarities between the auditory properties exhibited by parts of w and 
the other sorts of sensible properties to which they correspond in s?  
Kivy claims that the application of “bright” to c and l is univocal, and thus the word 
points to the same property possessed by both.  If “bright” were used equivocally, its application 
to both c and l would be merely homonymous and it would thus pick out two different properties.  
The consequence of this from the perspective of Kivy’s bottom-up account is that c could not 
represent l, since they do not genuinely share brightness.  Kivy’s argument for the univocity of 
“brightness” as applied to auditory and visual phenomena is unconvincing because it rests 
entirely upon his indefensible claim that brightness is simple, irreducible, non-contextual, and 
thus (following Locke) “unanalyzable.”  As Kivy puts it, “we cannot point to anything else in the 
music, or in the light, to support our claim that both possess brightness (that is, that both are 
‘bright’) other than the property of brightness itself.”13  However, above I pointed to numerous 
features in virtue of which both c and l are bright.   
Kivy’s account of technique (i) fails because the criterion for property sharing, strict 
sameness, is much too strong—the C-major chords’s brightness in Die Schöpfung, the darkness 
and softness of the strings in the passage preceding it, the thin timbres of a flute, the thick 
timbres of a cello, and the sweetness or sourness of a note, are simply not of the same sort as 
their visual, tactile, olfactory, and gustatory counterparts.  Albert Hayward also recognizes this 
defect of Kivy’s account, and suggests a convincing reformulation of Kivy’s criterion.  Hayward 
argues that the univocity of predicates and (thus) the sameness of properties are not needed.  He 
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insists, “[all that is needed] to show that there is a resemblance between musical and visual 
brightness is to establish some intersensory similarities among the things the word applies to 
without requiring that it name one and the same thing in each case.”14  This is precisely what I 
have doen above in showing how c and l are both correctly described as “bright”—i.e., that both 
are relatively clear, high on their respective continua, and fill the spaces they occupy.  Auditory 
and visual brightness are similar in these and other relevant respects, but they are not identical.  
And it is intersensory similarities such as these that technique (i) exploits (locally) when dealing 
with synaesthetic properties to acquire some representational content of its own and, as a result, 
its function within the global correspondence scheme between w and s. 
 
2. Technique (ii): shared emotional properties 
Expressive predicates, such as “sad” and “joyful,” also apply correctly to both musical 
and worldly objects.  Like synaesthetic property predicates, their application is also equivocal.  
The emotions works of music express are unarguably different in kind from those exhibited by 
the beings that actually feel them.  As a result, the fact that a work expresses certain emotions 
(e.g., sadness), and can thus be correctly described using expressive predicates (e.g., “sad”), can 
never be singly responsible for musical representation.15  Expression’s role is instead to help 
qualify or specify the representational content made available by other features already present in 
the music, and thus to fill in the finer-grained details left open by the global correspondence 
scheme between the work and its subject.   
Kivy offers Mendelssohn’s Die Hebriden as an example of expression’s role in musical 
representation.  The representation of a generic seascape is made possible by numerous structural 
similarities between the music and the sea. 
[The work] begins with the unmistakably seething ebb and flow of a heavy sea, 
represented by the persistent repetition of a musical figure obviously designed 
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to give the impression of a periodic wave motion or swell.  The motive 
“ripples” and “heaves,” and is both melodically and harmonically constructed 
to allow for its reiteration on various scale degrees, and in various keys, for the 
purpose of representing the lapping or the breaking of waves on the rocky 
coast.16   
 
That this is specifically the representation of the famed Scottish seas rather than some other 
seascape, according to Kivy, is secured by the music’s expressive qualities: the musical waves 
are “dark, brooding, melancholy, like the expressive quality of the Hebrides’ seas themselves.”17  
That the Hebrides’ seas express these emotions is evidenced by (and partly accounts for) the 
wealth of Ossianic mythology surrounding them, to which Mendelssohn certainly alludes 
throughout the work.18  Kivy’s claim about the specific association between these emotions and 
the Hebrides, however, is too strong.  Who is to say that other seascapes, say Lake Superior in 
the winter or certain stretches of the Bosporus, do not also express these emotions?  I suggest 
weakening Kivy’s claim to state simply that the work’s expression of these emotions, (in part) by 
connecting it more closely to the mythology surrounding its subject, allows it to represent the 
Hebrides’ seas more accurately and successfully than it otherwise would. 
Die Hebriden offers a good example of a work’s overall expressiveness strengthening its 
general correspondence to its subject.  For a case in which local moments of musical expression, 
targeting local moments in the subject, contribute to the large-scale representational whole, take 
Bach’s oratorio Matthäus-Passion.  At the highest level of the correspondence scheme, the 
work’s two parts accurately approximate the episodic structure of the narrative presented in 
chapters 26 and 27, respectively, of the Gospel of Matthew—a claim supported by their 
evocative movement and section titles.  But the work would hardly count as a successful 
representation if the specific content of the scenes, the large-scale arrangement of which it 
corresponds to globally, were not also mirrored in the smaller-scale musical phenomena that give 
rise to the work’s structure.  And on this score, Bach does not disappoint.  Each scene is 
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masterfully rendered within the unfolding musical fabric, mainly through the exploitation of 
expressive similarities between particular musical events and either (a) the objects, events, or 
states of affairs supplied or implied by the Gospel of Matthew, or (b) an appropriate emotional 
response to them, as the libretto often comments upon, rather than merely describing, the scenes 
depicted therein.   
The aria “Erbarme dich,” introduced in the previous chapter as an example of tone-
painting, in virtue of its lyrics and, more fundamentally, because of its location within the global 
correspondence scheme between the work and its subject, targets the scene in which Peter 
laments his denial of Christ: 
Then he began to call down curses on himself and he swore to them ‘I don't 
know the man!’  Immediately a cock crowed.  Then Peter remembered the 
words Jesus had spoken ‘Before the cock crows, you will have denied me three 
times.’  And he went out and wept bitterly. (Matt. 26: 74-5, New International 
Version) 
 
In addition to its location within the correspondence scheme, “Erbarme dich” shares numerous 
finer-grained internal features with its target, the result of which is a stronger resemblance 
between them.  There is, e.g., the descent in the natural minor scale of B in which the cellists 
pluck their strings in a series of triplets to evoke the tears streaming down Peter’s cheeks.  The 
most important similarities, though, are tied less strongly to the mimicry of human action and 
more strongly to the expression of emotion.   
“Erbarme dich” presents three subjects for our attention.  Peter (firstly) exists in the 
narrative past.  His actions are reported and reflected upon by the evangelist, who (secondly) 
exists for us in the present as portrayed by the alto voice.  Naomi Cumming, in her illuminating 
and provocative analysis of the aria, states,  
Although the narrative remains in the past tense, Peter’s weeping is made 
present by the music, which recreates the descending melodic contours of his 
denial.  So it is that the moment opens up to a subtle play of strongly evoked 
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presence with known absences.  Peter is absent from the high-priest’s 
courtyard, the stage of reported action, but his emotion is present in the 
evangelist’s voice.  This is not, then, his weeping alone, but incorporates the 
narrative persona.  The evangelist’s agency is merged with it, reinterpreting the 
emotion in the audience’s present time.  It is at this point, when the narrator has 
attained the transparency of identification with Peter, that the violin enters with 
an introduction to the aria.19 
 
The solo violin is the aria’s third subject.  The violin’s association with, but lack of definite 
connection to, both Peter and the evangelist—i.e., the absence of an identifiable target for it—is 
used by Bach, according to Cumming, to induce his intended audience of Lutheran believers to 
project themselves into the unfolding musical and dramatic fabrics by empathizing with the 
intense melancholy and grief that it expresses.  “The music forms the listener’s experience,” 
Cumming states, “and in its unique negotiation of the tension between striving and grief, it 
creates a knowledge of something that has been formerly unknown, something that asks to be 
integrated in the mind of the hearer.”20   
The violin functions representationally by prompting suitably sensitive listeners to 
sympathetically identify with Peter’s emotional state, allowing us to understand its particular 
quality and intensity, left wholly underdetermined in Matthew 26: 74-75, which simply states 
that he “wept bitterly.”  Bach uses the violin, in other words, to cause his audience to feel Peter’s 
melancholy and grief as he felt it, filling in a significant detail left open by both the gospel and 
the libretto, and thereby supplementing our understanding of both.  In doing so, Bach exploits a 
particular tenet of Lutheran theology, namely, that Peter’s denial of Christ is a symbol of any 
individual’s movement away from God.21  “Erbarme dich,” then, is intended as an occasion for 
both confession and repentance.  The self-confession and repentance implied in Peter’s weeping 
prompts the evangelist, as she reports it to us, to ask God for forgiveness for her own self-
dislocation from Him, which, in turn, is meant to prompt the audience to do the same—the “I” 
(“ich”) in, “Bin ich gleich von dir gewichen, stell’ ich mich doch wieder ein,” which translates as, 
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“Although I have strayed from thee, yet I have returned again,” while sung by the alto, is 
ambiguous between Peter, the evangelist, and us.22   
“An invitation for the listener to identify with the action,” Cumming says, “is a strategy 
of liturgical Passion settings” present throughout Matthäus-Passion.  Bach employs this strategy 
in “Erbarme dich” through the violin, which “foreshadows an aria in which an alto voice speaks 
repentantly in the first person, without further specification of his or her identity.  This persona is 
that of the listener, the believer who responds to the drama by identifying with it.”23  (A similar 
strategy is employed by Vaughan Williams in The Lark Ascending, as I discuss below.)  The 
violin’s significance, therefore, in addition to being representational and dramatic, is ultimately 
spiritual, which is Bach’s intention, as he wrote the oratorio for Good Friday services (originally 
in 1729 in St. Thomas’ church, Leipzig) when the Passion is traditionally enacted.24  And the 
violin gains all of its significance by way of its expressive content.25 
Were the violin to express emotions other than melancholy and grief, it would 
inaccurately render Peter’s emotional state and “Erbarme dich” would thus fail to target his 
lamentation.  A performance so poor that we were unable to perceive and understand the violin 
as sympathizing with Peter would simply not fit the libretto’s narrative content, leading to a 
mismatch between it and the music’s representational content.  In such a case, the inaccuracy 
would be so unforgivable that we would be inclined to say that the aria misrepresents its subject, 
as there would be a tension between (a) the large-scale structural resemblance between the 
Passion of St. Matthew and Bach’s musical version of it and (b) the local expressive 
disagreement between Peter’s lament and “Erbarme dich,” which, within the global 
correspondence scheme, should correspond to each other.  Such local disagreements resulting 
from the mismatch of finer-grained elements would negatively impact the global agreement 
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between the work’s coarse-grained structure and that of its intended subject; as a result, the status 
of Bach’s Matthäus-Passion as a representation of the relevant biblical passages would be called 
into question.  The aria’s location within Matthäus-Passion by itself, therefore, is not sufficient 
for its representational success.  A complex representing structure can be so only if all sorts of 
smaller things are right. 
 
3. Technique (iii): auditory imitation  
Technique (iii) functions representationally through what in the previous chapter I 
referred to as “gesturing.”  Gesturing occurs, recall, when a composer, in order to remind us of 
and thereby refer to a particular extra-opus target, t, uses a musical phenomenon that imitates, or 
“sounds like,” a sound typically emitted by t.  By recognizing the resemblance between the intra- 
and extra-opus auditory phenomena, i and e, respectively, we recognize w’s reference to t, which 
facilitates our understanding of s.  By resembling e, i acquires some representational content of 
its own, which it then imparts to w’s higher-level resemblances to s as w unfolds in real time. 
There are numerous examples of auditory imitation within the Western classical repertory, but I 
begin with the three birdsong-imitations from Beethoven’s Sixth Symphony. 
To make us aware of the birds in “Szene am Bach,” Beethoven chose instruments that 
closely match the auditory qualities of their songs: flute for the nightingale’s song, oboe for the 
quail’s, clarinet for the cuckoo’s.  Moreover, the musical line of each voice mimics the relative 
pitches and pitch contours of its corresponding bird’s song.  The imitations are thus achieved by 
both timbral and structural resemblances to each birdsong.  Unlike Olivier Messiaen’s catalogues 
of musical birdsongs for piano, which involved the meticulous transcription of slowed-down 
recordings into musical notation,26 Beethoven by no means offers pitch-for-pitch reconstructions 
of his extra-musical targets.  Since the individual pitches that comprise real birdsongs occur in 
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such quick succession that they are inaudible to the human ear, what we actually perceive are 
audible slurs whose peaks, troughs, and general sonic contours Beethoven captures in the 
melodic lines.  The resulting structural resemblances are at a much coarser grain than those in 
Messiaen’s works, but Beethoven’s birdsongs nonetheless resemble the actual ones—they 
simply do so more abstractly by distorting certain features of the birdsongs in order for them to 
fit more naturally within their (strictly “classical”) musical surroundings.   
In order to facilitate gesturing, musical imitations must produce a recognizable auditory 
resemblance, no matter how opaque, to the sounds they imitate.  This is true not only of 
imitations of melody, as the previous examples highlight, but also imitations of rhythm and 
harmony—the latter occurring mostly in the imitation of other musical works or styles.  Similar 
to melody, both rhythm and harmony are structurally defined: rhythm is the result of the 
temporal arrangement of pitches, while harmony pertains to their scalar (intervallic) 
arrangement.  Arthur Honegger’s Pacific 231 provides an excellent illustration of the 
representational function of rhythmic imitation, as its accelerating and decelerating rhythms 
produce a recognizable imitation of the rhythm of a steam locomotive’s journey.  
If we accept Honegger’s explanation of Pacific 231 at face value, however, imitation was 
not his goal, but an auditory byproduct of the structural resemblance that he exploits to achieve 
his actual goal.  “It has not been my intention,” he said, “to imitate the sound of the locomotive 
itself, but rather to use musical structures to translate the visual impressions and physical 
pleasure conveyed by the locomotive.”  Later, he claims that his goal was to “create a sense of 
rhythm accelerating mathematically while the speed of the motion itself decelerates.”27  While 
the work’s tempo remains basically constant, Honegger progressively reintroduces themes, 
whose note-values he has shortened, which he overlays onto the current musical line.  The 
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resulting perceptible effect is that of the rhythm accelerating as the auditory texture becomes 
increasingly thick—i.e., as more and more parts are played simultaneously.  This comes to 
resemble the cumulative momentum of the locomotive’s vast mass gathering speed.28  So even if 
Honegger did not intend to imitate a locomotive’s sounds, he succeeds in doing so, as a nearly 
unavoidable consequence of any performance of Pacific 231 that preserves its rhythmic 
relationships is the production of a musical progression that sounds sufficiently similar to the 
sounds of moving locomotive.   
Beethoven and Honegger’s works suggest that making use of a resemblance along at least 
one of the three dimensions of pitch-relations (melody, harmony, or rhythm) may be necessary 
for technique (iii)’s representational efficacy, since we do not seem to find representations in 
music that work without at least one of the three.  For further evidence I return to Beethoven’s 
Pastoral.   
Besides their melodic similarities, the musical imitations of the real birdsongs were also 
achieved by the similarities in timbre between them and the instruments on which they were 
played.  This seems to indicate that in order to succeed musical imitations must resemble the 
things imitated not just in terms of their melodic, rhythmic, or harmonic structures, but also in 
terms of some of their more salient nonstructural auditory properties.  Consequently, 
Beethoven’s birdsongs seem to indicate that structural and nonstructural auditory resemblances 
are jointly necessary for technique (iii) to function representationally.  The question, though, is 
whether similarities in nonstructural auditory qualities are always necessary for the musical 
imitation of worldly sounds to be successful.   
The answer is negative because, e.g., it would be possible for some listeners to recognize 
Beethoven’s imitations of some of the birdsongs even if they were performed on instruments 
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whose timbres vary drastically from those of the actual birdsongs, so long as the melodic 
relationships are preserved in the performance.  Such is the case with Messiaen’s bird works for 
piano.  Though they are less recognizable as birdsongs, they are not unrecognizable, and do not 
consequently lose their status as imitations due to timbral dissimilarity.  Similarly, so long as 
their pitch contours are preserved, both Beethoven’s and Messiaen’s musical birdsongs would 
count as imitations even if they were transposed into different keys—though likely not into a 
different mode, from major to minor (or vice versa).  This is because what generally matters for 
imitation are the melodic, rhythmic, and harmonic relationships between pitches and not their 
simpler auditory properties, such as timbre and loudness.   
While this holds generally, there are cases of musical imitation for which the “sounds 
like” relation, and its contribution to securing the work’s representation of its subject, cannot be 
fully accounted for by an underlying “is structured like” relation.  For instance, there is a passage 
in the fourth movement of Bartók’s Concerto for Orchestra in which the orchestra laughs 
derisively following a parody of the “invasion” ostinato from the first movement of 
Shostakovich’s Symphony No. 7 in C major, punctuated by a large, unmistakable musical 
“raspberry” carried out by glissandi on trilling trombones and woodwinds.  (To my ears, at least, 
both of these moments explicitly allude to Strauss’ Till Eulenspiegel, a discussion of which will 
occupy a good deal of the next chapter.)  That the music sounds like laughter is partly due to its 
having the same rhythm as a laugh; and that it sounds like a raspberry can be partly accounted 
for by the similarity in vibrato and pitch contour (a quick shift from very low to high).  However, 
another musical passage having the same rhythm as the laugh-imitation (a percussion passage, 
say) might not be a suitable representation of laughter unless it also sounds like laughter by 
sharing salient nonstructural properties with laughter.  The same holds of the latter raspberry 
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imitation.  At least as important as the structural features in both cases is the strong timbral 
resemblance between music and target, which makes the musical gestures sound more like 
human utterances.  The selection of the trombones and woodwinds for the raspberry is 
significant because their timbres are strongly similar to human utterances, unlike those of, say, a 
flute, which, as Beethoven recognized, is more appropriate to render bird utterances musically. 
In this passage from Bartók’s Concerto, “sounds like” and “is structured like” intermix 
and reinforce one another to represent laughter in response to Shostakovich’s symphony.  But the 
former relation cannot be fully reduced to the latter in accounting for the passage’s 
representational success or, more fundamentally, its status as a representation.  Rhythmic 
similarity, a type of structural resemblance, does not seem sufficient by itself to render laughter; 
nor does the similarity of pitch contour alone seem sufficient to render a raspberry musically.  
Nor, for that matter, do the timbral resemblances in each case.  Instead, the timbral and structural 
similarities work together to secure the passage’s representational content, which Bartók uses to 
communicate his distaste for Shostakovich’s symphony.   
Bartók began to convey this attitude in the parody of the ostatino that immediately 
precedes the laughter and raspberry.  Bartók slows down and simplifies Shostakovich’s ostatino, 
offering a noticeably dumbed-down version of the original.  (This is an instance of technique (v), 
which I discuss below.)  It thus makes sense within the Concerto itself why the music, which had 
been dynamic and whimsical up to this point, would be so repulsed by the introduction of a 
relatively dimwitted theme into its fabric.  So even without recognizing the passage as alluding 
to another work, we can perceive and understand the music as commenting upon itself.  But upon 
recognizing the reference to Shostakovich, the music’s self-commentary facilitates Bartók’s 
extra-opus commentary. 
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In the Concerto for Orchestra, Bartók employs the representation of laughter and a 
raspberry, secured by the joint exploitation of structural and timbral resemblances, to achieve 
extra-musical linguistic reference to his beliefs about and attitudes toward Shostakovich’s 
Seventh Symphony.  The other class of representational techniques, the ReRs, work in the other 
direction, employing various sorts of conventional reference to secure a piece of program 
music’s resemblance to its subject.  I investigate them presently.  
 
4. Technique (iv): bald stipulation 
When technique (iv) is employed, the audience must rely upon the composer’s overt 
stipulation or strong implication in the program that a given musical phenomenon (chord, figure, 
motif, melody, etc.), ϕ, corresponds to a specific target or set of targets in s.  How ϕ relates to, 
transforms, and is transformed by temporally near and distant musical phenomena at the same, 
lower, and higher levels across w’s hierarchical organization, rather than ϕ’s internal features, is 
used by the composer to approximate ϕ’s target(s)’s functional role(s) within s.  To take a 
favorite example, when the violin line in Vaughan Williams’ The Lark Ascending ascends, the 
lark to which it corresponds also ascends; when it descends, speeds up, slows down, etc., the 
lark’s movements are meant to correspond accordingly.  The same is true of the CeRs, but their 
internal features figure much more centrally into their intra- and extra-opus relationships—i.e., 
how they function within their musical surroundings and (consequently) how they approximate 
their targets’ functional roles in s, respectively; as a result, they acquire some representational 
content of their own due to their internal resemblances to their targets, unlike technique (iv), 
which only gains representational content at higher levels of the compositional hierarchy due to 
its relationships to increasingly higher-order musical phenomena within w that are used to 
approximate larger-scale targets in s.   
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The violin line in The Lark Ascending does not (i) share any relevant perceptual 
properties with larks, (ii) express emotions commonly expressed by or appropriate to larks 
(though it does express emotions appropriate to the poetic lark that is its subject), or (iii) imitate 
sounds emitted by a lark.  Instead, it musically renders a lark’s movements, which are extrinsic 
relations pertaining to its change in physical location, speed, and the like.  However, to 
accomplish this, Vaughn Williams exploits the violin’s emotional effect on us.  The violin line, 
making brilliant use of a musical pun, causes the spirits of suitably sensitive listeners to “soar,” 
similar to the lark’s flight, which serves to direct their attention to the work’s broader spiritual 
implications, as the lark’s journey is intended by the composer, following the George Meredith 
poem that was the work’s inspiration (and from which it borrows its name), as a metaphor for his 
hope for humanity after the horrors of World War I.  The metaphor is further achieved through 
Vaughn Williams’ use of the pentatonic scale, which frees the violin from a strong tonal center, 
and the metrically unspecified cadenzas, which gives the violinist greater freedom of expression, 
both of which suggest the liberation of the human spirit from the forces of oppression. 
Taken in isolation, however, technique (iv) is quite austere, since the musical phenomena 
it employs need not exploit any germane internal resemblances to their targets in s.  But because 
of its austerity, bald stipulation serves to highlight the complex and dynamic way in which all of 
the techniques operate within and help to establish the global correspondence scheme between w 
and s.  Its ReR classmates specify their targets in such a way that they reduce our reliance on the 
program, while technique (iv) actually increases our reliance on the program—e.g., we are 
reliant on the title, The Lark Ascending, to perceive and understand that a lark is the violin’s 
target.  Techniques (v) and (vi), conversely, lessen our reliance on the program by drawing upon 
the resources of members of the other class, acquiring their abilities to refer to their ultimate 
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targets in s—to which they need not, though often do, bear a germane internal resemblance—by 
resembling intermediate targets not in s. 
The programs of works that make use of technique (iv) explicitly or implicitly associate 
recurring musical themes with particular objects, events, or states of affairs.  Kivy says that such 
themes “are not ‘inherently’ representational but exist merely by virtue of a convention internal 
to the musical work,” likening them to the way in which a mathematician uses an arbitrary 
symbol to stand for some definite quantity.29  The associations between the themes exploited by 
this technique and their targets are conventional, as they bear no relevant internal resemblance to 
each other, and thus representation does not occur at the local level.  Representation instead 
occurs at higher levels up the compositional hierarchy, as the themes’ relationships to their 
musical surroundings are revealed as the work unfolds in real time.  While such themes possess 
no representational content of their own, the composer uses their transformations, developments, 
and reintroductions within the overall musical progressions to mirror the narrative structures 
suggested by the programs.  What we end up with is a series of nested correspondences in which 
the appearance of finer-grained, lower-level resemblances has implications for the coarser-
grained, higher-level correspondences between w and s.  For instance, Kivy says of the witch’s 
theme in Engelbert Humperdinck’s opera Hänsel und Gretel that, while it expresses “the moods 
appropriate to the wicked and supernatural,” it “becomes her representation simply by occurring 
in one form or another whenever she is mentioned, thought of, or appears [in the corresponding 
narrative].”30  
Staying with this example, despite lacking much intrinsic representational content, the 
witch’s theme possesses potential representational content because of the extrinsic relationships 
it bears to its musical surroundings.  The theme’s potential content is activated, and further 
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qualified and refined, by how it functions within the increasingly larger scale musical structures 
in which they are nested.  The theme furnishes the other levels of Hänsel und Gretel, as they 
arise within and are further developed by the musical progression, with representational content 
by creating higher-level resemblances to their targets.  In short, the witch’s theme comprises part 
of the higher-level phenomena’s intrinsic content.  These more local resemblances to their extra-
musical targets give rise to larger-scale correspondences when they are repeated later.  Where 
they reappear in the musical progression and whether they are altered or unaltered affect the 
representational content we initially ascribed to them.  There is a feedback between the finer- and 
coarser-grained resemblances as the work progresses, which ultimately gives rise to the global 
correspondence scheme between w and s.  These complex and dynamic interactions are the focus 
of the next chapter.  The preceding will suffice for present purposes.     
The initial statements of the themes employed by technique (iv) offer us a baseline from 
which to understand the actions of and changes in their targets through our understanding of the 
musical development.  It does not matter that they neither structurally nor nonstructurally 
resemble their targets intrinsically.  What matters is how the themes are transformed and 
developed at the increasingly higher levels within the compositional hierarchy as w progresses.  
Any instance of bald stipulation, therefore, is similar to the C major chord in Haydn’s Creation, 
which, as I discussed above, does not represent God’s First Light solely (if at all) in virtue of its 
internal morphology or properties, but rather because of its location within the work’s large-scale 
mapping of the narrative.  The difference, though, is that the C major chord corresponds its target 
in part by resembling its properties, while the themes employed by technique (iv) require 
conventional reference (by the composer in the program) to their targets in order to create a 
higher-level resemblance within the global correspondence scheme.  
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5. Technique (v): conventional association 
Technique (v) imitates (quotes, paraphrases, or alludes to—in short, recognizably 
approximates) musical phenomena from other works of music and exploits their preexisting 
associations to specific extra-musical objects, events, or states of affairs.  By translating these 
recognizable (most likely well-known) musical phenomena into w’s musical fabric, this 
technique converts the things they are commonly associated with into targets for w by way of a 
sort of musical metonymy, which helps to establish and flesh out s by introducing finer-grained 
details into the maximally coarse-grained correspondence scheme between w and s.  Similar to 
technique (iv), the musical phenomena employed by technique (v) need not bear any germane 
internal resemblances to their target(s) in s to fulfill their representational function(s). 
In order for the extra-opus reference to function representationally, the composer must 
presume the audience’s familiarity with the extra-musical association.  If they fail to grasp either 
the reference to the other work or its association with the thing he or she intends it to target, they 
will fail to grasp his work’s representational content.  But failure by the listener does not imply 
that the composer has failed.  In such cases, the burden often shifts to the listeners, who must 
educate themselves in order to become genuine members of the composer’s intended audience, 
with whom he or she takes for granted a shared background.  A listener can join the composer’s 
community by acquiring knowledge of the association, an academic exercise that most often will 
simply involve reading about the work under consideration.  Such information is usually 
included in the program notes provided before a performance of the work.  As soon as the 
reference and association are apparent, the listener becomes a full-fledged member of that work’s 
audience and she should be able to recognize the passage’s target.  As a result, the work will 
begin to make sense to her as a representation. 
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Although they contain musical imitations of other melodies, rhythms, or even harmonies, 
as when other pieces make use of Wagner’s famous “Tristan chord,” passages making use of 
conventional associations do not represent in quite the same way that imitations do.  Imitations 
gesture toward extra-musical objects by resembling the sounds they typically emit.  Rather than 
imitating the sounds of their targets, technique (v) functions representationally by imitating other 
musical works, exploiting a preexisting relationship between the other work and something 
external to it.  The imitated passage need not imitate or even be used to represent (within the 
original work) the extra-musical thing with which it is associated.  All that matters is that a 
relationship exists between the imitated work and the imitating work’s target.  Just like regular 
imitations, conventional associations gesture to some extra-musical target, which we then import 
into our experience of the musical development.  The recognition of the imitated passage is 
supposed to trigger in us the thought of the object, event, or state of affairs with which it is 
associated, which we then take as the imitating passage’s target.  In this way, conventional 
associations are similar to the themes employed by technique (iv).  The difference, however, is 
that instead of stipulating the target explicitly, the composer does so implicitly by expecting the 
audience to recognize the imitation of the other work.  Gesturing does occur—it simply involves 
the intermediate step of referring to another work.  Tchaikovsky’s 1812 Overture makes use of 
this technique multiple times.31   
Tchaikovsy wrote the 1812 Overture to commemorate the Battle of Borodino, which 
marked the turning point in Russia’s war against Napoleon.  It begins with the melody of “Spasi, 
Gospodi, lyudi Tvoya”, a Russian Orthodox hymn, played somberly by the strings.  Any 
informed audience member will immediately associate the melody with the hymn, which 
translates as “O Lord, Save Thy People.”  Hymns almost always contain a note-to-syllable 
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correlation between the music and text; thus, there will usually be a recognizable imitation by the 
melodic line of the vocal line.  By making use of the melody, Tchaikovsky secures some of his 
work’s representational content without the program’s help.  That is, the melody indicates to the 
audience that the music corresponds to what the hymn’s lyrics refer to or imply.  Through purely 
musical means, Tchaikovsky exploits the hymn’s meaning to foreshadow the coming violence, 
offering a purely musical prayer for the Russian victims of the coming battle.   
The battle is represented through a sort of musical metonymy.  Due to their associations, 
the melody of “La Marseillaise” is used as the French army’s leitmotif and the melodies of 
several Russian folk songs function as leitmotifs for their army.  The initial statement of “La 
Marseillaise,” a brass fanfare, which itself is commonly associated with a call to battle (as was 
seen in the previous chapter in William Byrd’s imitation of one in The Battell), maps the French 
invasion.  This is followed by the Russian folk theme “U vorot, u vorot batjuškinyh,” which 
translates “At the Gate, At Grandfather’s Gate,” indicating the French arriving onto the 
battlefield.  The overture has once again transformed a previously existing song’s lyrics into 
potential representational content through purely musical means.  In its next section, the musical 
development maps interwoven fragments of the French, Russian, and original melodies 
(organized contrapuntally) onto the raging battle—the soldiers as they intermingle in an 
exchange of blows by artillery, bullets, blades, and fists.  This passage contains scored cannon 
shots, emphasizing that the battle is being fought.  After a long passage for strings marked by 
several spiraling diminuendo, corresponding to the turn of the tide, the initial hymn returns on 
the full orchestra.  This time it offers thanks to God for Russia’s victory and liberation.  It is 
immediately followed by a quick-stepping folk song, which maps the Russians chasing the 
retreating French from the country, which is played in counterpoint with “Bozhe, Tsarya 
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khrani!” (“God Save the Tsar!”), punctuated by church bells and more cannon shots, all of which 
serve to indicate Russia’s triumph. 
While this example provides numerous instances of the technique, conventional 
associations do not exclusively convert lyrics into representational content—i.e., exploit a 
melody-lyric connection through quotation or paraphrase, thereby bringing the lyric’s referents 
to bear on our understanding of the music.  The technique can be used in other ways to secure a 
work’s representational content.  Perhaps the most famous example of such a common 
association is the tritone, the musical interval spanning three whole tones.  Since at least the 
medieval period, the tritone has been known more commonly as “the Devil’s chord.”  While the 
association was likely acquired because of the interval’s restless dissonance, the exact reason is 
not important.  What is important is that within the history Western music the tritone has become 
associated with the Devil.  The association was so strong, in fact, that for centuries the tritone 
was explicitly prohibited by the Church for fear that it called the Devil when sounded.  Perhaps 
this was why sometime around the early eighteenth century the interval also became known as 
diabolus in musica. 
Camille Saint-Saëns exploits this historical connection between the interval and the Devil 
in his Danse Macabre.  The work’s program refers to a folk legend in which the Devil appears in 
a cemetery each Halloween at midnight to play his fiddle for the awakened dead whose skeletons 
dance wildly until daybreak.  The association is so strong that one could imagine there being a 
particularly superstitious listener who even today could convince herself that Saint-Saëns has 
literally called the Devil into the music when the tritone is first sounded on the scordatura violin.  
Such a person might say a prayer to banish Satan from the theatre or perhaps even flee to protect 
her soul from his wickedness.  A more secular listener would merely recognize the association 
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and hear it as the Devil’s introduction into the unfolding narrative.  The selection of the violin is 
also of representational interest because, similar to the tritone, the instrument has also been 
associated with the Devil.  Thus, as will be made clear momentarily, the Danse Macabre also 
offers us an illuminating instance of technique (vi). 
 
6. Technique (vi): nonstandard instrumentation 
Turning to technique (vi), when we listen to works of music performed, we hear violins 
and other instruments, but we typically do not pay much reflective attention to the sounds that 
they make as of violins.  We instead perceive and recognize sources tacitly while attending to 
their audible effects—the properties they exhibit (timbral, dynamic, expressive, etc.); the 
melodies, harmonies, and rhythms they produce; their relationships to the audible effects of other 
instruments; and so on.  In short, when listening to music, the sounds and not their sources are 
the direct objects of our attention.  I do not mean to suggest, as Scruton does, that we (therefore) 
cannot infer, or are precluded from inferring, sources from the sounds they emit while listening 
to a work being performed—were this the case, gesturing would not offer a route through which 
works of program music represent their subjects.  I am merely suggesting that the instruments 
comprise a part of the phenomenal background of our musical experience, while the sounds they 
produce, and the increasingly higher-order musical phenomena that supervene on them, 
constitute the foreground.  But as a work is unfolding, especially when we are attending to a live 
performance of it rather than merely listening to a recording of one, our focus easily slips 
between foreground and background, and doing so comprises an important part of our musical 
experience (and of our aesthetic experiences more generally). 
We normally only take conscious note of the instrument(s) when we recognize a 
particular musical gesture or passage as displaying a high degree of technical difficulty, and we 
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admire the talents of the performer(s) accordingly when they execute it successfully.  But such 
mental notes are made in passing, and the instruments quickly recede once again into the 
phenomenal background behind the dynamically unfolding musical fabric.  The instruments 
employed by technique (vi), on the other hand, e.g., cannon, wind machines, and spoons, force 
themselves upon our attention and into the foreground.  Due to their general unusualness in a 
piece of classical music, as well as their specific unusualness relative to their musical 
surroundings in w, these sounds refer to their sources by resembling (indeed, by sharing every 
audible property with) the sounds emitted by them, thereby converting the sources into explicit 
targets for w.  Consequently, similar to technique (v), these instruments help to establish and 
flesh out s by introducing finer-grained details into the maximally coarse-grained 
correspondence scheme between w and s. 
Nonstandard instrumentation is a version of conventional association that exploits the 
relationships between sounds and the objects that make them, instead of those between melodies 
and objects, events, or states of affairs (or the lyrics of vocal lines which refer to them).  By 
incorporating a nonstandard object’s sound into the score, a composer gestures toward that 
noisemaker by exploiting its unusualness within a musical setting.  The object’s sound calls 
attention to itself, causing us to think of the object, which we consequently take to comprise part 
of the work’s representational content.  It is a type of musical self-reference.  The 1812 Overture, 
in addition to containing multiple instances of conventional association, also makes use of 
nonstandard instrumentation by calling for a cannon to be fired and church bells to be rung.   
To illustrate how the technique works, take the Danse Macabre.  While the violin is a 
standard instrument within the Western classical canon, its tuning in the Danse Macabre is, by 
definition, nonstandard—this is simply what scordatura means.  The violin has been associated 
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with the Devil since its invention in the mid-sixteenth century.32  The reason for this is likely 
because it quickly became the preferred accompaniment for dances, which had been associated 
with wicked and licentious behavior since ancient Greece (viz. bacchanalia).  Within the 
Christian tradition, the Devil was taken to be the cause of such behaviors.  From this, his 
association with the violin was born.  Much like its prohibition of the tritone, at one time the 
Church denounced troubadours who played the violin specifically because of its demonic 
associations—likely out of fear that the women these troubadours were wooing, possessed by 
satanic forces, would be unable to control their baser sexual appetites.  It is also possible that the 
violin’s association with the Devil came about via an intermediate association between the 
Emperor Nero, an early persecutor of the Christians who they justifiably demonized, and his 
fiddle.  But as with the tritone, the genesis of the violin’s association to the Devil is unimportant.  
What matters is that such an association exists, which composers of program music can exploit.33   
So the violin represents the Devil in the Danse Macabre doubly: (first) by sounding the 
tritone interval, and (second) by being his folkloric instrument of choice.  The work begins with 
a D note sounded twelve times on the harp, which shares a rhythmic and numeric structure with a 
clock striking midnight, the story’s temporal setting.  The tritone is then sounded, introducing the 
Devil into the music, which corresponds to his appearance in the cemetery.  The dance’s theme, 
a descending scale on the violin, is next introduced, and is subsequently repeated throughout the 
work.  This corresponds to the Devil calling the dead from their graves and playing for their 
skeletons as the dance begins.  This passage is followed by one further instance of nonstandard 
instrumentation.  Saint-Saën uses a xylophone early in this section to indicate the fact that 
skeletons, rather than some other demonic entities, are the dancers.  Since we recognize both the 
violin and the xylophone through their timbres, one might be tempted to conclude that they 
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function representationally through simple timbral resemblance.  However, as I discussed above 
with Bartók’s Concerto for Orchestra, these timbral resemblances work together with both local 
and global structural resemblances between the music and the narrative in which they are located 
to represent finer- and coarser-grained aspects of the work’s subject.  
An important fact about this representational technique is that standard instruments 
almost always can replace nonstandard ones.  Performances of the 1812 Overture usually replace 
the cannon that Tchaikovsy’s score calls for with timpani.  Timpani produce a similar auditory 
effect and work together with their location within the music-to-narrative correspondence to 
represent cannon fire.  The use of the nonstandard instruments prescribed by the score lends 
more than mere epistemic saliency to these works’ representation content.  While other 
instruments could possibly be used in a performance with little affect on the work’s status as a 
representation, the violin and xylophone in the Danse Macabre and the cannon in the 1812 
Overture produce stronger representations than their replacements.  The violin could be replaced 
with another instrument, but the association with the Devil would be severed.  As a result, the 
conductor or performers would need to stipulate in their program that the replacement instrument 
corresponds to the Devil.  Regarding the xylophone, however, it is difficult to imagine what sort 
of instrument could replace it to produce the desired auditory effect, as its eerie vibrato just feels 
like the right instrument to depict skeletons.  Were another instrument selected, a purely 
stipulative act would be required to secure the audience’s grasp of its connection to the 
undulating undead. 
Performances that make use of the prescribed nonstandard instruments will more 
accurately represent their works’ subjects by putting flesh on the barebones, course-grained 
structural correspondence—and, in the case of the Danse Macabre, the xylophone actually gives 
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the reanimated skeletons referred to in the program their bones.  As a result, such performances 
will be more successful in communicating their subjects to us.  The correspondence (or 
sometimes identity) of timbres between the music and its subject gains its general 
representational relevance in the same way that shared synaesthetic or expressive properties, and 
the themes employed by technique (v), gain theirs, namely, in virtue of their location within the 
overall musical structure.   
 
7. Conclusion 
The preceding examination provided brief analyses of several works of program music to 
illustrate how each of the representational techniques function within the global correspondence 
scheme between the works and their subjects.  These analyses are by no means complete, as in 
each section I concentrated on the technique that was its focus, largely to the exclusion of other 
techniques that may also be functioning within the works analyzed to represent their subjects 
more accurately and successfully.  Most program works employ multiple techniques, along 
multiple dimensions—both structural (melodic, harmonic, rhythmic) and nonstructural (timbral, 
dynamic, expressive)—, across varying expanses of the compositional hierarchy.  The resulting 
picture of musical representation is an extremely complex one, as is the epistemology it entails.  
Working out the details of this picture, which I do by (a) showing how all of the techniques be 
integrated within sophisticated works of program music and (b) evaluating its epistemological 
entailments, are the next chapter’s goals.
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CHAPTER 4 
 
MUSICAL UNDERSTANDING 
HEARING, REHEARING, AND INTERPRETING WORKS OF PROGRAM MUSIC 
 
 
 
Sophisticated works of program music will integrate several of the techniques examined 
in the previous chapter to varying degrees.  As a result, they will consist of a patchwork of finer- 
and coarser-grained resemblances (with various degrees of nesting) to the external objects, 
events, and states of affairs referred to or implied by their accompanying programmatic aids.  
The epistemology that results from this is as complex as the ontology just described (if not more 
so).  There is not just one rigid correspondence scheme, provided by the program notes and 
selected in advance, that we apply in perception to a performance in order to understand it as a 
representation of the work’s intended subject.  Understanding musical representations is rather a 
dynamic process.  The program by no means fully determines the targets.  It neither provides us 
with a complete picture of those properties, structures, and relations of the intended subject 
mapped by the music nor offers us detailed approximations of them.  Instead, it gives us an 
imprecise description of the targets, which serves to delimit the field of possibilities for the 
resemblances comprising the work’s representational content.   
We consequently have a complex epistemic task as the work unfolds before our ears in 
real time.  In order to recuperate its representational content and perceive, understand, and 
appreciate the connections between the music and its subject, we must attend to numerous 
resemblances, occurring along multiple dimensions, at different levels, and across varying 
expanses of the compositional hierarchy, whose valuations and weightings we must constantly 
update and revise as the work is performed.  Sophisticated program works demand listeners who 
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are up to this task.  This chapter explores what it takes for listeners to perceive, understand, 
interpret, and evaluate musical representations. 
 
1. Listening with understanding 
Before I address what is required to understand musical representations, I must first 
clarify what it is to understand music as such, since the former is integrally bound to the latter.  
There are multiple competing schools of thought in the philosophy of music regarding our 
musical understanding.  One school is concatenationalism, whose leading advocates are Jerrold 
Levinson, Nicholas Cook, and Roger Scruton.1  The basic tenet of concatenationalism is that the 
experience of local coherence is all that is required to understand a piece of music.  This 
involves a dynamic interaction between memory, perception, and expectation such that what we 
perceive at any given moment of the musical progression “makes sense” or “feels right” as a 
continuation from the moment just perceived (now vividly remembered), which then causes us to 
vividly anticipate (with varying degrees of exactitude) the immediately proceeding moment.2  
The almost entirely unconscious synthesis of previous, current, and expected musical events 
(spanning only a few measures) constitutes our musical understanding on this view.  The more 
vivid our memories of recently occurring musical events and the more often our expectations are 
fulfilled by the actual musical progression, the better we understand the work because we more 
strongly sense all of the work’s parts as “hanging together” or cohering.3  Since conscious 
reflection upon large-scale musical forms or higher-order relationships as we perceive the 
unfolding musical progression would only inhibit or interfere with this process, 
concatenationalists deny that it plays any part in our musical understanding.4   
While concatenationalism offers many insights and is highly suggestive, the 
phenomenology and epistemology just described offer an incomplete picture of our actual 
 119 
musical experiences.  The concatenationalists are correct that as musical works unfold in real 
time we only literally perceive, vividly remember, and vividly anticipate local small-scale forms 
and relationships.  But to claim that this accounts for nearly all of our musical experience and 
that being able to synthesize local musical events in this way from moment to moment is all that 
is needed to understand music is false.  Musical works are not mere series of constantly coupled 
moments, and we do not experience them as such.  The small-scale forms and relationships we 
perceive give rise to higher-order forms and relationships, which are not directly perceptible but 
indirectly inferred from the auditory surface features we literally perceive.  Contrary to 
concatenationalism, being consciously aware of these architectonic structures and reflectively 
relating them to one another across hierarchic levels and distant temporal stretches comprises a 
central part of our actual musical experience.  Because of their importance to our experience, 
these reflective abilities should figure prominently into any account of musical understanding. 
Levinson, who mounts the strongest defense of concatenationalism, attempts to hedge his 
bet on this point.  He claims that the synthesis of local events accounts for our “basic” 
understanding of music, which is a necessary condition for any type of higher-order musical 
understanding.5  I am perfectly comfortable with this assertion, as I believe that the unreflective 
synthesis of small-scale musical forms and relationships gives rise to our reflective awareness of 
large-scale ones.  However, I go a step further in contending that our reflective awareness of 
large-scale structures often feeds back into our unreflective synthesis of small-scale ones, and 
that the dynamic, mutual qualification of reflective and unreflective judgments lies at the core of 
our musical experience.  I share this view with Leonard B. Meyer, a strong proponent of 
architectonicism, concatenationalism’s principal competitor, whose other adherents include 
Stephen Davies and Peter Kivy.  Their view, briefly stated, is that a reflective awareness of at 
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least some of a musical work’s higher-order architectonic structures and relationships, in 
addition to the unreflective synthesis of small-scale forms, is required to understand the work.6    
The concatenationalists attempt to refute architectonicism, but instead argue against a 
straw man.  They do so by distinguishing between intellectual listening and musical listening, 
and claim that the architectonicists take the former to be the essence of our musical experience.7  
Musical listening is simply the (low-order) unconscious synthesis of local musical events that the 
concatenationalists advocate.  Intellectual listening, conversely, involves the conscious 
application of higher-order musicological concepts (acquired from formal training) onto our 
moment-to-moment perceptions of the musical progression, placing what is perceived under 
technical descriptions.  If we actually did this, the concatenationalists contend, we would miss 
many of the small-scale features (the raw sense-data) that make any sort of higher-order musical 
understanding possible.  Consequently, intellectual listening must be separated from our 
experience of music as such.  It belongs instead, they claim, solely within the purview 
musicology.  Musicologists are often interested in the imperceptible, and thus nonmusical, 
causes of the perceived musical surface: the performance or composition practices and 
techniques that account for the auditory effects we perceive.  These interests differ from those of 
the ordinary listener, whose musical understanding concatenationalism attempts to defend.  But 
architectonicism as it is actually practiced is not incompatible with this goal.  Indeed, it also 
claims to defend the ordinary listener’s understanding.   
Architectonicism contends that listeners do not need a background in music theory and 
analysis to become aware of a work’s most important higher-order structures and to relate 
hierarchically and temporally distant events consciously.  Central to an ordinary listener’s 
musical understanding, on this view, is the ability to mark off stretches of the musical 
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progression as units of individual significance, as individuals in P. F. Strawson’s sense, which 
architectonicists believe we can consciously recognize and reidentify without needing to place 
under technical descriptions.8  Instead of classifying an event as, e.g., “the main theme of a 
rondo,” ordinary listeners can simply index it as “that bit (of the musical progression)” and 
subsequently reidentify it when it is wholly or partially repeated in new musical surroundings 
and recognize it as an object undergoing change when it is developed or transformed in some 
way.  An educated listener many simply replace the untrained listener’s indexical (“that bit”) 
with a definite description (“the main theme”), but her experience and understanding of the event 
as a musical individual will be essentially the same as her uneducated counterpart’s.  The 
difference between the musical understanding of educated and uneducated listeners, then, is one 
of degree rather than one of kind.  The musical and intellectual modes of understanding are not 
absolutes, as the concatenationalists contend, but instead exist along a continuum.  
Understanding musical works involves a gradual process in which we make our way through 
numerous gradations of increasing awareness and comprehension; and any higher-order musical 
understanding we may achieve is an extension from the “basic” one advocated by 
concatenationalism.   
One type of understanding that is derived from our basic unreflective abilities, I contend, 
is our representational understanding of works of program music.  If this constitutes a genuine 
mode of musical understanding, concatenationalism must be false.  This is because our 
experience of program works is shaped and guided by our reflective awareness of their intended 
subjects: the small- and large-scale narrative structures, as well as the objects, events, and states 
of affairs contained therein, referred to or implied by the programmatic aids accompanying the 
music.  As a result, understanding a program work’s representational content entails reflecting on 
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hierarchically organized musical structures, identifying and reidentifying musical events as 
individuals, and consciously recognizing how these structures and individuals are related.   
This sort of understanding is open to both educated and uneducated listeners.  Take 
Richard Strauss’ Till Eulenspiegels lustige Streiche, Op. 28.  The musical individual identified 
by an uneducated listener as “that bit” and by an educated listener as “the main theme,” must be 
reflectively connected by both listeners with the object given by the program, Till Eulenspiegel, 
in order to understand it as a representation.  Because the program establishes relationships 
between both the large-scale musical and narrative structures in general and a specific seven-note 
figure and Till Eulenspiegel in particular, the theme’s introduction into the musical progression 
marks Till’s introduction into the associated narrative.  When the theme changes in some 
recognizable way, Till changes in an analogous way because the musical progression must 
structurally resemble the narrative suggested by the program in order to represent it both 
accurately and successfully.  If we were unable to demarcate these and other bits of the musical 
progression as individual units of significance, perceiving and understanding the work as a 
representation would be impossible.  
Musical individuals vary in complexity, as do their relationships to each other.  
Individuals can exist on any level of the musical hierarchy, overlap with each other, share 
elements, admit of multiple degrees of nesting, and interact with each other to produce new 
higher-order individuals.  Any musical object or event complex enough to be reidentified can 
count as an individual.  This will normally exclude single notes and chords, unless they possess 
some peculiar feature or features causing us to consider them as such.  The most basic elements 
of musical structure in the Western classical tradition are notes: pitched sounds arranged into 
accented or unaccented beats, which form chords when harmonized.  The successive 
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arrangement of notes and chords forms short, incomplete tunes (figures and motifs), and the 
arrangement of beats produces rhythm.  In most works, tunes are the smallest units of musical 
significance.  The concatenation of tunes forms melodies, which in turn form themes, which 
evolve through repetition and variation and are often (contrapuntally) layered with other melodic 
lines to form movements, the aggregation of which constitutes a musical work.  This progression 
from tunes to entire works reflects the levels of complexity achievable by musical individuals: 
single tunes can be reidentified later in new musical surroundings, entire works can be 
reidentified in separate performances, and so can any sort of sufficiently complex musical object 
or event in between. 
Every aspect of a given work’s structure that has the potential to be an individual will not 
always function as such in our experience of a given work.  But there will always be at least 
some aspects of that work’s structure such that, if we fail to recognize them as individuals, we 
will either misunderstand or fail to understand the work to some extent.  If we do not properly set 
off and attribute the appropriate significance to certain musical objects and events, the musical 
progression will not “make sense” or “feel right” from moment to moment.  And if we 
misunderstand a work at the most basic level, this will usually have devastating consequences for 
any higher-order understanding we hope to achieve.  If, e.g., we do not properly distinguish the 
seven notes comprising Till’s main theme in Strauss’ tone poem as a unit of individual 
significance, not only will we misperceive and misunderstand their development and interactions 
with other musical structures from moment to moment, but we will also be unable to recognize 
the work’s representational content.  As a result of misperceiving the music, our grasp on its 
connection to the narrative provided by the program will be greatly loosened.   
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A consequence of not properly identifying Till’s main theme as an individual is that the 
listener will experience the musical objects, events, and states of affairs as failing to match up 
with the extra-musical ones that Strauss intends them to represent.  Upon recognizing the 
mismatch, a generally attentive and appreciative listener will revaluate her previous experience 
of the theme and attempt to recalibrate the faulty boundaries that she has projected onto the 
musical progression until they fit the narrative.  If successful, she will now be able to recognize a 
central feature of the work’s representational content.  By modifying her representational 
understanding, she will simultaneously correct her basic musical understanding of the work, 
since the musical progression should now make sense to her from moment to moment.  This case 
reveals that understanding the music at a higher level can influence our understanding of the 
work at the most basic level, as a type of reflective listening has fed back into and shaped this 
listener’s unreflective experience of local coherence.  Recognizing Till’s theme as an individual, 
therefore, is central to our understanding of Strauss’ tone poem both as music and as a 
representation.   
The above demonstrates that understanding program works as representations can 
enhance our understanding of them as music—a fact the skeptics challenge in the assimilation 
bias argument, which I believe the discussion currently underway thoroughly disproves.  To 
what extent our musical understanding is enhanced will vary from piece to piece.  The detailed 
program notes of Till Eulenspiegel influence our moment-to-moment experience of the music 
more strongly than, say, the evocative section titles of Beethoven’s Pastoral Symphony.  Yet in 
both cases, regardless of detail, the program conveys a story that makes reference to certain local 
events, as well as to specific objects and states of affairs, whose relationships give rise to a 
hierarchic narrative structure (however imprecise it may be).  Prior knowledge of these extra-
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musical small-scale events and large-scale structures gives us a sense of how the music should 
proceed: they prime us to listen for certain sorts of musical events and structures and suggest 
candidate schemas for interpretation, leading us to search for ways to map the music onto the 
narrative both locally and globally.   
We learn from the program, e.g., that Strauss’ version of Till’s story is episodic, and we 
thus expect the music to reflect this overarching structure.  This expectation is confirmed by our 
musical experience, as the work is arranged such that Till’s two themes alternate with several 
contrasting themes.  It is further confirmed in advance to an educated listener by the work’s 
subtitle, nach alter Schelmenweise—in Rondeauform—für grosses Orchester gesetzt, which 
explicitly states that the piece is “rondeau” form.  Interestingly, the piece is not in rondeau form, 
but is in a variation of rondo form.  The former was a Medieval and early Renaissance musical 
form based on the poetic form of the same name, and is distinct from the latter, which was 
developed during the eighteenth century.  By mislabeling the form that the musical progression 
takes, Strauss intentionally destabilizes our expectations from the outset.  However, he does refer 
us back to the historical period during which the piece is set, the fourteenth century, and he also 
draws our attention to the connection between music and literature so relevant to the piece.  
Now, if our expectations are rarely confirmed by the music, i.e., if we consistently fail to map 
musical to narrative structures as the work progresses, then either (a) we are attending to 
improperly individuated musical events, whose boundaries we must modify; (b) the work is a 
weak or inaccurate representation, and thus we need to expend more mental energy to perceive 
and understand its representational content; or (c) the work misrepresents its intended subject, 
and any mapping we discover between work and subject is essentially illusory. 
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The relationship between program and music is not unidirectional; instead, they mutually 
enhance our aesthetic experience and understanding.  Not only does knowledge of the story 
suggested by the program enrich our musical experience, but the music also enriches our 
understanding of the story because it is “brought to life,” so to speak, through the music.  The 
program explicitly refers to certain objects, events, and states of affairs that are mirrored in the 
music.  But the program will always underdetermine these things to some degree, as even the 
most detailed descriptions will fail to capture many of their features.  The music also represents 
things that are merely implied by the program.  Take the program note at measures 117–134 of 
Till Eulenspiegel: “Hop! On horseback through the market-women.”  It refers to the specific 
prank and the parties involved, but how the episode unfolds is left wholly unstated.  Thus, it is 
from the musical development that we learn that Till overturns the women’s carts, sending their 
goods and wares crashing to the ground.  This part of the story is filled in by the music, whose 
structure we superimpose onto that of the narrative, thus enhancing it.   
This process of achieving greater representational accuracy and gaining higher degrees of 
understanding is constructive: aware of a coarse-grained structural resemblance between the 
story and the music, we (first) recognize certain musical elements, properties, and relationships 
as representationally relevant, (second) actively seek out the appropriate extra-musical analogs, 
and (finally) furnish our understanding of the narrative with them.  Recognizing that the music 
contains the resources for a more accurate mapping of its stated target, we improve upon the 
initial coarse-grained resemblance, and experience the finer-grained structures as the musical 
progression brings them into focus.  This further refutes the skeptical claim, discussed in Chapter 
2, that the extra-musical aids do all of the “representational work” for works of program music, 
with the music contributing little or nothing.  In this specific case, although the program primes 
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our expectations, the music assumes most of the representational responsibility by illuminating 
aspects of the story left open by the program. 
What counts as “appropriate” analogs for the musical elements, properties, and 
relationships is initially delimited by the program, as it defines the realm of representational 
possibilities, and is then further refined by the music.  In the scene under discussion, Strauss 
makes use of nonstandard instrumentation to imitate the banging of pots and pans.  Since the 
music also suggests a country market (for reasons discussed shortly), a listener could reasonably 
infer that different sorts fruit, vegetables, and other food items appropriate to fourteenth-century 
Germany are among the goods that spill to the ground.  Such details will vary from performance 
to performance and from listener to listener.  The program can fully specify almost none of the 
connections between music and subject, as it would be too epistemically cumbersome for 
listeners to use as a guide for our aesthetic experiences.  Likewise, the music cannot fully render 
everything left unstated by the program, nor would such a high level of representational accuracy 
be needed.  Composers must abstract away from many of their subject’s properties, structures, 
and relations, and distort those targeted by the music to varying degrees, in order to successfully 
represent them.  They also intentionally leave some things out, as all good artists do, which must 
be filled in by the imaginations and interpretive abilities of both performers and listeners.   
Strauss provides a telling example of entrusting some of his work’s representational 
content to his listeners.  “It is impossible for me to furnish a program to Eulenspiegel,” he wrote 
in a letter to Franz Wüllner, the conductor preparing for the work’s 1895 premiere in Cologne. 
[W]ere I to put into words the thoughts which its several incidents suggested to 
me, they would seldom suffice, and might even give rise to offense.  Let me 
leave it, therefore, to my hearers to crack the hard nut which the rogue has 
prepared for them.  By way of helping them to a better understanding, it is 
sufficient to point out the two Eulenspiegel motives which, in the most 
manifold disguises, moods, and situations, pervade the whole catastrophe, 
when after he has been condemned to death, Till is strung up to the gibbet.  For 
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the rest, let them guess at the musical joke which a rogue has offered them.9 
 
After the November premiere, upon his friend Wilhelm Mauke’s request, Strauss wrote 
programmatic labels into the score that refer the music to the incidents they represent, which 
Mauke subsequently published in 1896 and on which I base my interpretation.  I return to the 
issues of accuracy and success in Section 4.  I turn presently to the issue of interpretation.   
 
2. Interpretation and Analysis 
If concatenationalism were correct, it would be nearly impossible to offer explicit 
interpretations of works of program music as representations founded on our experience of the 
music.  Since on this view our musical experience is largely unreflective, our musical 
understanding is mostly ineffable: the vast majority of what we experience is incommunicable in 
principle.10  (Note, though, that the ineffability of experience in no way implies the ineffability of 
understanding.)  It is for this reason that concatenationalists believe our basic musical 
understanding is manifested solely in listening: in our unconscious ability to synthesize past, 
present, and future small-scale events.11  As a result, being able to describe what we perceive is 
not only unnecessary to demonstrate our basic understanding of a work, but our attempts to do so 
will normally fail, since we will be forced to use metaphors and other poetic sorts of description 
that will inadequately capture our experience.  (Note, though, that the use of metaphors by no 
means implies a failed description.  Indeed, metaphors often are use precisely to capture aspects 
of our experience that literal descriptions cannot.)  It is for this misguided reason that the 
concatenationalists take the (reflective) “intellectual” and “representational” modes of 
understanding as separate from the (unreflective) “musical” mode, and are forced to assert 
falsely that the first two cannot be brought to bear on the third in any beneficial way.   
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In interpreting a program work as a representation, we must describe its representational 
content: those aspects of the music that have correlates in the work’s subject.  If our 
interpretation is correct, the descriptions of the narrative we recuperate from the music (aided by 
the program) will mirror the actual musical progression, since the two are structurally similar.  
Our representational interpretation of the work will express our awareness of its small- and large-
scale forms and relationships, and thus our musical understanding at both the basic and higher 
levels.  Consequently, I am in agreement with the architectonicists, who argue that our musical 
understanding is demonstrated by our ability to describe a work’s salient features.12  An educated 
listener whose descriptions illuminate more of a work’s features will, accordingly, have a better 
understanding of the work than her uneducated counterpart.  While seemingly uncontroversial, 
this is precisely the conclusion the concatenationalists try (unsuccessfully) to avoid by insisting 
upon the “pure” aesthetic experience of music.   
In order to illustrate the finer points of interpreting works of program music, I now 
provide an extended representational analysis of the preceding discussion’s central example: 
Strauss’ Till Eulenspiegel.  The tone poem demonstrates how all of the techniques examined in 
the previous chapter can be integrated to produce a complex, successful, and enjoyable musical 
representation.  While descriptions couched in a purely nontechnical vocabulary could 
demonstrate a listener’s great appreciation and understanding of the work, better analyses will be 
expressed mainly in the technical vocabulary of the musicologist, as it provides the clearest 
means by which to describe the musical elements, properties, and relationships that comprise the 
work’s representational content.  For this reason my analysis is largely technical.  Some of the 
work’s central features have already been discussed.  For the sake of completeness, I reproduce 
them in full below. 
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MUSICALLY MIRRORING TILL’S MISADVENTURES 
The subject of Strauss’ work is the fictional fourteenth-century trickster and German 
peasant folk hero Till Eulenspiegel, who is represented by the fine-grained musical structures of 
the two themes Straus associates with him.  Till’s misadventures are represented by the global 
relationships between his two themes and the work’s other passages, which represent different 
episodes and the targets of his mischief.  The representation is globally achieved by how Till’s 
themes reappear and are changed and developed within these passages.  The work contains 
instances of all of the representational techniques analyzed in the previous chapter.  How they 
interact to realize the extra-musical objects, events, and states of affairs referred to and implied 
by the accompanying program is revealed as the present analysis proceeds.    
While above I said the work is a rondo, it should be technically classed as a sonata-rondo 
deformation, as it does not fully conform to all of the norms of rondo form.13  This “designed 
uncertainty”14 operates on two levels.  First, it emphasizes that Till is a character who will not 
allow his will to be bent to the established norms.  Second, it indicates that Till’s story cannot be 
adequately captured by or confined to the established norms of Western classical music.   
The work can be separated into eight distinct sections, which I analyze in turn.  Where 
appropriate, select quotations from the program notes, along with the measures to which they 
refer, are indicated in brackets.  
 
PROLOGUE 
The work begins in 6/8 time with the violins’ statement of a brief musical phrase that 
many interpreters take to imitate the speech-pattern of the German phrase “Es war einmal” 
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(“Once upon a time”).  [“Once upon a time there was a knavish fool…” mm. 1–5.]  Till’s themes 
are then introduced.   
 
EXPOSITION 
Till’s first theme is initially stated as a horn call, which begins on the unstable or 
“opened” inverted (6/4) chord over the dominant.  [“…named Till Eulenspiegel,” mm. 6–45.]  
This is significant because such chords rarely begin a phrase or melody.  Moreover, the theme 
starts on an unanticipated offbeat.15  Thus, from the very first moment of his introduction Till is 
presented as an unpredictable nonconformist.  Ranging over almost four octaves, the theme’s up-
tempo melody, played piano (softly) for its initial statement, reaches a peak, falls downward, and 
is then developed to a grand conclusion with two notes sounded by the strings.  This represents 
Till concluding one of his merry pranks.  The activity peaks, he drops to the ground or bows, and 
the strings imitate his triumphal “ta da!”  This passage presents Till as a merry character making 
mischief for the amusement of an audience.   
While its formally notated time signature is 6/8, the theme does not conform to it.  
Rather, two 7/8 measures are followed by a 9/8 measure, which then settle into 6/8 time.16  This 
metrically and rhythmically irregular passage maps Till’s uncontainable and erratic behavior as 
he performs a prank.  The theme utilizes two of the techniques discussed in the previous chapter.  
It is predominantly a complex leitmotif, as the theme represents Till’s actions via a fine-grained 
mapping from the musical gesture to an event in the world.  The theme also shares (synaesthetic) 
properties with the character it depicts, indicated by the fact that the terms “nonconformist” and 
“unpredictable” correctly describe both. 
When the theme is played a second time, Strauss marks it to be played mezzo forte (half 
loudly)—Till gains confidence.  The theme is then repeated and varied by several different 
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instrumental groups.  It is first taken by the oboe; then by the clarinets; then the bassoons, 
contrabassoons, violas, and cellos; and finally it is developed by several measures of quick 
fortissimo (as loudly as possible) eighth-note chords by the tutti (entire) orchestra.  The orchestra 
then rests.  The successive addition of instruments throughout the theme’s repetitions, which is 
musical imitation in the technical sense (a type of purely musical resemblance), maps Till as he 
infects an audience with his merriment and mischief.  The infection starts with one person and 
increasingly spreads to more until finally everyone is in on the fun. 
After the orchestra rests, Till’s main theme, a seven-note phrase in F major, is stated once 
by solo D clarinet.  [“He was a wicked goblin…” mm. 46–74.]  The syncopation of the melody 
imitates Till’s laughter either as he mocks those who he has just tricked or as he plans his next 
prank.  Over the theme’s last note, the oboes and English horn play a sforzando (made loud) 
chord for two measures.  The rest of the orchestra then plays a fortissimo chord, which is 
immediately succeeded by a quick galloping rhythm lasting several measures.  [“…up to new 
tricks,” mm. 75–112.]  This marks the end of the Exposition.  It recognizably imitates the rhythm 
of a horse’s gallop, from which we can easily infer that Till is riding a horse through the 
countryside as he makes his way to his first adventure.  
 
EPISODE I. UPSETTING THE MARKETPLACE 
A serene pastoral motif, containing flutes suggestive of birdsongs, represents a country 
marketplace where women are selling their goods and wares.  Interwoven between moments of 
serenity are intervals of quick muted strings, the result of which is an unsettlingly tense feeling.  
This foreshadows the impending mischief.  [“Just wait you faint-hearts!”  mm. 113–116.]  A 
rising bassoon enters, and the sudden crash of a cymbal marks the beginning of the prank in 
which Till overturns the carts, and the pots, pans, and other goods and wares, which chaotically 
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crash to the ground.  [“Hop!  On horseback through the market-women,” mm. 117–134.]  The 
music, which was at first peaceful and simple, instantly becomes rapid and raucous: there are 
multiple crescendos along with discordant chords played fortissimo and sforzando.  Drums, 
timpani, ratchet, and slapstick—the latter two of which are certainly nonstandard—support the 
representation because of their timbral resemblance to the sounds of the carts being overturned 
and the goods and wares being damaged.  A quick flute motif subsequently maps Till as he flees 
the scene, and serves as a bridge to his next prank.  [“He runs away…” mm. 151–159.]  The 
sharing of a property, in this case quickness, once again facilitates the representation.   
 
EPISODE II. THE MOCK SERMON 
The time signature of this episode is a simple 2/4, which marks a change from the 
compound 6/8 of the previous sections.  Additionally, the tempo slows down and the range of 
pitches becomes less erratic and more constrained, corresponding to the change in venue while at 
the same time taking on the qualities of the new venue: a church.  The motif, a slow march 
(mostly for strings) in B flat major whose phrase-format is “wearily shopworn” and musically 
“orthodox,” represents the serious, dull, and restrictive Teutonic clergy.17  The first four notes of 
Till’s main theme in F major are A, F, B, C.  No matter the key of the other episodes, these four 
notes remain the same.  But here the theme is transposed into B flat major.  The transposition of 
Till’s theme into the home key of the clergy’s motif represents Till putting on the vestments of a 
priest.  Making use of a musical pun, Till makes himself “at home” among the clergymen.  
[“Disguised as a parson, he oozes unction and morality…” mm. 179–182.]  Musically, 
transposing Till’s theme to the prevailing key achieves stability.18  This indicates that Till has 
successfully blended in to his surroundings, having tricked both the clergymen and their 
parishioners.   
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During the clergy motif’s introduction, an augmentation of the first six notes of Till’s 
main theme is given to the lowest instruments—contrabasses, bass clarinet, contrabassoons, low 
horns, and tuba—emphasized by orchestral doubling.19  This corresponds to Till’s big toe, 
unbeknownst to the naïve parishioners, peeking out from under his shabby priestly vestments.  
[“but the knave peeps out at his big toe,” mm. 191–195.]  The logic of this pun is a bit tortured, 
but it works as follows.  Till’s first theme is currently in B flat major, which, as we already 
know, represents him in disguise.  The appearance of part of his theme maps a part of Till 
appearing.  That it is given to the lowest instruments settles that it is at the lowest part of Till’s 
body.  The program specifies that it is his toe.  The musical passage and the toe share the 
(synaesthetic) property of lowness.  The orchestral doubling is used to make this moment stand 
out by drawing our attention to it.    
After these few measures, Till’s main theme, which imitates his mocking laughter, is first 
played on the D clarinet.  It is then taken by solo violin with a change in syncopation, followed 
by a series of four tied chords (played by brass and other instruments) that map Till’s satisfaction 
with the fact that he is getting away with his blasphemous sermon.  More chords build to a 
crescendo and a loud drum roll sounds—Till forcefully makes some profane point.  Till’s main 
theme is then repeated twice by solo violin—the sermon continues.  But on the second repetition 
it is developed as the pitches get incrementally higher, and then a glissando quickly plummets in 
a series of triplets from the top note all the way to the bottom note of the violin.  The music 
mimics Till as he shudders at the thought that his blasphemy could ultimately result in his death.  
[“But, because of his mockery of religion, he feels a sudden horror of his end,” mm. 196–199.]  
But Till’s trepidation is only momentary, as his worry-free main theme immediately returns, 
providing the bridge to the next episode.    
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EPISODE III. A ROMANTIC INTERLUDE 
The love motif next enters on the strings—Till exchanges courtesies with some pretty 
village maidens who are initially smitten.  [“Till as gallant, exchanging dainty courtesies with 
pretty girls,” mm. 209–212; “They’ve been really smitten,” mm. 222–228.]  Till’s first theme is 
then developed by horns and strings.  Its rhythm is no longer abrupt, but has become regular.  Its 
first two notes are sixteenth, which are followed by and tied to (legato) a series of six eighth 
notes; there is an eighth rest, and then three tied chords; it finishes with a tied series of ten 
incrementally descending sixteenth notes.  This maps Till wooing the pretty maidens.  [“He woos 
them,” mm. 229–232.]  As he woos them, Till’s “original insolence is tamed into a simpering 
persuasiveness, his theme, at first so galvanic, now languishing in its plaintive downward 
droopings.”20  The latter passages (mm. 222–232) have a dialogic form.  There is a back and 
forth between, and intermingling of, Till’s theme and the love motif, which often occur on the 
very same instruments: the strings.  This corresponds to the verbal, and perhaps other, exchanges 
between Till and the maidens, all of whom appear to be speaking the same language: that of 
love.   
But despite Till’s seeming triumph, the maidens reject him.  [“However fine, a basket 
still signifies refusal,” mm. 244–252.]  The music becomes violent.  This musical change maps 
the rejected Till storming about in uncontrollable anger.  The love motif is taken up by the horns, 
whose timbres are darker than those of the strings.  It also becomes quicker, differently 
syncopated, erratic, and much louder (fortissimo and sforzando).  Till’s first theme is then 
repeated, slightly varied and one octave lower, as, resigned to his defeat, he swears revenge.  
[“Rage ends with Till’s departure,” m. 253; “Vows revenge on the whole human race,” mm. 
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263–292.]  Once he recovers from this extended tantrum, the main theme is played—Till laughs 
as he plans his next prank—and we are immediately taken to the next episode.   
 
EPISODE IV. CONFOUNDING THE SCHOLARS 
There is a slow, serious motif in A-minor representing (by sharing properties with) an 
assembly of university professors, given to the bassoons, bass clarinet, and contrabassoon.  
[“Philistines’ motif,” 293–299.]  In this episode Till takes on the academy by posing impossible 
conundrums to these pompous philistines.21  The beginning of this episode has a dialogic form.  
A musical idea related to Till’s first theme, at first given to the strings but then enriched by 
further orchestration, is stated in A-minor, which is then answered by the rumbling bass of the 
professors’ motif (played piano)—Till poses a conundrum to which the professors coyly 
respond.  The second statement of Till’s conundrum-posing is a more erratic and enhanced 
version of the first.  Strauss notes that it is to be played forte and lustig (merrily) by the high 
strings and winds in quick bursts followed by slight rests over the professor’s motif, which is 
now played mezzo forte with divisi cellos and basses added.  This corresponds to Till merrily 
lobbing a series of preposterous questions over the heads of the steadily confounded professors. 
The dialogic form of these passages gives way to the complete bafflement of the 
professors, represented by “a set of overlapping, stretto-close imitative entrances, one after 
another, but each implying a different tonal center.”22  For instance, an upper cello and low horn 
in B flat minor follows a lower cello and low horn played in A-minor, which are then followed 
by a viola and horn in B minor, and so on.  This maps the professors as they desperately throw 
out answer after answer without principle—analogous to the lack of tonal center—to questions 
they cannot even understand.  Till’s main theme is played over this passage by the strings as he 
mocks their futile endeavor.  The episode builds to a climax, and drums map Till abandoning the 
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thoroughly confounded professors.  [“After imposing a few whopping theses on the Philistines, 
he abandons them, baffled, to their fate,” mm. 315–344.]  It concludes with a superb example of 
musical imitation: a loud, extended trill from the trumpet, woodwinds, and violin, which mimics 
Till, now at a safe distance, responding to the assembly with a resounding “raspberry” (to which 
Bartók, as discussed in the previous chapter, is almost certainly alluding in his Concerto for 
Orchestra).  
 
RECAPITULATION. TILL GOES ON HIS WAY 
This section begins with a light dance in 6/8 time.  Making use of conventional 
association, this represents Till merrily dancing a jig in the street.  The dance is followed by a 
short clarinet section, which utilizes timbral resemblance to map Till whistling a little ditty.  
[“Till’s street ditty,” mm. 375–382.]  Till’s first theme is then recapitulated, once again on the 
horn and in the same key with the same scoring.  Later in this section nearly twenty bars are 
almost identical to eighteen of the exposition: specifically, mm. 465–484, with a few additions to 
fit into the new musical context, are roughly equivalent to mm. 63–80.  The remainder of this 
section, however, is not particularly recapitulatory, although at points it refers back to previous 
material.23  Till’s first theme is instead developed and varied all over the orchestra, which 
corresponds to Till doing several unspecified tricks for an audience.  Strauss leaves the specifics 
of these events to be filled in by his listeners’ imaginations.  But any informed listener should 
recognize that as the music becomes increasingly unconventional (both rhythmically and 
contrapuntally), Till’s tricks become more and more erratic and subversive.   
The quick flute theme from the end of Episode I returns toward the end of this section 
and is further developed as Till attempts to escape arrest for his misdeeds.  However, the clergy’s 
motif from Episode II returns in full force (fortissimo) on the full orchestra, corresponding to 
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Till’s arrest for mocking religion.  Were we unable to reflectively recognize the return of these 
two musical events as such, our ability to follow along with the story as it unfolds would be 
greatly diminished.   
 
EPISODE V (CODA). TILL IS ARRESTED AND HUNG 
An abrupt drum roll, which was presaged in Episode II when Till shudders at the thought 
of his untimely end, announces the trial.  Till’s horrifying premonition has come true: he must 
pay with his life for mocking religion.  [“The trial,” mm. 577ff.]  The loud low brass play a 
somber fanfare in F-minor, which, exploiting the conventional association between fanfares and 
ceremonies, maps the social prosecution reciting their accusations.  Till’s main theme on D 
clarinet, intervals shortened to indicate his concern and hesitance, maps Till’s attempt to respond 
to the charges being made against him.  The low brass and D clarinet themes go back and forth 
dialogically for five rounds.   As they proceed Till’s theme becomes successively shortened and 
is finally silenced as Till desperately tries, but fails, to weasel his way out of execution.  The 
keys of these two themes are important.  Till’s is in the original F major.  The prosecution’s 
theme is in F minor.  The juxtaposition of major and minor represents the fact that the 
prosecution is “intent on reversing the fortunes of Till’s F major.”24 
Two sudden fortissimo notes played by low winds announce the guilty verdict and the 
sentence of death by hanging.  The two notes mimic the pronouncement of death in German, 
“Der Tod!”  The D clarinet shrilly rises, distorting the first theme, imitating Till’s anguished 
screams as he is hung.  Six F major impulses by the strings—first played pizzicato and piano, 
then pianissimo (very softly)—gradually slow and become more infrequent; there is one last soft, 
abrupt chord; and finally all is quiet.  Till’s body (F major) swings back and forth; it jerks one 
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last time; and finally he is dead.  [“Up the ladder!  There he swings, the air is squeezed out of 
him, a last jerk.  Till’s mortal part has come to an end,” mm. 615–619.]   
 
EPILOGUE. TILL’S INDOMITABLE SPIRIT 
After the silence, the introductory “Once upon a time” theme returns.  Many scholars 
interpret this to be Strauss’ musical commentary on the story: an affirmation that a spirit like 
Till’s can never truly be destroyed, which is confirmed by the mischievousness and cleverness 
embodied by the work itself.  The work ends with a final restatement of Till’s first theme, as 
Till’s soul has one last laugh before departing, from both the music and this plane of existence.  
 
3. Rehearing Music 
From the above analysis, it is clear that Strauss draws upon all of the resources of 
Western classical music, exploiting all of the representational techniques examined and 
systematized in the previous chapter, in order to render Till’s misadventures in music.  He does 
so by mirroring the structures referred to and (more often) implied by the accompanying program 
in the musical structure.  But the work is not merely a purely abstract formal object that we 
coldly contemplate at an intellectual distance.  The moments of imitation, resemblance, and 
expression couched within the global correspondence scheme between the work and its subject 
make for a non-arbitrary resemblance, as they imbue the music with dramatic effect, human 
meaning, and other important aesthetic qualities.   
We listen to works of program music not just for the sake of acquiring knowledge, but 
also for the sake of enjoyment.  If we did not enjoy our experience, we would be significantly 
less inclined to listen to a work again.  Rehearing works is central to both our understanding and 
our ability to offer in-depth interpretations and analyses.  There is a mutual feedback between 
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understanding and enjoyment.  Typically, the more we learn about the work, the greater our 
enjoyment becomes.  I chose Till Eulenspiegel as the focus of this chapter not only because it 
exemplifies all of the relevant representational techniques, though this was certainly necessary 
for my selection, but also because I enjoy it.  In order to produce the above analysis I had to 
listen to a few recorded performances of the piece dozens of times.  This work lent itself well to 
such extensive rehearing because I find (and still find) it exceedingly clever and delightful.  The 
more I have listened to it, the more rewarding my aesthetic experience of the work has become. 
Meyer articulates the importance of rehearing musical works better than any philosopher 
considered in this chapter.  “Because listening to music is a complex art involving sensitivity of 
apprehension, intellect, and memory,” he states, “many of the implications of an event are 
missed on first hearing.” 
For to comprehend the implications of a musical event fully, it is necessary to 
understand the event itself clearly and to remember it accurately.  Hence it is 
only after we come to know and remember the basic, axiomatic events of a 
work—its motives, themes, and so on—that we begin to appreciate the richness 
of their implications.  It is partly for these reasons that a good piece of music 
can be reheard and that, at least at first, enjoyment increases with familiarity.25  
 
Meyer recognizes that after listening to a piece of music too many times it can lose its original 
effect on us and, as a result, become tedious.  This explains the importance of conductors and 
performers in the life of a work, as they have it within their power to revitalize works that have 
become stale.  Adopting an information theoretic approach, Meyer states, 
A piece of music is more than a series of symbols in a score.  It is their specific 
realization in sound or imagined sound.  The performer, guided by traditional 
practice, interprets and articulates the composer’s symbols, and in so doing 
both actualizes and particularizes the potential information contained in the 
score.  He shapes and confirms (or non-confirms) our expectations not about 
what events will take place (these have been more or less stipulated by the 
composer), but about how the events will take place—the manner and timing of 
their arrival.  Insofar as each performance of a piece of music creates a unique 
work of art, to that extent the information contained in the performance is new.  
And by creating new information, the performer helps to make the rehearing of 
music rewarding and enjoyable.26  
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This passage demonstrates that our aesthetic interests change upon hearing new performances of 
a work that we (mistakenly) believe we have exhaustively perceived, understood, and 
appreciated.  We experience the new performance with an additional interest in the subtle and 
non-subtle differences between it and the previously audited performances.   
New performances fulfill and frustrate our expectations at different moments of the 
musical progression.  When our expectations are fulfilled our experience will be largely 
unreflective, as a good deal of what we were previously reflectively responsive to will be 
converted into tacit dispositions.  Since the musical line is progressing as we feel it should be, 
there is little upon which to reflect.  But when our expectations are frustrated, we become acutely 
aware of perceptible differences.  This causes us to modify our expectations of how the music 
will progress, as the implicative relationships between the work’s parts have been altered to 
some degree.  In such cases the performers have exposed us to more of the work’s potential 
aesthetic significance.27  With works of program music in particular, performers can reveal 
representational content that the composer has left unspecified or implicit, as I mentioned earlier 
with regard to Till Eulenspiegel.   
Musical works (the good ones anyway) are highly complex aesthetic objects whose intra- 
and extra-opus implications—i.e., those implications that inhere solely between the work’s parts 
and those that extend to things beyond itself (as in quotation, expression, and representation)—
gradually reveal themselves through repeated exposure.  Using Goodman’s terminology, they are 
“replete”: each element has potential aesthetic significance, so no interpretation can discount any 
element out of hand.28  Consequently, we should not conceive of musical understanding as a 
closed-process within well-defined temporal and epistemic limits.  Instead, it is a dynamic, open-
ended process that may be in principle incompletable.  We should not delude ourselves into 
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believing that we can ever fully understand some sufficiently complex works of music or, for that 
matter, any sophisticated work of art, as Scruton seems to do.29  The meanings of good works are 
most likely inexhaustible.   
Before the advent of recording and playing devices, attending multiple performances of a 
piece of music was the only way to facilitate the gradual process of understanding and 
interpretation.  Depending on one’s means and proximity to a decent music scene, there 
generally would be several sustained intervals during which this process would grind to a halt.  
Our plight has been greatly eased by the wide availability of recordings of individual 
performances in various formats that we can listen to as much as we wish to increase our 
understanding of a work and construct detailed interpretations, such as the one I offered above.  
From this one can reach the obvious conclusion that the more performances of a single work we 
can get to our ears, the better off we are.   
The forerunner to our current situation was the piano reduction, which grew in popularity 
during the mid-nineteenth century.  A piano reduction is a full score transcribed for just the 
piano, which preserves the principal melodic, harmonic, and rhythmic relations produced by the 
many instrumental parts of a polyphonic work.  As a result, it allows individuals who were 
unable to attend multiple performances of a work to hear many of its relevant features at their 
leisure in the comfort of their own homes.  All that is required is a piano and someone who can 
read and play music.   
Due to this convenience, the piano reduction was incorporated into the salon cultures of 
Western Europe—most notably that of France.  These gatherings of mostly intellectuals involved 
conversations about art and philosophy, and were ideally aimed at the refinement of taste and the 
expansion of knowledge.  When the topic was music, the participants would often gather around 
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the piano to play and discuss the latest works.  A few measures were played and then discussed.  
A few of the subsequent measures would then be played, and the subsequent discussion would 
revolve around their relationships to the previous measures and their now shared implications to 
future events.  When works of program music were considered, the discussion would concern, in 
addition to their intra-opus implications, their extra-opus ones.  This process would continue 
until either the participants were satisfied with their understanding of the work or the 
conversation shifted to some other subject.30  This points to the important fact that the acquisition 
of musical understanding is not a private process, but a public one in which listeners directly and 
indirectly build upon and revise how they perceive and understand music.  That our musical 
understanding is an object of public scrutiny is further evidenced by the ongoing dialectical 
project of music interpretation and analysis that has spanned numerous generations within the 
history of Western classical music, from which I have drawn and to which I hope to have 
contributed above.   
The concatenationalists cannot account for these facts due to their belief that our musical 
understanding is mostly ineffable.  As a result, they seem to be forced into a sort of private 
language argument.  If descriptions of a work are not needed to demonstrate one’s understanding 
of it, we have no way of knowing whether two listeners are attending to the same surface 
features other than to look at their behaviors.  But it seems perfectly plausible that two listeners 
exhibiting sufficiently similar outward behaviors could have wildly divergent internal 
experiences of the same work, and the concatenationalists provide us with few (if any) resources 
by which to intervene and correct those that are defective.  In fact, the idea of a defective musical 
experience is rendered nearly incoherent by their position.  For the concatenationalists our 
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musical experience is purely phenomenal, irreducibly sensible, and ineffable.  This seems to 
entail that whatever seems or feels right to a listener will be right (to them). 
This is similar to the skeptical confirmation bias argument against musical representation 
that I introduced in Chapter 2.  Listeners can supply a musical work of any sort with any story 
they like and actively find or construct features in the music that will mirror it, the argument 
went; and thus, a work’s representational content can vary drastically from listener to listener.  
But the musical experiences of attentive and appreciative listeners who select the same story, 
namely, the one provided by the composer in the program, should largely agree, and their 
agreement should be demonstrated by their descriptions of their experiences.  Consequently, 
listeners must be able to discern and describe—whether in the nontechnical vocabulary of the 
ordinary listener or, better, in the technical vocabulary of the educated listener—the abstract 
formal structures of Till Eulenspiegel that correspond to those of the associated narrative in order 
to understand it properly: they must identify and reidentify the same musical individuals, 
establish the same boundaries and weight them to sufficiently similar degrees, and so on.  But 
listeners must also recognize the moments of imitation, resemblance, and expression that give 
the work added dimensions of meaning and aesthetic significance.  These dimensions are also 
open to interpretation and public debate, which comprise a vital part of our experience and 
understanding of the work. 
 
4. Accuracy and Success 
The moments just mentioned bring Till’s story to life before our ears, to speak loosely, by 
effectively directing us to their extra-musical analogues.  They do so because of their unrivaled 
quality combined with their locations within the global correspondence scheme between musical 
and narrative structures.  It is due to Strauss’ skillful rendering of these moments that Till’s story 
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emerges so vividly from our experience of the music, which leaves little doubt that his tone 
poem is a tremendous success.  But what does this mean?  When is a musical representation 
successful?  In Chapter 1 I distinguished between success and accuracy as the main criteria by 
which we evaluate works of program music.  But while these two concepts were introduced, they 
were left largely unanalyzed.     
Accuracy pertains to the degree of similarity between the structures of the representation 
and those of its subject.  Success (or effectiveness) has to do with how easily the representation 
communicates its subject to us—i.e., how readily we are able to recover the subject from its 
representational content.  But for a representation of any sort, effectiveness is what really 
matters.  For instance, a highly effective but inaccurate map of a city guides us to our destination 
more easily than an accurate but epistemically cumbersome one.  As Robert Cummins states,  
Given limited space, a map that leaves out many features and distorts others 
may be more effective than a more accurate map that will fit in the available 
space (a single page atlas, say) only at the price of being unreadable.  
Approximations to a target […] are often more effective because more 
tractable.31  
 
This is especially true of artistic representations.  In terms of our aesthetic interests, accuracy is 
almost always a secondary concern.  What matters primarily is how well the artwork conveys its 
subject to us.  This is the hallmark of a good representation, from Titian’s religious and 
mythological works, to Picasso’s cubistic portraits, to Strauss’ tone poems.  
All musical representations abstract away from many of their subject’s features and 
distort those that they do preserve to varying degrees.  The reason for this is that in order also to 
succeed as a good piece of music, they must adhere to the conventions of the Western classical 
tradition.  There are two types of success, therefore, that need to be taken into consideration by 
any analysis of a work of program music: representational success and musical success.  The 
first pertains to how easily we are able to recover the representational content from our 
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experience of the music.  The second involves (among other things) the degree of small-scale 
coherence and large-scale unity, and how both are realized in the music.  Often the more closely 
a work adheres to classical conventions, the more locally coherent and globally unified it is; and 
thus, the more easily we are able to follow along with the musical progression from moment to 
moment.  Since the work is easier to understand at the basic level, we should be able to grasp its 
representational content more easily, as those structures will likely be more readily apparent.  
Our basic musical understanding facilitates our representational understanding of the work and, 
as a result, musical success gives way to representational success. 
There are other cases, however, in which departures from convention are effectively used 
to represent some salient aspect(s) of a work’s subject, as (locally) the introduction of Till’s first 
theme and (globally) Strauss’ deformation of sonata-rondo form illustrate.  But such cases are 
the exception rather than the norm.  In general, composers of program music want their works to 
stand alongside pieces of absolute music with respect to musical excellence.  This urge can be so 
strong that some composers have either greatly downplayed or even disavowed their works’ 
representational content altogether, as Liszt did with his symphonic poems and Strauss 
eventually did with Till Eulenspiegel.  Not even Beethoven was immune, as he relegated his 
Pastoral Symphony’s representational aspects to a subordinate status.  These (and other) 
composers contend that, instead of representing their subjects, their works merely (or mainly) 
offer a purely musical expression of the feelings aroused by them.  However, the historical fact 
that a composer has given in to this pressure out of fear that his work will not be taken seriously 
as music does not mitigate the ontological fact of its representational status.  Status does not 
depend entirely on use, since the resemblances exploited by the work exist regardless of whether 
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the composer officially acknowledges them.32  Simply by associating his work with a program, 
the composer licenses the sort of experience that I have been defending.  
The phenomenon of distancing a work from its stated programmatic goals occurred 
almost exclusively during the War of the Romantics when the very future of music as an art was 
thought to be in the balance.  The stakes have been drastically lowered since then, stemming 
largely from the progressives’ victory over conservatism with regard to the direction taken by 
music in the classical tradition.  As a consequence, the works of program music that current 
audiences hold in the highest regard, which include those of Liszt, Strauss, and Beethoven, are 
generally those that balance representational concerns with the purely musical ones of melodic, 
harmonic, and rhythmic organization.  Most composers wish for their program works to succeed 
both musically and representationally.  Thus, while Strauss bent the norms of classical music, he 
did not break them.  Incoherent music is not the product of his use of small- and large-scale 
deviations from convention to represent Till.  Instead, they result in a musical progression that is 
merely unlikely, though allowable and understandable, within the tradition.   
Both musical success and representational success are essentially matters of structure, 
admit of degrees, and depend as much on the music as they do on the listener.  The more easily 
we perceptually recover a work’s representational content, which (recall) are those aspects of the 
musical work that have correlates in the subject, the more successful it is as a representation.  
And those pieces considered most musically successful from the standpoint of the classical 
tradition are generally those organized such that we perceive all of their parts as “hanging 
together,” and thus feel that they “make sense” from moment to moment.  That is, our 
expectations of what will happen next as the music unfolds are not wholly thwarted, but if they 
are ever frustrated at a given moment, some subsequent musical event or events cause us to 
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mistrust our previous expectation(s), thereby easing the frustration.  This feeling of tension and 
release is a central organizing principle of classical music, and it pertains to both local coherence 
and global unity.  The greater the tension built, the stronger the possible release, and thus the 
more satisfaction we feel at a passage’s (or work’s) completion. 
Till Eulenspiegel once again offers a helpful example.  While the initial statement of 
Till’s first theme is certainly jarring, its subsequent repetitions cause us to feel that it makes 
sense or that it is at home within its musical surroundings.  Indeed, this section primes our 
expectations as to how the subsequent musical line will progress (i.e., it establishes norms of 
continuation).33  As a result, we quickly overcome the initial shock of Till’s first theme, become 
comfortable with it, and are able to follow along easily with the subsequent musical progression.  
This experience is reflected in the representation of the story.  Like us (Strauss’ audience), Till’s 
audience is initially shocked by his subversive behavior, but quickly ends up joining in on his 
merriment.  This passage, by representing an event that the program leaves unstated, enhances 
our understanding of the story by making us aware of an important aspect of Till’s character: that 
his roguish personality is infectious—he was a folk hero, after all.   
While this passage comes to make sense musically without any help from the program, 
and actually ends up adding to our understanding of the story it suggests, the work contains other 
moments that make little musical sense in the absence of their programmatic goals.  Take the 
trial and execution.  The music is not completely incoherent, but our sense that this section 
coheres from moment to moment and fits within the overall musical progression strongly 
depends upon our knowledge of the program.  The work presents a musical puzzle that is solved 
by the program: the music proceeds and fits together in this peculiar way because it mirrors the 
final act of Till’s story.   
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This discussion of Till Eulenspiegel reveals that works of program music can contain 
passages (e.g., the Exposition) in which the music enhances our understanding of the story by 
rendering how the events the program refers to and implies unfold.  It also shows that program 
works can contain passages (e.g., the Coda) in which our knowledge of the program supplements 
our understanding of the music.  These two sorts of cases demonstrate that musical success and 
representational success can be mutually dependent.  The second case further demonstrates how 
musical success can positively affect representational accuracy by compelling us to seek extra-
musical analogues for finer-grained musical structures whose relationships to the story are not 
explicitly indicated by the program.  Accuracy and success will not always directly correspond, 
however; they will often be inversely related.   
To illustrate how representational accuracy can come apart from the two types of success, 
compare the birdsongs in Beethoven’s Pastoral Symphony with those written for piano by 
Messiaen, both of which I have previously discussed.  Beethoven’s birdsongs are highly 
inaccurate, especially that of the nightingale, but they nevertheless effectively convey the 
presence of birds to us, which flesh out the scene at the brook (Szene am Bach).  The brook is 
itself represented by a string motif that reflects the structure of water by making use of an 
extended series of “flowing” sixteenth notes, which gives rise to an audible resemblance that is 
likely only recognizable as such with the program’s help.  Messiaen’s birdsongs are significantly 
more accurate, since they were meticulously transcribed pitch-for-pitch (for the right hand) from 
slowed-down recordings of actual birdsongs.  Some reductions and distortions were unavoidable, 
however, as “piano and pianist together [are] unable to render faithfully the speed, high registers 
and microtonal intervals of much birdsong.”34  Messiaen additionally transcribed harmonies (for 
the left hand) in several of these works that imitate the background noises heard in the recordings 
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in order to situate his birds within their natural environments: a stream, river, meadow, sea, and 
so on.   
Beethoven and Messiaen’s representations of birds rely predominantly on auditory 
imitation.  As I have explained previously, we are able to infer the subject of a musical imitation 
because in ordinary experience we have coupled the original sound and its source in thought 
such that the sound implies (or gestures to) its source—i.e., upon perceiving the sound we are 
unthinkingly made aware of the object that typically makes it.  This ability is preserved in our 
experience of the music, as we connect the musical imitation with the extra-musical analogue 
referred to or implied by the program.  That is, the imitation indicates the presence of the object 
that is its source, which we supply in our musical experience to fill out our representational 
understanding of the work.  It would seem to follow from this that the more accurate the 
imitation, the more easily the music will convey its subject to us.  But despite their high degree 
of precision, Messiaen’s works are arguably less successful at making us aware of the birds they 
depict than Beethoven is in the Pastoral Symphony.   
In order to represent the birdsongs as accurately as he does, Messiaen abandons 
traditional tonality and rhythmic modes, since they do not exist in nature.35  Consequently, his 
works are more difficult for us to understand musically than Beethoven’s Pastoral is because 
they do not adhere to the norms of symphonic form and counterpoint with which we are familiar.  
And although Messiaen’s works thrive on repetition, stemming from the fact that they copy 
actual birdsongs, their overall structures feel arbitrary to ears attuned to traditional classical 
music.  It is very difficult to parse melodies, phrases, and other higher-order individuals in 
Messiaen’s works, and so our expectations of what will happen from moment to moment are 
almost entirely defeated (as we are not familiar with norms of continuation for works of this 
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sort).  As a result, Messiaen’s bird works convey their subjects to us less readily than 
Beethoven’s birdsongs do.  We infer the birds from Beethoven’s less accurately rendered 
birdsongs more easily than from Messiaen’s exceedingly more precise renderings. 
It is important to recognize that Beethoven could not have rendered highly accurate 
imitations of the nightingale, quail, and cuckoo calls.  As Cummins notes, “it is the fact that 
different representational schemes often differ in what structures they can represent that makes 
them differentially useful and, to some extent, incommensurable in content.”36  Beethoven’s 
representational scheme utilizes the conventions of classical music, which possess a set of quasi-
rules that (mainly) pertain to the production and organization of melodies, harmonies, and 
rhythms.  It was these “rules” that Messiaen had to break in order for his birdsongs to have the 
high degree of accuracy that Beethoven, bound by them, cannot match.  But what Beethoven’s 
work lacks in accuracy it more than makes up for in greater effectiveness, since the Pastoral 
succeeds both representationally and musically, while Messiaen’s works struggle on both counts.  
It is more difficult to grasp the representational content of Messiaen’s works because it is more 
difficult to understand them musically, while it is because the Pastoral is easier to understand 
musically that we can more readily recover its representational content.  And while we enjoy the 
Pastoral Symphony as a work of profound genius, Messiaen’s works are enjoyed mainly as 
musical curiosities.   
Beethoven’s birdsongs also possess a much greater economy than Messiaen’s do, both 
musically and in terms of composition practices.  Where Messiaen’s method consumed vast 
amounts of time and mental energy, resulting in a set of complex and challenging musical works, 
Beethoven is able to communicate his birds to us with merely a few slight gestures.  This relates 
to the second half of Cummins’ statement, regarding the differential usefulness of competing 
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representational schemes.  Messiaen developed his scheme, an extension of his style, precisely to 
render highly accurate approximations of natural phenomena: to mirror natural structures in 
musical ones.  Messiaen’s scheme was useful to him only insofar as it was able to do this.  But 
achieving a high degree of representational accuracy was not Beethoven’s concern.  To speak 
loosely, while Messiaen was a “musical ornithologist” (in addition to being an actual one), 
Beethoven was a “tone-painter” or “tone-poet,” and an impressionist at that.  Beethoven wished 
to give us impressions of the scenes his work represents.  The scenes were meant to depict the 
experiences of some unnamed subject (most likely the composer himself), using the music to 
present aural, visual, poetical, and emotional responses to certain natural and social scenes.  The 
structural resemblances here are much weaker than those found in, e.g., Till Eulenspiegel, but 
they are enough for the emotions expressed by the music to function representationally.  Since 
expression was of primary importance, the conventions of classical music were exceedingly 
useful for Beethoven’s representational concerns, as he had simply to employ and refine already 
existing ‘rules’ rather than create new ones.   
Regarding these “rules,” I agree with Scruton that they are not “prescriptions but 
generalizations from the history of style.”37  That is, they are general guidelines for composing 
music that “sounds correct,” “feels right,” or “makes sense” to listeners entrenched within or 
familiar with that history.  These “rules” possess a good amount of leeway, without which, e.g., 
Strauss would have had difficulty effectively representing Till’s misadventures.  But at a certain 
imprecise point, the threshold is reached where classical music is no longer produced, and that of 
some new style is.  This is borne out by the history of Western music.  Composers have 
progressively built upon the achievements of their predecessors, which eventually led to the 
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clean break from the classical tradition in the early twentieth-century referred to earlier.38  The 
styles subsequently produced can only be understood as a response to this tradition. 
Messiaen was a successor to this break.  His primary interests were color and symmetry, 
as opposed to the classical tradition’s concern with unity, tension and release, and so on, and in 
order to produce them he had to create his own techniques of melodic, harmonic, and rhythmic 
organization.  Because of his style’s newness, which is governed by standards of correctness 
different from those of classical music, the representational scheme Messiaen utilizes to 
represent the birdsongs is one with which most of us lack familiarity: the basic elements are the 
same—notes, chords, motifs, etc.—but their organization and relationships are completely 
different.  As a result, we consider Messiaen’s works to be less successful than (most of) those in 
the classical tradition, both musically and representationally.  But they will likely become more 
successful for us as we become more familiar with his style.   
Familiarity, at least with music, breeds greater understanding rather than contempt.  With 
sophisticated works of program music, familiarity leads to recognition of higher degrees of 
accuracy (of the finer details) and to greater success, which gives way to a greater 
representational understanding.  The more comfortable we are with a given style or genre, the 
more easily program works within that style or genre should convey their subjects to us.  And as 
we become better acquainted with a particular work—through rehearing it, analyzing its score, 
reading other analyses and interpretations, or conversing with other listeners—we discover the 
increasingly fine-grained structures that come to comprise its representational content.   As a 
result, we open ourselves to a more rewarding aesthetic experience, a more richly rendered 
representation, and a more vivid impression of the subject from the music.  
 
 154 
CHAPTER 5 
 
FURTHER REFLECTIONS AND FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS 
 
 
 
 In the preceding chapters I presented a theory of musical representation that, unlike many 
theories of representation since the 1960s, is not modeled on conventional linguistic 
communication.  Linguistic or language-like communication has a role in musical representation, 
but only as a result of how it functions within overarching resemblances between (parts of) the 
work of program music, w, and (parts of) its subject, s.  On my theory, a large-scale 
correspondence (or resemblance) between the compositional structure of w and the narrative 
structure of s, which is provided (implicitly or explicitly) by the accompanying programmatic 
aids, is filled in as a result of more local, finer-grained musical phenomena within w targeting—
by either resembling or referring to—the objects, events, or states of affairs comprising s, as w 
unfolds in real time.  Perceiving and understanding such dynamic, hierarchical systems of 
resemblances and references is no simple task.  As such, sophisticated works of program music 
are quite demanding of their listeners, and all bear repeated auditions.  In the previous chapter, I 
discussed the importance of rehearing program works (often dozens of times) to our recognizing 
integral features of both the maximally large-scale correspondence scheme between w and s and 
the smaller-scale aspects of s that w targets.   
 
1. Further Reflections 
 
In Chapter 4, I also noted the interplay in our experience of w (as a representation of s) 
between the music and the program, and how, while the program usually prompts our initial 
recognition of the relationship between w and s, it is the music that does most of the 
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representational work.  I used Strauss’ Till Eulenspiegel to illustrate how aspects of the music 
that, viewed purely from the formal musicological perspective, comprise units of individual 
musical significance (themes, modulations, recapitulations, etc.) were mirrored directly in those 
aspects of the music that comprise units of individual representational significance (characters, 
events, etc.).  In other words, in our experience of the tone poem there is not a mismatch between 
our formal and representational understandings—i.e., in perceiving and understanding the 
unfolding narrative by following along with the unfolding musical fabric, we focused our 
attention upon the very same aspects upon which one listening to the piece as a purely formal 
structural would focus their attention.  This was how I responded to the assimilation bias 
argument, which was introduced in Chapter 2 as the skeptics’ strongest argument against the 
very possibility of musical representation.  It stated, recall, that the accompanying programmatic 
aids, rather than the music, does most of the work for w to represent s.  While the programmatic 
aids prompt and guide our perception and understanding of w as a representation of s as w 
unfolds in real time, it is the music that does the representing and it does so by making use of the 
six techniques that were the focus of Chapter 3.  
The other main argument advanced by the skeptics against the possibility of musical 
representation was the confirmation bias argument.  This argument claimed that any work of 
music could be provided with any program and we could construct a number of sufficiently 
reasonable correspondence schemes between the music and the suggested narrative to perceive 
and understand the music as a representation of its ostensible subject because there will be 
numerous antecedent resemblances of various sorts from which we could selectively produce 
these schemes.  I responded to this problem, recall, by arguing that only programmatic aids 
provided by composers are relevant to the discussion.  That Beethoven’s publisher gave many of 
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his works evocative titles should have little bearing on how we perceive understand his works, 
musically or representationally.  Only programmatic aids provided by Beethoven himself, such 
as the section titles of his Sixth Symphony, should be used (initially) to prime our expectations 
as to how the music will represent the various scenes referred to therein, which will be based 
largely upon norms and conventions that we have internalized as tacit listening dispositions from 
our previous experiences with other works of program music within the Western “classical” 
repertory, and (subsequently) to guide and shape our experience of the music as it unfolds in real 
time.  To make use of any other extra-musical aids is to fail to listen to Beethoven’s music as he 
intended it to be experienced.   
This prescriptive legislation upon our listening practices is consistent with one of the 
central underlying motivations for my theory: my desire to defend composers of program music 
(firstly) from those who believe their intentions should not figure whatsoever into to how we 
understand their works, e.g., nominalists (such as Goodman) and most post-modern theorists, 
and (secondly) from those who claim that composers’ intentions to represent things with their 
works can never be met by music, i.e., the skeptics.  The skeptical position implies, though few 
skeptics ever come right out and say it, that Beethoven, Bach, Haydn, Liszt, Wagner, and their 
musical peers, did not understand what they were doing when they wrote either works of 
instrumental program music or works of music with programmatic elements (e.g., oratorios, 
operas, etc.), such as Bach’s Matthäus-Passion or Haydn’s Die Schöpfung.  The skeptics usually 
try to soften this implication by suggesting that the reason composers associate their works with 
programs is to draw their listeners’ attention to the expressive elements of their works, offering 
the fact that the main goal of most Western classical music is the expression of emotions in 
support of this suggestion.  The number and variety of techniques that have been developed and 
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refined by composers since the sixteenth century, which were introduced in Chapter 2 and 
analyzed in Chapter 3, among which only one utilizes music’s expressive abilities, count 
strongly against this misinterpretation of composer intentions.  
This leads to a simple but deeply important question that I have yet to address explicitly: 
Why program music?  That is, why did composers from the Renaissance to the Classical periods 
write pieces with intentional representational content and why did this peripheral and seemingly 
parasitic aspect of the musical art not only continue, but actually flourish, in the age of 
Romanticism, during which it received its greatest challenge?  This is a question of artistic 
motivation.  Romantic skeptic Eduard Hanslick voiced a version of the opinion discussed 
above—that composers associate their works with particular extra-musical subjects (mainly) in 
order to secure desired emotional responses from their listeners.   
For Hanslick, musical forms are too ambiguous to express particular emotions, let alone 
represent anything.  Thus, composers give their works programs to disambiguate the emotions 
they intended to their audience to feel.  By explicitly attaching his tenth symphonic poem to 
Shakespeare’s Hamlet, e.g., Lizst was manipulating his audience by giving them concrete targets 
upon which to fix their emotions—the ambiguous emotion induced by a given moment in the 
work is transformed by the program into “Hamlet’s melancholy,” and consequently the audience 
knows how to respond emotionally to the music.  In short, the program is meant to produce a 
sympathetic response from the audience.   
The presence of a program indicated to Hanslick that the music must be deficient, since it 
was incapable of achieving the composer’s goal by itself.  For Hanslick, therefore, the program is 
merely a crutch used by second-rate composers to elicit powerful emotional experiences from 
their listeners.  Liszt was the main target of Hanslick’s ire, largely due to the fact that Liszt’s 
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symphonic poems were examples of pieces of music straying from the traditions that Hanslick 
and his conservative allies so deeply venerated.  Liszt’s Hamlet, for instance, involves the 
deformation of normative sonata-form characteristics,1 as does Strauss’ Till Eulenspiegel, which 
(recall) should be classified as a sonata-rondo deformation.  In both examples, the deformation of 
traditional musical forms can be accounted for largely by their composers’ representational 
intentions.      
Scruton has something very similar in mind when he says of program works, “the 
composer is apt to depend on a specific literary reference [suggested by the program] in order to 
secure the hearer’s complicity in what is better described as an imaginative endeavor than as an 
inevitable perception.”2  For Scruton, just as it was for Hanslick, the lack of inevitability calls 
into question music’s status as a medium capable of representation.  But it is precisely by 
prompting the sort of imaginings it does from listeners that musical representation operates and, 
moreover, acquires its aesthetic value.  Works of program music demand a level of attention and 
musical sophistication from their audience to reveal their subjects (and the targets that comprise 
them) in a way that uncontroversial pictorial representations, which anyone can pass by in a 
gallery and pick out the intended subject with little more than a glance before quickly moving on 
to the next painting, do not.3   
An implication of the skeptical position shared by Scruton and Davies (and perhaps also 
by Hanslick) seems to be that the amount of effort a listener has to put in to a work of program 
music just to make the subject manifest is too much for what little rewards they get out of it—a 
greater appreciation of a deficient piece of music.  But I believe the analysis of Till Eulenspiegel 
in the previous chapter, as well as the briefer analyses of the other works of program music 
throughout the preceding chapters, indicate that this is simply false.  These works delight any 
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listener not deafened by prior philosophical commitments in the ways they render in sound the 
patterns of everyday life (e.g., Beethoven’s Pastoral, Strauss’ Symphonia Domestica, or Villa-
Lobos’ O tremzinho do caipira), the fantastic (Berlioz’ Symphonie fantastique, Mussorgy’s 
Night on Bald Mountain and Rimsky-Korsakov’s more famous orchestration of it, or Saint-Saëns 
Danse macabre), the comic (Till Eulenspiegel), and the tragic (Beethoven’s Ouvertüre 
Coriolan).   
The moments of imitation, property sharing, and expression couched within the global 
correspondence scheme in all of the above examples, as well as the instances of allusion to other 
musical works and the use of exotic instruments toward programmatic ends, make for non-
arbitrary resemblances between works and subjects.  They imbue the music with dramatic effect, 
human meaning, and other important aesthetic qualities that are well worth the listener’s time 
and effort.  Just as most uncontroversial pictorial representations deserve more than a mere 
passing glance, most works of program music deserve more attention—both by music-lovers and 
that subset of music-lovers who deny their representational import.  
 
2. Future Considerations 
 All of the qualities mentioned above (imitation, allusion, etc.), which can be produced by 
the representational techniques analyzed in Chapter 3, can also be found in works of music that 
have no specific (or explicitly intentional) programmatic goals.  Therefore, my work in the 
preceding chapters regarding how we perceive, understand, and evaluate works of program 
music should be largely applicable to a fuller examination of how we experience works of 
absolute music.  In other words, representational listening of the kind I have advocated may 
suggest a model for understanding purely musical listening—with regard to, e.g., how we parse 
the boundaries of musical individuals and synthesize their hierarchical organization as a piece of 
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absolute music unfolds in real time.  Chapter 4 laid the groundwork for such an exploration, 
which I believe deserves to be taken further.  
A related topic that deserves further exploration pertains to the relationship between 
representation and expression in Western art music.  Since expressiveness is what connects 
program music so deeply to absolute music, I believe the analysis of our experience of works of 
absolute music just mentioned, the one to be modeled on my account of representational 
listening, will mainly concentrate on the expression of emotions.  This is because in 
programmatic works for which expression is central to representational success, it is often 
difficult to separate expressive content from representational content.  Such a strong connection 
between representation and expression does not seem to be as present in other artistic media, 
including painting.  For instance, in El Greco’s Repentance of Peter, we first see a man standing 
in a particular pose—his hands are clasped and his eyes are cast upward.  The expression of 
grief, however, is quite ambiguous and our ability to perceive it seems largely due to the work’s 
title.  But in Bach’s musical rendering of the same scene in his “Erbarme Dich” aria from the 
Matthäus-Passion, Peter is his grief.  That is, Bach uses the deep grief and melancholy expressed 
by the music to represent Peter.   
This is purely speculative, but the above may indicate that music is (perhaps) more able 
to capture the phenomenology of perceiving another human described (correctly, in my opinion) 
by Sartre in Being and Nothingness.  According to Sartre, e.g., we see the anger before we see 
the wild eyes, flushed cheeks, flared nostrils, and trembling fists of the angry person.4  Likewise, 
in “Erbarme Dich,” we perceive the grief before we recognize the particular musical forms of the 
solo violin and accompanying lower strings that underpin its successful expression and through 
which a finer-grained representation of Peter’s actions is achieved.  For instance, an 
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appoggiatura at one moment audibly imitates a sigh.  More fundamentally, though, Peter’s grief 
involves the vacillation from his sorrow at a lost object, his beloved Christ, and his striving for a 
new relationship with God, which is reflected in the violin solo’s conflict of impulses in inflected 
gestures of rising and falling thirds.5  This is dissimilar from El Greco’s painting, wherein we see 
the position of Peter’s (or, rather, an older man’s) body and the look on his face, and then, with 
the help of extra-pictorial aids, perceive his grief.  If this brief analysis is correct, music, contrary 
to the skeptics, may actually be able to represent human subjects to us better than painting can by 
more readily approximating our actual experience of human life. 
The final topic deserving further exploration is unrelated to the previous two.  It pertains 
to the relationships between various versions of the same piece of program music—e.g., 
Mussorgsky’s original versions of Pictures at an Exhibition and Night on Bald Mountain for 
piano and the orchestrations subsequently arranged by Ravel and Rimsky-Korsakov, 
respectively.  Among the orchestrators’ main motives was a desire to enhance the programmatic 
aspects of these two piano works to make their representational content more easily perceivable 
and understood by listeners.  As such, it would be worthwhile to examine in depth the 
representational techniques utilized by the orchestrators to achieve their goal.  Timbral 
similarities to the sources of the imitated sounds targeted by the music, which would be 
impossible for a piano to reproduce, is readily apparent in the orchestral versions, including, e.g., 
the use of church bells in “The Great Gate of Kiev,” the last scene in Pictures at an Exhibition.  
But what other techniques did Ravel and Rimsky-Korsakov employ?  Does a full orchestra more 
effectively express the emotions Mussorgsky intended the piano to express?  Does a wider range 
of instruments allow for allusions to other pieces of music, parts of which expanded upon the 
piano versions’ representational content?   
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Moreover, it would be worthwhile to look at multiple arrangements of the same program 
work to see what programmatic and other aspects they highlight.  For instance, there are dozens 
of different arrangements of Pictures at an Exhibition, both for full orchestra as well as for other 
instrumental groups, including a progressive rock version by Emerson, Lake & Palmer.  It would 
certainly be worth comparing Leopold Stokowski’s darker and more restrained orchestration, 
which he felt to be a more authentically Russian arrangement of the original, with Ravel’s 
livelier and more dynamic version, which Stokowski dismissed as “too French.”6 
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what, e.g., Britten does by quoting Mahler’s Second Symphony in “Storm,” exploiting its proto-
representational features by giving them a specific subject.  
These features will overlap to a large degree with proto-expressive features, i.e., those 
musical properties, structures, and relations that could be exploited by any composer to express 
certain emotions.  How they are utilized and arranged will determine whether they are (a) merely 
expressive; (b) expressive of emotions similar to those expressed by a work’s subject, and thus 
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vitally felt.  Such is the pattern, or logical form of sentience; and the pattern of 
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Music is a tonal analogue of emotive life.  (1953, 27) 
 
Langer believes that such properties, structures, and relations can be exploited by composers to 
achieve specific representational ends, but that they are used to their fullest potential in the 
purely musical expressions of works of absolute music, since, like so many philosophers of 
music (Kivy included), she believes that program music (qua music) is inferior.   
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67 Scruton 1999, 78 ff. 
68 One might claim that this signifies Walton’s failed attempt to force music into his theory of 
pictorial representation, and thus take it as offering a reductio of his entire theory.  I make no 
such claims here, though I recognize their force.   
 169 
 
69 Using Hofstadter’s terminology, which he borrowed from computer science, we take a 
chunked view of the work’s representational content (1999, 285-288). 
 
CHAPTER 2     
1 Eggar 1929, 46. 
2 Carter 2007. 
3 See Campbell 2000, 57. 
4 See Kivy 1984 (ch. 4). 
5 Davies (1994, 93) compares this to a famous actor making a cameo appearance in a film as 
himself, thereby representing himself. 
6 Walker 1989, 309. 
7 Ibid. 358.   
8 Ibid. 
9 See Grey 2000. 
10 It is important to recognize that this debate occurred during a time in which ranking the arts in 
order of importance was not only considered an intellectually worthwhile pursuit, but one of 
utmost aesthetic and philosophical importance.  In the third Critique, Kant ranks music as lowest 
among the fine arts (Ak. 329).  But within a few short decades, music ascended meteorically to 
the top of the ranking, thanks mainly to the intellectual class taking Schopenhauer’s ideas 
seriously.    
11 Walker 1989, 338. 
12 Hanslick 1885, 44 
13 Ibid. 80. 
 170 
 
14 Scruton 1999 (ch. 5), which is an updated version of Scruton 1976. 
15 Davies 1993 and 1994. 
16 Note that the Gricean model of non-natural meaning that Scruton adopts does not entail a 
commitment to the linguistic bias, since, for Grice, linguistic meaning is a special case of 
“signaling,” e.g., flashing one’s headlights to indicate to an on-coming driver that she has left her 
brights on, a mode of communication that is not necessarily linguistic.  However, as I think is 
made clear in the subsequent section, Scruton models the meanings of representations on the 
meanings of sentential utterances.  Thus, while Grice does not necessarily maintain the linguistic 
bias in semantics, Scruton does. 
17 Scruton 1976, 273-274. 
18 Wollheim 1980 (essay 5). 
19 Scruton 1976, 274. 
20 Grice 1957, 383-384. 
21 See Grice 1968, 150-151.  See also Grice 1969. 
22 Scruton 1976, 274-275. 
23 Davies 1994, 88. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Scruton 1999, 124. 
26 Scruton 1976, 276. 
27 Kivy 1984, 157-158. 
28 Davies 1994, 88. 
29 Ibid. 
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30 Ibid. 88-89.  Here, Davies directly appeals to Davidson 1978.  That Davies nevertheless 
maintains that pictures do “describe” the things they represent, despite challenging Scruton’s 
account of the meanings of representations, further demonstrates just how deeply the linguistic 
bias is entrenched within the philosophy of art—in addition to being very naïve.  Just because we 
can describe a pictorial representation of a man in innumerable ways, by saying, e.g., “The man 
is tall,” in no way implies that the picture tells us, “The man is tall,” etc., or even that the artist 
intended that we should view the picture in these ways. 
31 Davies 1994, 89. 
32 Scruton 1999, 3; Strawson 1959 (ch. 2). 
33 Scruton recognizes that sounds are not the perceptible qualities of concrete objects in the way 
that colors are because objects emit them (1999, 2).  Instead, sounds are the phenomenal qualities 
of physical air vibrations.  Because they exist independently of the concrete objects that emit 
them, sounds are themselves objects of our perception.  While spatial location is an essential 
feature of the air vibrations on which sounds supervene, this is not true of sounds as phenomenal 
objects.  Their only essential features are frequency, amplitude, and quality.   
34 Strawson 1959, 67. 
35 Scruton 1999, 15.  
36 Ibid. 79. 
37 Geach 1967, 628. 
38 Ibid. 627. 
39 Scruton 1999, 116. 
40 Ibid. 72. 
41 Ibid. 109-110. 
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42 N.B. This is just an adaptation of the multiple-realizability argument against reductionism in 
the philosophy of mind. 
43 Ibid. 79. 
44 Ibid. 2-3. 
45 Sound, of course, could exist independent of any specific instrument without existing 
independent of every instrument.  This obvious objection to Scruton’s position is not one that he 
even considers, rendering his position significantly less tenable. 
46 Ibid. 79. 
47 Ibid. 80. 
48 Ibid. 92. 
49 Note that we have little reason to accept Scruton’s assertion that metaphors can be eliminated 
from our scientific descriptions of nature.  Over the last thirty or so years, philosophers of 
science seem to have reached a broad consensus that, while metaphors are certainly eliminated 
from the mathematical formulae used to describe or model the natural world, many are 
ineliminable from how scientists talk about the natural world.  For a helpful discussion, see 
Rothbart 1984. 
50 Ibid. 93. 
51 See Wollhiem 1980, 212-213, and 1987, 46. 
52 Davies 1994, 89. 
53 Ibid. 53-58. 
54 In contrast, Wollhiem, the originator of the seeing-in theory of artistic representation, 
considers the artist’s intention to represent as a sufficient, rather than a necessary, condition of 
representation (1993,165). 
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55 Scruton 1976, 274.  Of course, Scruton includes conditions (4) and (5), which are no longer 
under consideration. 
56 Davies 1994, 277. 
57 Scruton 1999, 120. 
58 Ibid. 125. 
59 Ibid. 126. 
60 Davies 1994, 94. 
61 Kivy 2002, 187. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Davies 1994, 94-95. 
64 Scruton 1999, 132. 
65 Davies 1994, 96. 
66 See Frege 1956. 
67 Scruton 1999, 88-89. 
68 Ibid. 91. 
69 A much fuller analysis of this piece will be provided in Chapter 4. 
70 Scruton 1976, 277. 
71 Kivy 1984, 28. 
72 Scruton 1976, 279. 
73 Scruton 1999, 131. 
74 Scruton 1976, 280. 
75 Davies 1993, 20. 
76 Ibid. 20-21. 
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77 Goodman 1978 (ch. 2). 
78 I have taken this point from Richard Taruskin 1985, 356. 
79 Davies 1993, 20. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid. 
82 However, it seems to be perfectly acceptable on Walton’s make-believe theory (see especially 
1988, 51). 
83 Davies 1994, 85. 
 
CHAPTER 3     
1 For work on the subject of “downward causation,” see, e.g., Campbell 1974, who coined the 
term; Bitbol (forthcoming); Kim 1999 and 2006; and O’Connor 1994. 
2 Leonard B. Meyer’s entire account of music, some of which will be featured in Chapter 4, 
depends on both downward and upward causation.  On Meyer’s account, see Narmour 1991.  
3 Scruton 1998, 106. 
4 Ibid. 106-108. 
5 The second example is Gombrich’s.  Of the importance of perceptual constancy, he writes, 
“Without this faculty of man and beast alike to recognize identities across the variations and 
difference, to make allowance for changed conditions, and to preserve the framework of a stable 
world, art could not exist” (2000, 52). 
6 Gombrich 2000, 50-52. 
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7 Scruton (1998, 74-75) makes use of this example.  Surrealist René Magritte’s 1933 and 1935 
works, La condition humaine, employ the paintings within paintings convention to arguably 
more philosophical ends.  
8 Kivy 1984, 76. 
9 Ibid. 68. 
10 See Collier and Hubbard (2004). 
11 Cummins (1996, 96-97) rightly urges that we resist theories of this sort. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 70. 
14 Hayward 1985, 406. 
15 Kivy (1984, 133) grants this fact. 
16 Ibid. 138. 
17 Ibid. 139.  
18 See Grey 2000. 
19 Cumming 1997, 21 
20 Ibid. 17. 
21 Ibid. 36. 
22 Ibid. 18. 
23 Ibid. 21. 
24 Ibid. 37. 
25 Cumming describes the violin’s distinctive expressive content as follows. 
The aspect of striving enters the phrase with its opening notes.  A rising minor 
sixth moving from an anacrusis into each of the first two bars creates the 
unmistakable impetus of gesture […].  This leap has been predicted, with its 
compensatory fall, in the contours of Peter's denial and the evangelist's 
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response.  ‘Imploring’ and ‘melancholy’ qualities are accorded by Kirnberger 
to the rising minor sixth (1773/1979, p. 373), and are reflected here in an active 
striving that leaps beyond the point of tonal rest (in moving to the third degree) 
and so contains the impetus for a return that suggests some ‘disappointment’.  
The opening leap is not, however, unelaborated, and in the two-note figuration 
of its grace notes lies the beginning of a figure that will return in each of the 
following three bars […].  This figure of rising and falling thirds is a basic 
gestural unit, embodying a moment of striving toward a goal and of receding 
from it, almost too soon.  The differing placement of this gesture in relation to 
the voice-leading and rhythm of each bar yields a shifting of affective content 
between them. (Cumming 1997, 24) 
 
26 These famously include his Catalogue d’oiseaux and La Fauvette des jardins. 
27 Inoue 1996. 
28 Serotsky. 
29 Kivy 1984, 52. 
30 Ibid. 
31 My interpretation was aided by Comer 2001. 
32 Sullivan 1998. 
33 The association has been exploited more recently in the Charlie Daniel’s Band’s 1979 
crossover pop hit, “The Devil Went Down to Georgia.” 
 
CHAPTER 4     
1 See Levinson 1997; Cook 1987 and 1990; Scruton 1999. 
2 Levinson 1997, 15-16. 
3 Ibid. 100-101. 
4 Cook 1990, 174. 
5 Levinson 1997, 18, 29. 
6 See Davies 1983 and 1994; Kivy 1986, 1990, and 2001; Meyer 1956 and 1967. 
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7 Cook 1990, 152-160; Levinson 1997, 72-73; Scruton 1999, 214. 
8 See Davies 1994, 341.  The appeal to Strawson to explain the architectonicists’ position is 
mine; no practicing architectonicist, to my knowledge, does so. 
9 Ferguson, 1954, 566. 
10 See Scruton 1999, 376. 
11 Cook 1990, 154-158; Levinson 1997, x; Scruton 1999, 212. 
12 Davies 1994, 338-339; Kivy 1984 and 1990, 105-108. 
13 Hepokoski 2006.  Schmid (2003, 126) notes that the work also combines elements of 
variations form. 
14 See Meyer 1967,  
15 Hepokoski 2006, 19. 
16 Ibid. 19. 
17 Ibid. 24. 
18 See Mason 1916, 183. 
19 Hepokoski 2006, 25. 
20 Mason 1919, 176. 
21 This is sheer speculation, but with this episode Strauss, an adherent of the rabidly progressive 
Wagner, may be suggesting that Schumann’s League of David (his name for the Leipzig 
conservatives) in the last piece of his Carnaval, here represented by the stuffy, set-in-their-ways 
professors, are really the Philistines.  Till, on this reading, stands in for Strauss himself. 
22 Hepokoski 2006, 28. 
23 See McNaught 1937, 790. 
24 Hepokoski 2006, 37. 
 178 
 
25 Meyer 1967, 46. 
26 Ibid. 48. 
27 Ibid. 9-11. 
28 Goodman 1976, 229-230. 
29 Scruton 1999, 137-138. 
30 See Norris 2000. 
31 Cummins 1996, 27. 
32 See Cummins 1996, 18. 
33 This is related to a common technique in improvisation.  When the performer hits a wrong 
note, one that the audience perceives as ‘sour’, she should simply repeat the line.  By doing so, 
the audience comes to perceive or understand the note not as a mistake, but as simply a sensible 
continuation of what precedes it. 
34 Nichols 1994, 9. 
35 Ibid. 8. 
36 Cummins 1996, 109. 
37 Scruton 1999, 334. 
38 Ibid. 234. 
 
CHAPTER 5     
1 See Moortele 2006. 
2 Scruton 1976, 277. 
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3 Note that by this comment I do not mean to degrade uncontroversial pictorial representations, 
but merely the view the amount effort needed to perceive a work’s subject necessarily counts as 
a negative against that work’s status as a representation and aesthetic merit. 
4 Sartre 1984, 454-455. 
5 These and other underlying musical forms are explained quite thoroughly in Cumming 1997, 
22 ff. 
6 See Russ 1992, 84. 
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